Author Archives: Edward A. Studzinski

About Edward A. Studzinski

Ed Studzinski has more than 30 years of institutional investment experience. He was a partner at Harris Associates in Chicago, Illinois. Harris is known for its value-oriented, bottom-up investment approach that frames the investment process as owning a piece of the business relative to the business value of the whole, ideally forever. At Harris, Ed was co-manager of the Oakmark Equity & Income Fund (OAKBX). During the nearly twelve years that he was in that role, the fund in 2006 won the Lipper Award in the balanced category for "Best Fund Over Five Years." Additionally, in 2011 the fund won the Lipper Award in the mixed-asset allocation moderate funds category as "Best Fund Over Ten Years. Concurrently Ed was also an equity research analyst, providing many of the ideas that contributed to the fund’s success. He has specialist knowledge in the defense, property-casualty insurance, and real estate industries, having followed and owned companies as diverse as Catellus Development, General Dynamics, Legacy Hotels, L-3, PartnerRe, Progressive Insurance, Renaissance Reinsurance, Rockwell Collins, SAFECO, St. Joe Corporation, Teledyne, and Textron. Before joining Harris Associates, over a period of more than 10 years, Ed was the Chief Investment Officer at the Mercantile National Bank of Indiana, and also served on their Executive and Asset-Liability Committees. Prior to Mercantile, Ed practiced law. A native of Peabody, Massachusetts, he received his A.B. in history (magna cum laude) from Boston College, where he was a Scholar of the College. He has a J.D. from Duke University and an M.B.A. in marketing and finance, as well as a Professional Accounting Program Certificate, from Northwestern University. Ed has earned the Chartered Financial Analyst credential. Ed belongs to the Investment Analyst Societies of Boston, Chicago, and New York City. He is admitted to the Bar in the District of Columbia, Illinois, and North Carolina.

Skin in the Game, Part Two

By Edward A. Studzinski

The trouble with our times is that the future is not what it used to be.

Paul Valery

Nassim Nicholas Taleb, the author of The Black Swan as well as Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder, has recently been giving a series of interviews in which he argues that current investment industry compensation practices lead to subtle conflicts of interest, that end up inuring to the disadvantage of individual investors. Nowhere is this more apparent than when one looks at the mutual fund complexes that have become asset gatherers rather than investment managers.

By way of full disclosure I have to tell you that I am an admirer of Mr. Taleb’s. I was not always the most popular boy in the classroom as I was always worrying about the need to consider the potential for “Black Swan” or outlier events. Unfortunately all one has to have is one investment massacre like the 2008-2009 period. This gave investors a lost decade of investment returns and a potentially permanent loss of capital if they panicked and liquidated their investments. To have a more in-depth appreciation of the concept and its implications, I commend those of you with the time to a careful study of the data that the Mutual Fund Observer has compiled and begun releasing regularly. You should pay particular attention to a number called the “Maximum Drawdown.” There you will see that as a result of that dark period, looking back five years it is a rarity to find a domestic fund manager who did not lose 35-50% of his or her investors’ money. The same is to be said for global and international fund managers who likewise did not distinguish themselves, losing 50-65% of investors’ capital, assuming the investors panicked and liquidated their investments, and many did.

A number of investment managers that I know are not fans of Mr. Taleb’s work, primarily because he has a habit of bringing attention to inconvenient truths. In Fooled by Randomness, he made the case that given the large number of people who had come into the investment management business in recent years, there were a number who had to have generated good records randomly. They were what he calls “spurious winners.” I would argue that the maximum drawdown numbers referred to above confirm that thesis.

How then to avoid the spurious winner? Taleb argues that the hedge fund industry serves as a model, by truly having managers with “skin in the game.” In his experience a hedge fund manager typically has twenty to fifty times the exposure of his next biggest client. That of necessity makes them both more careful and as well as aware of the consequences if they have underinvested in the necessary talent to remain competitive. Taleb quite definitively states, “You don’t get that with fund managers.”

I suspect the counterargument I am going to hear is that fund managers are now required to disclose, by means of reporting within various ranges, the amount of money they have invested in the fund they are managing. Just go to the Statement of Additional Information, which is usually found on a fund website. And if the SAI shows that the manager has more than $1 million invested in his or her fund, then that is supposed to be a good sign concerning alignment of interests. Like the old Hertz commercial, the real rather than apparent answer is “not exactly.”

The gold standard in this regard has been set by Longleaf Partners with their funds. Their employees are required to limit their publicly offered equity investments to funds advised by Southeastern Asset Management, Longleaf’s advisor, unless granted a compliance exception. Their trustees also must obtain permission before making a publicly offered equity investment. That is rather unique in the fund industry, since what you usually see in the marketing brochures or periodic fund reports is something like “the employees and families of blah-blah have more than $X million invested in our funds.” If you are lucky this may work out to be one percent of assets under management in the firm, hardly hedge-fund like metrics. At the same time, you often find trustees of the fund with de minimis investments.

The comparison becomes worse when you look at a fund with $9 billion in assets and the “normal” one percent investment management fee, which generates $90 million in revenue. The fund manager may tell you that his largest equity investment is in the fund and is more than $1 million. But if his annual compensation runs somewhere between $1million and $10 million, and this is Taleb’s strongest point, the fund manager does not have a true disincentive for losing money. The situation becomes even more blurred where compliance policy allows investment in ETF’s or open-ended mutual funds, which in today’s world will often allow a fund manager to construct his own personal market neutral or hedged portfolio, to offset his investment in the fund he is managing.

Is there a solution? Yes, a fairly easy one – adopt as an industry standard through government regulation the requirement that all employees in the investment firm are required to limit their publicly offered equity investments to the funds in the complex. To give credit where credit is due, just as we have a Volcker rule, we can call it the “Southeastern Asset Management” rule. If that should prove too restrictive, I would suggest as an alternative that the SEC add another band of investment ranges above the current $1 million limit, at perhaps $5 million. That at least would give a truer picture for the investor, especially given the money flows now gushing into a number of firms, which often make a $1 million investment not material to the fund manager. Such disclosure will do a better job of attuning investment professionals to what should be their real concern – managing risk with a view towards the potential downside, rather than ignoring risk with other people’s money.

Postscript:

What does it say when such well known value managers as Tweedy, Browne and First Pacific Advisors are letting cash positions rise in their portfolios as they sell and don’t replace securities that have reached their target valuations? Probably the same thing as when one of the people I consider to be one of the outstanding money managers of our time, Seth Klarman at Baupost Partners, announces that he will be returning some capital to his partnership investors at year end. Stay tuned.

“Skin in the Game, Part One”

By Edward A. Studzinski

“Virtue has never been as respectable as money.” Mark Twain

One of the more favored sayings of fund managers is that they like to invest with managements with “skin in the game.” This is another instance where the early Buffett (as opposed to the later Buffett) had it right. Managements can and should own stock in their firms. But they should purchase it with their own money. That, like the prospect of hanging as Dr. Johnson said, would truly clarify the mind. In hind sight a major error in judgment was made by investment professionals who bought into the argument that awarding stock options would beneficially serve to align the interests of managements and shareholders. Never mind that the corporate officers should have already understood their fiduciary obligations. What resulted, not in all instances but often enough in the largest capitalization companies, was a class of condottieri such as one saw in Renaissance Italy, heading armies that spent their days marching around avoiding each other, all the while being lavishly paid for the risks they were NOT facing. This sub-set of managers became a new entitled class that achieved great personal wealth, often just by being present and fitting in to the culture. Rather than thinking about truly long-term strategic implications and questions raised in running a business, they acted with a short-duration focus, and an ever-present image of the current share price in the background. Creating sustainable long-term business value rarely entered into the equation, often because they had never seen it practiced.

I understood how much of a Frankenstein’s monster had been created when executive compensation proposals ended up often being the greater part of a proxy filing. A particularly bothersome practice was “reloading” options annually. Over time, with much dilution, these programs transferred significant share ownership to management. You knew you were on to something when these compensation proposals started attracting negative vote recommendations. The calls would initially start with the investor relations person inquiring about the proxy voting process. Once it was obvious that best practices governance indicated a “no” vote, the CFO would call and ask for reconsideration.

How do you determine whether a CEO or CFO actually walks the walk of good capital allocation, which is really what this is all about? One tip-off usually comes from discussions about business strategy and what the company will look like in five to ten years. You will have covered metrics and standards for acquisitions, dividends, debt, share repurchase, and other corporate action. Following that, if the CEO or CFO says, “Why do you think our share price is so low?” I would know I was in the wrong place. My usual response was, “Why do you care if you know what the business value of the company is per share? You wouldn’t sell the company for that price. You aren’t going to liquidate the business. If you did, you know it is worth substantially more than the current share price.” Another “tell” is when you see management taking actions that don’t make sense if building long-term value is the goal. Other hints also raise questions – a CFO leaves “because he wants to enjoy more time with his family.” Selling a position contemporaneously with the departure of a CFO that you respected would usually leave your investors better off than doing nothing. And if you see the CEO or CFO selling stock – “our investment bankers have suggested that I need to diversify my portfolio, since all my wealth is tied up in the company.” That usually should raise red flags that indicate something is going on not obvious to the non-insider.

Are things improving? Options have gone out of favor as a compensation vehicle for executives, increasingly replaced by the use of restricted stock. More investors are aware of the potential conflicts that options awards can create and have a greater appreciation of governance. That said, one simple law or regulation would eliminate many of the potential abuses caused by stock options. “All stock acquired by reason of stock option awards to senior corporate officers as part of their compensation MAY NOT BE SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF UNTIL AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS FROM THE INDIVIDUAL’S LAST DATE OF SERVICE.” Then you might actually see the investors having a better chance of getting their own yachts.

Edward A. Studzinski