Author Archives: David Snowball

About David Snowball

David Snowball, PhD (Massachusetts). Cofounder, lead writer. David is a Professor of Communication Studies at Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois, a nationally-recognized college of the liberal arts and sciences, founded in 1860. For a quarter century, David competed in academic debate and coached college debate teams to over 1500 individual victories and 50 tournament championships. When he retired from that research-intensive endeavor, his interest turned to researching fund investing and fund communication strategies. He served as the closing moderator of Brill’s Mutual Funds Interactive (a Forbes “Best of the Web” site), was the Senior Fund Analyst at FundAlarm and author of over 120 fund profiles.

Beck, Mack & Oliver Partners Fund (BMPEX), September 2013

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

Beck, Mack & Oliver Partners Fund seeks long term capital appreciation consistent with the preservation of capital. It is an all-cap fund that invests primarily in common stock, but has the ability to purchase convertible securities, preferred stocks and a wide variety of fixed-income instruments.  In general, it is a concentrated portfolio of foreign and domestic equities that focuses on finding well-managed businesses with durable competitive advantages in healthy industries and purchasing them when the risk / reward profile is asymmetric to the upside.

Adviser

Beck, Mack & Oliver LLC, founded in 1931. The firm has remained small, with 25 professionals, just seven partners and $4.8 billion under management, and has maintained a multi-generation relationship with many of its clients.  They’re entirely owned by their employees and have a phased, mandatory divestiture for retiring partners: partners retire at 65 and transition 20% of their ownership stake to their younger partners each year.  When they reach 70, they no longer have an economic interest in the firm. That careful, predictable transition makes financial management of the firm easier and, they believe, allows them to attract talent that might otherwise be drawn to the hedge fund world.  The management team is exceptionally stable, which seems to validate their claim.  In addition to the two BM&O funds, the firm maintains 670 “client relationships” with high net worth individuals and families, trusts, tax-exempt institutions and corporations.

Manager

Zachary Wydra.  Mr. Wydra joined Beck, Mack & Oliver in 2005. He has sole responsibility for the day-to-day management of the portfolio.  Prior to joining BM&O, Mr. Wydra served as an analyst at Water Street Capital and as an associate at Graham Partners, a private equity firm. In addition to the fund, he manages the equity sleeve for one annuity and about $750 million in separate accounts.  He has degrees from a bunch of first-rate private universities: Brown, Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania.

Strategy capacity and closure

The strategy can accommodate about $1.5 billion in assets.  The plan is to return capital once assets grow beyond the optimal size and limit investment to existing investors prior to that time.  Mr. Wydra feels strongly that this is a compounding strategy, not an asset aggregation strategy and that ballooning AUM will reduce the probability of generating exceptional investment results.  Between the fund and separate accounts using the strategy, assets were approaching $500 million in August 2013.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Over $1 million.  The fund is, he comments, “a wealth-creation vehicle for me and my family.”

Opening date

December 1, 2009 for the mutual fund but 1991 for the limited partnership.

Minimum investment

$2500, reduced to $2000 for an IRA and $250 for an account established with an automatic investment plan

Expense ratio

1.0%, after waivers on assets of $50.7 million, as of June 2023. 

Comments

One of the most important, most approachable and least read essays on investing is Charles Ellis, The Loser’s Game (1977).  It’s funny and provocative and you should read it in its entirety.  Here’s the two sentence capsule of Ellis’s argument:

In an industry dominated by highly skilled investors all equipped with excellent technology, winners are no longer defined as “the guys who perform acts of brilliance.”  Winners are defined as “the guys who make the fewest stupid, unnecessary, self-defeating mistakes.”

There are very few funds with a greater number or variety of safeguards to protect the manager from himself than Beck, Mack & Oliver Partners.  Among more than a dozen articulated safeguards:

  • The advisor announced early, publicly and repeatedly that the strategy has a limited capacity (approximately $1.5 billion) and that they are willing to begin returning capital to shareholders when size becomes an impediment to exceptional investment performance.
  • A single manager has sole responsibility for the portfolio, which means that the research is all done (in-house) by the most senior professionals and there is no diffusion of responsibility.  The decisions are Mr. Wydra’s and he knows he personally bears the consequences of those decisions.
  • The manager may not buy any stock without the endorsement of the other BM&O partners.  In a unique requirement, a majority of the other partners must buy the stock for their own clients in order for it to be available to the fund.  (“Money, meet mouth.”)
  • The manager will likely never own more than 30 securities in the portfolio and the firm as a whole pursues a single equity discipline.  In a year, the typical turnover will be 3-5 positions.
  • Portfolio position sizes are strictly controlled by the Kelly Criterion (securities with the best risk-reward comprise a larger slice of the portfolio than others) and are regularly adjusted (as a security’s price rises toward fair value, the position is reduced and finally eliminated; capital is redeployed to the most attractive existing positions or a new position).
  • When the market does not provide the opportunity to buy high quality companies at a substantial discount to fair value, the fund holds cash.  The portfolio’s equity exposure has ranged between 70-90%, with most of the rest in cash (though the manager has the option of purchasing some fixed-income securities if they represent compelling values).

Mr. Wydra puts it plainly: “My job is to manage risk.” The fund’s exceedingly deliberate, careful portfolio construction reflects the firm’s long heritage.  As with other ‘old money’ advisors like Tweedy, Browne and Dodge & Cox, Beck, Mack & Oliver’s core business is managing the wealth of those who have already accumulated a fortune.  Those investors wouldn’t tolerate a manager whose reliance on hunches or oversized bets on narrow fields, place their wealth at risk.  They want to grow their wealth over time, are generally intelligent about the need to take prudent risk but unwilling to reach for returns at the price of unmanaged risk.

That discipline has served the firm’s, and the fund’s, investors quite well.  Their investment discipline seeks out areas of risk/reward asymmetries: places where the prospect of permanent loss of capital is minimal and substantial growth of capital is plausible. They’ve demonstrably and consistently found those asymmetries: from inception through the end of June 2013, the fund captured 101% of the market’s upside but endured less than 91% of its downside. To the uninitiated, that might not seem like a huge advantage.  To others, it’s the emblem of a wealth-compounding machine: if you consistently lose a bit less in bad times and keep a little ahead in good, you will in the long term far outpace your rivals.

From inception through the end of June, 2013, the strategy outpaced the S&P 500 by about 60 basis points annually (9.46% to 8.88%).  Since its reorganization as a fund, the advantage has been 190 basis points (15.18% to 13.28%).  It’s outperformed the market in a majority of rolling three-month periods and in a majority of three-month periods when the market declined.

So what about 2013?  Through late August, the fund posted respectable absolute returns (about 10% YTD) but wretched relative ones (it trailed 94% of its peers).  Why so? Three factors contributed.  In a truly defensive move, the manager avoided the “defensive” sectors that were getting madly bid up by anxious investors.  In a contrarian move, he was buying energy stocks, many of which were priced as if their industry was dying.  And about 20% of the fund’s portfolio was in cash.  Should you care?  Only if your investment time horizon is measured in months rather than years.

Bottom Line

Successful investing does not require either a magic wand or a magic formula.  No fund or strategy will win in each year or every market.  The best we can do is to get all of the little things right: don’t overpay for stocks and don’t over-diversify, limit the size of the fund and limit turnover, keep expenses low and keep the management team stable, avoid “hot” investments and avoid unforced errors, remember it isn’t a game and it isn’t a sprint.  Beck, Mack & Oliver gets an exceptional number of the little things very right.  It has served its shareholders very well and deserves close examination.

Fund website

Beck Mack & Oliver Partners

Fact Sheet

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Tributary Balanced (FOBAX), September 2013 update

By David Snowball

THIS IS AN UPDATE OF THE FUND PROFILE ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN April 2012. YOU CAN FIND THAT PROFILE HERE.

Objective and strategy

Tributary Balanced Fund seeks capital appreciation and current income. They allocate assets among the three major asset groups: common stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. Based on their assessment of market conditions, they will invest 25% to 75% of the portfolio in stocks and convertible securities, and at least 25% in bonds. The portfolio is typically 70-75 stocks from small- to mega-cap and turnover is well under half of the category average.  They currently hold about 60 bonds.

Adviser

Tributary Capital Management.  At base, Tributary is a subsidiary of First National Bank of Omaha and the Tributary Funds were originally branded as the bank’s funds.  Tributary advises six mutual funds, as well as serving high net worth individuals and institutions.  As of June 30, 2013, they had about $1.3 billion under management.

Manager

David C. Jordan, since July 2013.  Mr. Jordan is the Managing Partner of Growth Equities for Tributary and has been managing portfolios since 1982.  He managed this fund from 05/2001 to 07/2010. He has managed four-star Growth Opportunities (FOGRX) since 1998 and two-star Large Cap Growth (FOLCX) since 2011.  Before joining Tributary, he managed investments at the predecessors to Bank One Investment Advisors, Key Trust of the Northwest, and Wells Fargo Denver.

Management’s stake in the fund

Mr. Jordan’s investments are primarily in equities (he reports having “more than half of my financial assets invested in the Tributary Growth Opportunities Fund which I manage”), but he recently invested over $100,000 in the Balanced fund. 

Strategy capacity and closure

The advisor has “not formally discussed strategy capacities for the Balanced Fund, believing that we will not have to seriously consider capacity constraints until the fund is much larger than it is today.”

Opening date

August 6, 1996

Minimum investment

$1000, reduced to $100 for accounts opened with an automatic investing plan.

Expense ratio

0.99%, after a waiver, on $78 million in assets (as of July 2023).  Morningstar describes the expenses as “high,” which is misleading.  Morningstar continues benchmarking FOBAX against “true” institutional functions with minimums north of $100,000.

Comments

The long-time manager of Tributary Balanced has returned.  In what appears to be a modest cost-saving move, Mr. Jordan returned to the helm of this fund after a three year absence. 

If his last stint with the fund, from 2001 – 2010, is any indication, that’s a really promising development.  Over the three years of his absence, Tributary was a very solid fund.  The fund’s three-year returns of 13.1% (through 6/30/2013) place it in the top tier of all moderate allocation funds.  Over the period, it captured more of the upside and a lot less of the downside than did its average peer.  Our original profile concluded with the observation, “Almost no fund offers a consistently better risk-return profile.”

One of the few funds better than Tributary Balanced 2010-2013 might have been Tributary Balanced 2001-2010.  The fund posted better returns than the most highly-regarded, multi-billion dollar balanced funds.  If you compare the returns on an investment in FOBAX and its top-tier peers during the period of Mr. Jordan’s last tenure here (7/30/2001 – 5/10/2010), the results are striking.

Tributary versus Vanguard Balanced Index (VBINX)?  Tributary’s better.

Tributary versus Vanguard STAR (VGSTX)?  Tributary.

Tributary versus Vanguard Wellington (VWELX)?  Tributary.

Tributary versus Dodge and Cox Balanced (DODBX)?  Tributary.

Tributary versus Mairs & Power Balanced (MAPOX)?  Tributary.

Tributary versus T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRWCX)?  Price, by a mile.  Ehh.  Nobody’s perfect and Tributary did lose substantially less than Cap App during the 10/2007-03/2009 market collapse.

Libby Nelson of Tributary Capital Management reports that “During that time period, David outperformed the benchmark in 7 out of 9 of the calendar years and the five and ten-year performance was in the 10th percentile of its Morningstar Peer Group.”  In 2008, the fund finished in the top 14% of its peer group with a loss of 22.5% while its average peer dropped 28%.  During the 18-month span of the market collapse, Tributary lost 34.7% in value while the average moderate allocation fund dropped 37.3%.

To what could we attribute Tributary’s success? Mr. Jordan’s answer is, “we think a great deal about our investors.  We know that they’re seeking a lower volatility fund and that they’re concerned with downside protection.  We build the portfolio from there.”

Mr. Jordan provided stock picks for the fund’s portfolio even when he was not one of the portfolio managers.  He’s very disciplined about valuations and prefers to pursue less volatile, lower beta, lower-priced growth stocks.  In addition, he invests a greater portion of the portfolio in less-efficient slices of the market (smaller large caps and mid-caps) which results in a median market cap that’s $8 billion lower than his peers.

Responding to the growing weakness in the bond market, he’s been rotating assets into stocks (now about 70% of the portfolio) and shortening the duration of the bond portfolio (from 4.5 years down to 3.8 years).  He reports, “Our outlook is for returns from bonds in the period ahead to be both volatile, and negative, so we will move further toward an emphasis on stocks, which also may be volatile, but we believe will be positive over the next twelve months.”

Bottom Line

The empirical record is pretty clear.  Almost no fund offers a consistently better risk-return profile.  That commitment to consistency is central to Mr. Jordan’s style: “We are more focused on delivering consistent returns than keeping up with momentum driven markets and securities.”  Tributary has clearly earned a spot on the “due diligence” list for any investor interested in a hybrid fund.

Fund website

Tributary Balanced

Fact Sheet

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North Square Strategic Income (formerly Advisory Research Strategic Income), (ADVNX), September 2013

By David Snowball

At the time of publication, this fund was named Advisory Research Strategic Income.

Objective and Strategy

The fund seeks high current income and, as a secondary objective, long term capital appreciation.  It invests primarily in straight, convertible and hybrid preferred securities but has the freedom to invest in other income-producing assets including common stock.  The advisor wants to achieve “significantly higher yields” than available through Treasury securities while maintaining an investment-grade portfolio.  That said, the fund may invest “to a limited extent” in high-yield bonds, may invest up to 20% in foreign issues and may write covered call options against its holdings.  Morningstar categorizes it as a Long-Term Bond fund, which is sure to generate misleading peer group performance stats since it’s not a long-term bond fund.

Adviser

Advisory Research (ARI).  AR is a Chicago-based advisor for some of the nation’s wealthiest individuals, as well as privately-held companies, endowments, foundations, pensions and profit-sharing plans. They manage over $10.0 billion in total assets and advise the five AR funds.

Manager

Brien O’Brien, James Langer and Bruce Zessar.  Mr. O’Brien is ARI’s CEO.  He has 34 years of investment experience including stints with Marquette Capital, Bear Stearns and Oppenheimer.  He graduated with honors from Boston College with a B.S. in finance and theology.  He oversees four other AR funds.   Mr. Langer is a Managing Director and helps oversee two other AR funds.  Like Mr. O’Brien, he worked for Marquette Associates.  His career started at the well-respected Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago.  Mr. Zessar has a J.D. from Stanford Law and 11 years of investing experience.  Mr. Zessar also co-manages All-Cap Value (ADVGX). The team manages about $6 billion in other accounts.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Mr. O’Brien provided a seed investment when the strategy was launched in 2003, and today has over $1 million in the fund.  Mr. Langer has around a half million in the fund and Mr. Zessar had between $10,000 and $50,000 in the fund.   

Strategy capacity and closure

They estimate a strategy capacity of about $1 billion; since they do invest heavily in preferred shares but have the ability to invest elsewhere, they view the cap as flexible.  Mr. Zessar notes that the few others open-end funds specializing in preferred shares have asset bases of $1 – 5 billion.

Opening date

December 31, 2012 after the conversion of one limited partnership account, Advisory Research Value Income Fund, L.P., which commenced operations on June 30, 2003 and the merger of another.

Minimum investment

$2500.

Expense ratio

0.90%, after waivers, on assets of $167.9 million, as of July 2023. 1.15%, after waivers, for “A” class shares. 

Comments

Preferred stocks are odd creatures, at least in the eyes of many investors.  To just say “they are securities with some characteristics of a bond and some of a stock” is correct, but woefully inadequate.  In general, preferred stock carries a ticker symbol and trades on an exchange, like common stock does.  In general, preferred stockholders have a greater claim on a firm’s dividend stream than do common stockholders: preferred dividends are paid before a company decides whether it can pay its common shareholders, tend to be higher and are often fixed, like the coupon on a bond. 

But preferred shares have little potential for capital appreciation; they’re generally issued at $25 and improving fortunes of the issuing firm don’t translate to a rising share price.  A preferred stock may or may not have maturity like a bond; some are “perpetual” and many have 30-40 year maturities.  It can either pay a dividend or interest, usually quarterly or semi-annually.  Its payments might be taxed at the dividend rate or at your marginal income rate, depending.  Some preferred shares start with a fixed coupon payment for, say, ten years and then exchange it for a floating payment fixed to some benchmark.  Some are callable, some are not.  Some are convertible, some are not.

As a result of this complexity, preferred shares tend to be underfollowed and lightly used in open-end funds.  Of the 7500 extant open-end mutual funds, only four specialize in preferred securities: ADVNX and three load-bearing funds.  A far larger number of closed-end funds invest in these securities, often with an overlay of leverage.

What’s the case for investing in preferred stocks

Steady income.  Strategic Income’s portfolio has a yield of 4.69%.  By comparison, Vanguard Intermediate-Term Treasury Fund (VFITX) has a 30-day yield of 1.38% and its broader Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund (VBIIX) yields 2.64%.

The yield spread between the fed funds rate and the 10-year Treasury is abnormally large at the moment (about 280 bps in late August); when that spread reverts to its normal level (about 150 bps), there’s also the potential for a little capital appreciation in the Strategic Income fund.

In the long term, the managers believe that they will be able to offer a yield of about 200-250 basis points above what you could get from the benchmark 10-year Treasury.  At the same time, they believe that they can do so with less interest rate sensitivity; the fund has, in the past, shown the interest rate sensitivity associated with a bond portfolio that has a six or seven year maturity.

In addition, preferred stocks have traditionally had low correlations to other asset classes.   A 2012 report from State Street Global Advisors, The Case for Preferred Stocks, likes the correlation between preferred shares and bonds, international stocks, emerging markets stocks, real estate, commodities and domestic common stocks for the 10 years from 2003 to 2012:

ssga

As a result, adding preferred stock to a portfolio might both decrease its volatility and its interest rate sensitivity while boosting its income.

What’s the case for investing with Advisory Research

They have a lot of experience in actively managing this portfolio.

Advisory Research launched this fund’s predecessor in 2003.  They converted it to a mutual fund at the end of 2012 in response to investor demands for daily liquidity and corrosive skepticism of LPs in the wake of the Madoff scandal. The existing partners voted unanimously for conversion to a mutual fund.

From inception through its conversion to a mutual fund, the L.P. returned 4.24% annually while its benchmark returned 2.44%, an exceptionally wide gap for a fixed-income fund.  Because it’s weakly correlated to the overall stock market, it has held up relatively well in downturns, losing 25.8% in 2008 when the S&P 500 dropped 37%.  The fund’s 28.1% gain in 2009 exceeded the S&P’s 26.5% rebound.  It’s also worth noting that the same management team has been in place since 2003.

The team actively manages the portfolio for both sector allocation and duration.  They have considerable autonomy in allocating the portfolio, and look to shift resources in the direction of finding “safe spread.”  That is, for those investments whose higher yield is not swamped by higher risk.  In mid-2012, 60% of the portfolio was allocated to fixed preferred shares.  In mid-2013, they were half that.  The portfolio instead has 50% in short-term corporate bonds and fixed-to-floating rate securities.  At the same time, they moved aggressively to limit interest-rate risk by dramatically shortening the portfolio’s duration.

Bottom Line

This is not a riskless strategy.  Market panics can drive even fundamentally sound securities lower.  But panics are short-term events.  The challenge facing conservative investors, especially, is long-term: they need to ask the question, “where, in the next decade or so, am I going to find a reasonable stream of income?”  With the end of the 30-year bond bull market, the answer has to be “in strategies that you’ve not considered before, led by managers whose record is solid and whose interests are aligned with yours.” With long-term volatility akin to an intermediate-term corporate bond fund’s, substantial yield, and a stable, talented management team, Advisory Research Strategic Income offers the prospect of a valuable complement to a traditional bond-centered portfolio.

Fund website

North Square Strategic Income.  SSgA’s The Case for Preferred Stock (2012) is also worth reading, recalling that ADVNX’s portfolio is neither all-preferred nor locked into its current preferred allocation.

SSgA’s Preferred Securities 101

2023 Semi-Annual Report

Fact Sheet

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September 2013, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

AdvisorShares YieldPro ETF

AdvisorShares YieldPro ETF will be an actively-managed ETF that seeks to provide current income and capital appreciation primarily investing in both long and short positions in other ETFs that offer diversified exposure to income producing securities.  They’ll mostly target securities that provide “competitive yield” but will add in “instruments which provide little or no yield for diversification or risk management purposes.” The fund will be managed by Joshua Emanuel, Chief Investment Officer of Elements Financial Group since 2010.  Before that he was a Principal, Head of Strategy and co-chair of the Investment Management Committee at Wilshire Associates.  The fund’s expense ratio has not yet been set.

American Century Emerging Markets Value Fund

American Century Emerging Markets Value Fund, Investor class shares, will pursue capital growth by investing in e.m. stocks.  They target the 21 markets in the MSCI E.M. index.  It’s a quant portfolio that starts by ranking stocks from most to least attractive based on value, momentum and quality. They then run a portfolio optimizer to balance risk and return.  It will be managed by Vinod Chandrashekaran, Yulin Long, and Elizabeth Xie. All are members of the Quantitative Research team. The expense ratio will be capped at 1.46%.  The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  Launch is set for some time in October.

Brown Advisory Strategic European Equity Fund

Brown Advisory Strategic European Equity Fund, Investor shares, seeks to achieve total return by investing principally in equity securities issued by companies established or operating in Europe.  They may invest directly or through a combination of derivatives.  The fund will be managed by Dirk Enderlein of Wellington Management. Wellington is indisputably an “A-team” shop (they’ve got about three-quarters of a trillion in assets under management).  Mr. Enderlein joined them in 2010 after serving as a manager for RCM – Allianz Global Investors in Frankfurt, Germany (1999-2009). Media reports described him as  “one of Europe’s most highly regarded European growth managers.” The expense ratio will be capped at 1.35%.  The minimum initial investment is $5,000.  Launch is set for some time in October.

DoubleLine Shiller Enhanced CAPE

DoubleLine Shiller Enhanced CAPE, Class N shares, looks for “total return in excess of the Shiller Barclays CAPE® US Sector TR USD Index.”  The Shiller CAPE (cyclically-adjusted price-earnings) index tracks the performance of the four (of ten) sectors which have the best combination of a low CAPE ratio and price momentum on their side.  The fund will attempt to outdo the index by using leverage and by holding a fixed-income portfolio similar to DoubleLine Core Fixed Income’s. The fund will be managed by The Gundlach (given that he sees himself as super-heroic, an Enhanced Cape fits) and Jeffrey Sherman.  The expense ratio will be capped at 0.80%.  The minimum initial investment is $2,000.  Launch is set for some time in October.

Driehaus Micro Cap Growth Fund

Driehaus Micro Cap Growth Fund (and, in truth, pretty much every Driehaus fund) seeks to maximize capital appreciation.  They anticipate investing at least 80% in a non-diversified portfolio of micro-caps then then trading them actively; they anticipate a turnover of 100 – 275%. The managers will be Jeffrey James and Michael Buck.  This is another instance of a limited partnership (or, in this case, two limited partnerships) being converted into mutual funds.  Those were the Driehaus Micro Cap Fund, L.P. and the Driehaus Institutional Micro Cap Fund, L.P.  Mr. James has been running the Micro Cap LP since 1998 and Mr. Buck has been assisting on that portfolio.  The current draft of the prospectus does not include the LP’s track record.  The expense ratio will be capped, but it has not yet been announced.  The minimum initial investment is $10,000.

Even Keel Managed Risk Fund

Even Keel Managed Risk Fund will seek to provide total return consistent with long-term capital preservation, while seeking to manage volatility and reduce downside risk during severe, sustained market declines.  It will be a hedged large cap equity portfolio.  The managers will be Blake Graves and Zack Brown of Milliman Financial Risk Management LLC.  The expense ratio will be capped at 0.97%.  The minimum initial investment is $3,000.

Even Keel Opportunities Managed Risk Fund

Even Keel Opportunities Managed Risk Fund will seek to provide total return consistent with long-term capital preservation, while seeking to manage volatility and reduce downside risk during severe, sustained market declines. It will be a hedged SMID cap portfolio.  The managers will be Blake Graves and Zack Brown of Milliman Financial Risk Management LLC.  The expense ratio will be capped at 0.97%.  The minimum initial investment is $3,000.

Even Keel Developed Markets Managed Risk Fund

Even Keel Developed Markets Managed Risk Fund will seek to provide total return consistent with long-term capital preservation, while seeking to manage volatility and reduce downside risk during severe, sustained market declines.  It will be an international equity portfolio hedged with long/short exposure to index, Treasury and currency futures.  The managers will be Blake Graves and Zack Brown of Milliman Financial Risk Management LLC.  The expense ratio will be capped at 0.97%.  The minimum initial investment is $3,000.

Even Keel Emerging Markets Managed Risk Fund

Even Keel Emerging Markets Managed Risk Fund will seek to provide total return consistent with long-term capital preservation, while seeking to manage volatility and reduce downside risk during severe, sustained market declines.  It will be an emerging markets equity portfolio hedged with long/short exposure to index, Treasury and currency futures.  .  The managers will be Blake Graves and Zack Brown of Milliman Financial Risk Management LLC.  The expense ratio will be capped at 0.97%.  The minimum initial investment is $3,000.

Fidelity Short Duration High Income

Fidelity Short Duration High Income will pursue high current income and is willing to accept some capital appreciation.  The prospectus is really kind of an ill-written jumble, they have an unnatural affinity for bullet-pointed lists.  At base, they’ll invest mostly in BB or B-rated securities with a duration of three years or less but they might slip in defaulted securities, common stock and floating rate loans.  It will be managed by Matthew Conti (lead portfolio manager) and Michael Plage. Mr. Conti also manages Fidelity Focused High Income (FHIFX) about which Morningstar is unimpressed, and bits of other bond funds. The expense ratio will be capped at 0.80%.  The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  Launch is set for some time in October.

Harbor Emerging Markets Equity Fund

Harbor Emerging Markets Equity Fund will seek long-term growth by investing at least 65% (?) of its portfolio in what the managers believe to be high-quality firms located in, or doing serious business in, the emerging markets. All Harbor funds are sub-advised.  This one is managed by Frank Carroll and Tim Jensen of Oaktree Capital Management. Oaktree is a first-tier institutional manager which has agreed to sub-advise very few (uhh, two?) mutual funds.  They have an emerging markets equity composite, representing their work for private clients, but the current prospectus does not reveal the composite’s age or performance.  The fund is scheduled to go live on November 1.  It would be prudent to check in then. The expense ratio will be capped at 1.62%.  The minimum initial investment is $2,500.

Hull Tactical US ETF

Hull Tactical US ETF will be an actively-managed ETF that pursues long-term growth by playing with fire.  It will invest in a combination of other ETFs that match the S&P, match the inverse of the S&P or are leveraged to returns of the S&P.  The managers will position that fund somewhere between 200% long and 100% short, with the additional possibility of 100% cash.  The fund will be managed by Blair Hull, Founder and Chairman of HTAA, and Brian von Dohlen, their Senior Financial Engineer.  Expenses not yet set.

Manning & Napier Equity Income

Manning & Napier Equity Income, Class S shares, wants to provide “total return through a combination of current income, income growth, and long-term capital appreciation.” They’re going to target income-paying equity securities including common and preferred stocks, convertible securities, REITs, MLPs, ETFs and interests in business development companies.  The fund will be managed by Michael J. Magiera, Managing Director of Equity Income Group, Christopher F. Petrosino, Managing Director of the Quantitative Strategies Group, Elizabeth Mallette and William Moore.  The expense ratio will be capped, but it has not yet been announced.  The minimum initial investment is $2,000.

Manning & Napier Emerging Opportunities

Manning & Napier Emerging Opportunities Series, Class S shares, will seek long-term growth by investing primarily in a domestic mid-cap growth portfolio.  Their target is companies growing at least twice as fast as the overall economy. The fund will be managed by Ebrahim Busheri, Managing Director of Emerging Growth Group, Brian W. Lester and Ajay M. Sadarangani. The expense ratio will be capped, but it has not yet been announced.  The minimum initial investment is $2,000.

Meridian Small Cap Growth

Meridian Small Cap Growth will pursue long-term growth of capital by investing primarily in equity securities of small capitalization companies.  The bottom line is that this is the new platform for the two star managers, Chad Meade and Brian Schaub, who Meridian’s new owner hired away from Janus. Morningstar’s Greg Carlson described them as “superb managers” who were “consistently successful during their nearly seven years at the helm of this small-growth fund,” referring to Janus Triton. The expense ratio is not set.  The minimum initial investment is $1,000.

Northern Multi-Manager Emerging Markets Debt Opportunity Fund

Northern Multi-Manager Emerging Markets Debt Opportunity Fund will seek both income and capital appreciation by investing in emerging and frontier market debt.  That includes a wide variety of corporate and government bonds, preferred and convertible securities and derivatives.  The sub-advisers include teams from a Northern Trust subsidiary, Bluebay Asset Management (a British firm with $56 billion in AUM) and Lazard. The expense ratio, after waivers, is capped at 0.93%.  The prospectus covers only an institutional class, with a $1 million minimum.

PIMCO TRENDS Managed Futures Strategy Fund

PIMCO TRENDS Managed Futures Strategy Fund, “D” shares for retail, will seek “absolute risk-adjusted returns.”  The plan is to invest in derivatives (and an unnamed off-shore fund run by PIMCO) linked to interest rates, currencies, mortgages, credit, commodities, equity indices and volatility-related instruments; they’ll invest in sectors trending higher and can short the ones trending lower.  They plan on having a volatility target but haven’t yet announced it.  In general, managed futures funds have been a raging disappointment (the group has losses over every trailing period from one day to five years).  In general, PIMCO funds excel.  It’ll be interested to see which precedent prevails.  The manager is as-yet unnamed and the expense ratio is not set.  The minimum initial investment is $2,500 for “D” shares purchased through a supermarket.

Redwood Managed Volatility Fund

Redwood Managed Volatility Fund, “N” class shares, will seek “a combination of total return and prudent management of portfolio downside volatility and downside loss.”  The strategy is pretty distinctive: invest in high-yield bonds when the high-yield market is trending up and in short-term bonds whenever the high-yield market is trending down.  The fund will be managed by Michael Messinger and Bruce DeLaurentis.  Mr. Messinger seems to be a business/marketing guy while DeLaurentis is the investor.  Mr. DeLaurentis’s separate accounts composite at Kensington Management, stretching back 20 years, seems fairly impressive.  He’s returned about 10% over 20 years, 11% over 10 years, and 15% over five years. The expense ratio is not set.  The minimum initial investment is $10,000.

Rx Fundamental Growth Fund

Rx Fundamental Growth Fund, Advisor shares, will seek capital appreciation by investing in stocks.  The description is pretty generic.  The highlight of this offering is their manager, Louis Navellier.  Mr. Navellier is a famous growth-investing newsletter guy.  He once had a line of mutual funds that merged with a couple Touchstone funds.  The Touchstone fund Navellier subadvises is fairly mild-mannered though its performance in recent years has been weak.  His separate account composites show mostly lackluster to abysmal performance over the past 7-10 years.  The expense ratio is capped at 2.06%.  The minimum initial investment is $250.

Steinberg Select Fund

Steinberg Select Fund, Investor class, will seek growth by investing in stocks of all sizes.  It will likely invest in developed foreign stocks as well, but there’s not much of a discussion of asset class weighting.  It seems like they’re looking for defensive names, but that’s not crystal clear.  Michael Steinberg will head the investment team.  Their all-cap concentrated value composite has a substantial lead over its benchmark since inception in 1990 and about a 150 bps annual lead in the past 10 years, but seems to have taken a dramatic dive in the 2007-09 crash.  The expense ratio is capped at 1.0%.  The minimum initial investment is $10,000.

Stone Toro Relative Value Fund

Stone Toro Relative Value Fund will seek capital appreciation with a secondary focus on current income. It invests in an all-cap portfolio, primarily of dividend-paying stock.  Up to 40% might be invested in international stocks via ADRs.  They warn that their strategy involves active and frequent trading. The manager will be Michael Jarzyna, Founding Partner and CIO of Stone Toro.  The expense ratio is capped at 1.57%.  The minimum initial investment is $1000.

T. Rowe Price Global Industrials Fund

T. Rowe Price Global Industrials Fund will pursue long-term capital growth by investing in a global, diversified portfolio of industrial sector stocks.  The general rule seems to be, if it requires a large factory, it’s in.  The fund will be managed by Peter Bates, an industrials analyst who joined Price in 2002 but who has no prior fund management record.  The expense ratio is capped at 1.05%.  The minimum initial investment is $2500, reduced to $1000 for IRAs.

Thomson Horstmann & Bryant Small Cap Value Fund

Thomson Horstmann & Bryant Small Cap Value Fund, Investor shares, is looking for capital appreciation.  The plan is to invest in small-value stocks but there’s nothing in the prospectus that distinguishes their strategies from anyone else’s.  The fund will be managed by Christopher N. Cuesta, who joined THB in 2002 and has managed micro-cap accounts for them since 2004 and small cap ones since 2005.  He’d previously worked at Salomon Smith Barney and Van Eck.  This private accounts composite shows persistently high beta, excellent upmarket performance and very weak downmarket performance.  The expense ratio is capped at 1.5%. The minimum initial investment is $100. 

WCM Focused Emerging Markets Fund

WCM Focused Emerging Markets Fund, Investor class, will seek long-term capital appreciation by investing in emerging and frontier markets stocks and corporate bonds.  They can also invest in multinational corporations with large e.m. footprints.  The fund will be non-diversified.   Beyond being “bottom up” investors, details are a bit sketchy.  The fund will be managed by a team from WCM Investment Management, led by Sanjay Ayer. Their emerging markets composite has a two year history.  It appears to have substantially outperformed an e.m. equity index in 2011 and trailed it in 2012.  The expense ratio is not yet set. The minimum initial investment is $1000. 

WCM Focused Global Growth Fund

WCM Focused Global Growth Fund, Investor class, will seek long-term capital appreciation by investing in a non-diversified portfolio of global blue chip stocks.  The fund will be managed by a team from WCM Investment Management, led by Sanjay Ayer. Their Quality Global Growth composite has a five year history.  It appears to have substantially outperformed a global equity index over the past five years, though it trailed it in 2012. The expense ratio is not yet set. The minimum initial investment is $1000. 

West Shore Real Asset Income Fund

West Shore Real Asset Income Fund, “N” class, will seek a combination of capital growth and current income.  30-50% will be in dividend-paying US equities, 30-50% in “foreign securities that the Adviser believes will provide returns that exceed the rate of inflation” and 20% in alternative investments, such as hedge funds.  There’s no evidence (e.g., a track record) to suggest that this is a particularly good idea.  The fund will be managed by Steve Cordasco, President of West Shore, Michael Shamosh, and James G. Rickards. The expense ratio is capped at 2.0%. The minimum initial investment is $2500. 

FPA Paramount (FPRAX), September 2013

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

The FPA Global Value Strategy will seek to provide above-average capital appreciation over the long term while attempting to minimize the risk of capital losses by investing in well-run, financially robust, high-quality businesses around the world, in both developed and emerging markets.

Adviser

FPA, formerly First Pacific Advisors, which is located in Los Angeles.  The firm is entirely owned by its management which, in a singularly cool move, bought FPA from its parent company in 2006 and became independent for the first time in its 50 year history.  The firm has 28 investment professionals and 72 employees in total.  Currently, FPA manages about $25 billion across four equity strategies and one fixed income strategy.  Each strategy is manifested in a mutual fund and in separately managed accounts; for example, the Contrarian Value strategy is manifested in FPA Crescent (FPACX), in nine separate accounts and a half dozen hedge funds.  On April 1, 2013, all FPA funds became no-loads.

Managers

Pierre O. Py and Greg Herr.  Mr. Py joined FPA in September 2011. Prior to that, he was an International Research Analyst for Harris Associates, adviser to the Oakmark funds, from 2004 to 2010.  Mr. Py has managed FPA International Value (FPIVX) since launch. Mr. Herr joined the firm in 2007, after stints at Vontobel Asset Management, Sanford Bernstein and Bankers Trust.  He received a BA in Art History at Colgate University.  Mr. Herr co-manages FPA Perennial (FPPFX) and the closed-end Source Capital (SOR) funds with the team that used to co-manage FPA Paramount.  Py and Herr will be supported by the two research analysts, Jason Dempsey and Victor Liu, who also contribute to FPIVX.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

As of the last SAI (September 30, 2012), Mr. Herr had invested between $1 and $10,000 in the fund and Mr. Py had no investment in it.  Mr. Py did have a very large investment in his other charge, FPA International Value.

Opening date

September 8, 1958.

Minimum investment

$1,500, reduced to $100 for IRAs or accounts with automatic investing plans.

Expense ratio

0.94% on $323 million in assets, as of August 2013.

Comments

We’ve never before designated a 55-year-old fund as a “most intriguing new fund,” but the leadership and focus changes at FPRAX warrant the label.

I’ve written elsewhere that “Few fund companies get it consistently right.  By “right” I don’t mean “in step with current market passions” or “at the top of the charts every year.”  By “right” I mean two things: they have an excellent investment discipline and they treat their shareholders with profound respect.

FPA gets it consistently right.

FPA has been getting it right with the two funds overseen by Eric Ende and Stephen Geist: FPA Paramount (since March 2000) and FPA Perennial (since 1995 and 1999, respectively).   Morningstar designates Paramount as a five-star world stock fund and Perennial as a three-star domestic mid-cap growth fund (both as of August, 2013).  That despite the fact that there’s a negligible difference in the fund’s asset allocation (cash/US stock/international stock) and no difference in their long-term performance.  The chart below shows the two funds’ returns and volatility since Geist and Ende inherited Paramount.

fpa paramount

To put it bluntly, both have consistently clubbed every plausible peer group (mid-cap growth, global stock) and benchmark (S&P 500, Total Stock Market, Morningstar US Growth composite) that I compared them to.  By way of illustration, $10,000 invested in either of these funds in March 2000 would have grown to $35,000 by August 2013.  The same amount in the Total Stock Market index would have hit $16,000 – and that’s the best of any of the comparison groups.

To be equally blunt, the funds mostly post distinctions without a difference.  In theory Paramount has been more global than Perennial but, in practice, both remained mostly focused on high-quality U.S. stocks. 

FPA has decided to change that.  Geist and Ende will now focus on Perennial, while Py and Herr reshape Paramount.  There are two immediately evident differences:

  1. The new team is likely to transition toward a more global portfolio.  We spoke with Mr. Py after the announcement and he downplayed the magnitude of any immediate shifts.  He does believe that the most attractive valuations globally lie overseas and the most attractive ones domestically lie among large cap stocks.  That said, it’s unlikely the case that FPA brought over a young and promising international fund manager with the expectation that he’ll continue to skipper a portfolio with only 10-15% international exposure.
  2. The new team is certain to transition toward a more absolute value portfolio.  Mr. Py’s investment approach, reflected in the FPIVX prospectus, stresses “Low Absolute Valuation. The Adviser only purchases shares when the Adviser believes they offer a significant margin of safety (i.e. when they trade at a significant discount to the Adviser’s estimate of their intrinsic value).”  In consequence of that, “the limited number of holdings in the portfolio and the ability to hold cash are key aspects of the portfolio.”  At the last portfolio report, International Value held 24 stocks and 38% cash while Paramount held 31 and 10%.  Given that the investment universe here is broader than International’s, it’s unlikely to hold huge cash stakes but likely that it might drift well north of its current level at times.

Bottom Line

Paramount is apt to become a very solid, but very different fund under its new leadership.  There will certainly be a portfolio restructuring and there will likely be some movement of assets as investors committed to Ende and Geist’s style migrate to Perennial.  The pace of those changes will dictate the magnitude of the short-term tax burden that shareholders will bear. 

Fund website

FPA Paramount Fund

2013 Q3 Report and Commentary

Fact Sheet

[cr2013]

August 1, 2013

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

dave-by-pier

Welcome to the Vacation 2013 issue of the Observer. I’ve spent the past two weeks of July and the first days of August enjoying myself in Door County, the Cape Cod-like peninsula above Green Bay. I’ve done substantial damage to two Four Berry pies from Bea’s Ho-made Pies (jokes about the makers of the pie have been deleted), enjoyed rather more Leinies than usual, sailed on a tall ship, ziplined (ending in a singularly undignified position), putt-putted, worked with my son on his pitching, hiked miles and learned rather more than I cared to about alewives, gobies and lake levels.

I did not think (much) about mutual funds, Mr. Market, my portfolio, or the Dow’s closing level.  Indeed, I have no idea of what the market’s been doing.

Life is good.

Risk spectrum for Observer funds

We have published some dozens of profiles of new, distinguished and distinctive funds in the past couple years (click on the Funds tab if you’re curious).  Charles Boccadoro, our Associate Editor, has been working on ways to make those profiles more organized and accessible.  Here’s his take on one way of thinking about the collection.

Dashboard of MFO Profiled Funds

Each month, David provides in-depth analysis of two to four funds, continuing a FundAlarm tradition. Today, more than 75 profiles are available on MFO Funds index page. Most are quite current, but a few date back, under “Archives of FundAlarm,” so reference appropriately.

This month we roll out a new summary or “dashboard” of the many profiled funds. It’s intended to help identify funds of interest, so that readers can better scroll the index to retrieve in-depth profiles.

The dashboard presents funds by broad investment type, consistent with MFO Rating System. The three types are: fixed income, asset allocation, and equity. (See also Definitions page.)

Here is dashboard of profiled fixed income and asset allocation funds:

charles1

For each fund, the dashboard identifies current investment style or category as defined by Morningstar, date (month/year) of latest profile published, fund inception date (from first whole month), and latest 12-month yield percentage, as applicable.

Risk group is also identified, consistent with latest MFO rating. In the dashboard, funds with lowest risk will generally be at top of list, while those with highest risk will be at bottom, agnostic of M* category. Probably good to insert a gentle reminder here that risk ratings can get elevated, temporarily at least, when funds hit a rough patch, like recently with some bond and all-asset funds.

The dashboard also depicts fund absolute return relative to cash (90-day T-Bill), bonds (US Aggregate TR), and stocks (S&P 500 TR), again agnostic of M* category. If a fund’s return from inception through the latest quarter exceeds any of these indices, “Return Beats…” column will be shaded appropriately.

The Enhanced Strategy column alerts readers of a fund’s use of leverage or hedge via short positions, or if a fund holds any derivatives, like swaps or futures. If so, regardless of how small, the column will show “Yes.” It’s what David calls a kind of complexity flag. This assessment is strictly numerical using latest portfolio allocations from Morningstar’s database in Steele Mutual Fund Expert.

Finally, the column entitled “David’s Take” is a one-word summary of how each fund was characterized in its profile. Since David tends to only profile funds that have promising or at least intriguing strategies, most of these are positive. But every now and then, the review is skeptical (negative) or neutral (mixed).

We will update the dashboard monthly and, as always, improve and tailor based on your feedback. Normally the dashboard will be published atop the Funds index page, but for completeness this month, here’s dashboard of remaining equity funds profiled by MFO:

charles2

equities2

Charles/28Jul13

Would you ever need more than one long-short fund?

By bits, investors have come to understand that long-short (and possible other alternative) funds may have a place in their portfolios.  That’s a justifiable conclusion.  The question is, would you ever want need more than one long-short fund?

The lead story in our July issue made the argument, based on interviews with executives and managers are a half dozen firms, that there are at least three very distinct types of long-short funds (pure long/short on individual stocks, long on individual stocks/short on sectors or markets, long on individual stocks plus covered called exposure) .  They have different strategies and different risk-return profiles.  They are not interchangeable in a portfolio.

The folks at Long-Short Advisors gave permission to share some fascinating data with you.  They calculated the correlation matrix for their fund, the stock market and ten of their largest competitors, not all of which are pure long/short funds.  By way of context, the three-year correlation between the movement of Vanguard’s Small Cap Index Fund (NAESX) and their S&P 500 Index Fund (VFINX) is .93; that is, when you buy a small cap index as a way to diversify your large cap-heavy portfolio, you’re settling for an investment with a 93% correlation to your original portfolio.

Here are the correlations between various long/short funds:

correlation matrixThis does not automatically justify inclusion of a second or third long-short fund in your portfolio, but it does demonstrate two things.  First, that long-short funds really are vastly different from one another, which is why their correlations are so low.  Second, a single long-short fund offers considerable diversification in a long-only portfolio and a carefully selected second fund might add a further layer of independence.

Royce Value Trust plans on exporting its investors

Royce Value Trust (RVT) is a very fine closed-end fund managed by a team led by Chuck Royce.  Morningstar rates it as a “Gold” CEF despite the fact that it has modestly trailed its peers for more than a decade.  The fund has attracted rather more than a billion in assets.

Apparently the managers aren’t happy with that development and so have propsoed exporting some of their investors’ money to a new fund.  Here’s the SEC filing:

I invite you to a special stockholder meeting of Royce Value Trust Inc. to be held on September 5, 2013. At the meeting, stockholders will be asked to approve a proposal to contribute a portion of Value Trust’s assets to a newly-organized, closed-end management investment company, Royce Global Value Trust, Inc. and to distribute to common stockholders of Value Trust shares of common stock of Global Trust.

And why would they “contribute” a portion of your RVT portfolio to their global fund?

Although Value Trust and Global Trust have the exact same investment objective of long-term growth of capital, Value Trust invests primarily in U.S. domiciled small-cap companies while Global Trust will invest primarily in companies located outside the U.S. and may invest up to 35% of its assets in the securities of companies headquartered in “developing countries.” For some time, we have been attracted to the opportunities for long-term capital growth presented in the international markets, particularly in small-cap stocks. To enable Value Trust’s stockholders to participate more directly in these opportunities, we are proposing to contribute approximately $100 million of Value Trust’s assets to Global Trust.

I see.  RVT shareholders, by decree, need more international and emerging markets exposure.  Rather than risking the prospect that they might do something foolish (for example, refuse to buy an untested new fund on their own), Royce proposes simply diversifying your portfolio into their favorite new area.  By the same logic, they might conclude that you could also use some emerging markets bonds.  Were you silly enough to think that you needed domestic small cap exposure and, hence, bought a domestic small cap fund?  “No problem!  We’ll launch and move you into …”

And why $100 million exactly?  “The $100 million target size (approximately 8% of Value Trust’s current net assets) was established to satisfy New York Stock Exchange listing standards and to seek to ensure that Global Trust has sufficient assets to conduct its investment program while maintaining an expense ratio that is competitive with those of other global small-cap value funds.”  So, as a portfolio move, RVT shareholders gain perhaps 4% exposure to small caps in developed foreign markets and 2% in emerging markets.

In one of Morningstar’s odder tables, they classified RVT as having the worst performance ever, anywhere, by anything:

rvtYou might notice the frequency with which RVT trails 100% of its peers.  Odd in a “Gold” fund?  Not so much as you might think.  When I asked Morningstar’s peerless Alexa Auerbach to check, she reported that RVT’s category contains only two funds.  The other, slightly better one is also from Royce and so the 100th percentile ranking translates to “finished second in a two-person race.”

Experienced managers launching their own firms: Barron’s gets it (mostly) right

Barron’s featured a nice story on the challenge of launching a new fund firm and highlighted four star managers who choose to strike out on their own (“Introducing the New Guard,” July 8, p.p. L17-19). (We can’t link directly to this article, but if you Google the title you should be able to gain complimentary access to it.) They focus on four firms about which, you might have noticed, I have considerable enthusiasm:

Vulcan Value Partners, whose Vulcan Value Small Cap Fund we profiled.

Highlights: C.T. Fitzpatrick – one of the few managers whose funds I’ve profiled but with whom I’ve never spoken – distinguishes Vulcan’s approach from the Longleaf (his former employer) approach because “we place as much emphasis on business quality as we do on the discount.” He also thinks that his location in Birmingham is a plus since it’s easier to stand back from the Wall Street consensus if you’re 960 (point eight!) miles away from it. He also thinks that it makes recruiting staff easier since, delightful as New York City is, a livable, affordable smaller city with good schools is a remarkable draw.

Seafarer Capital Partners, whose Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income is in my own portfolio and to which I recently added shares.

Highlight: Andrew Foster spends about a third of this time running the business. Rather than a distraction, he thinks it’s making him a better investor by giving him a perspective he never before had. He frets about investors headlong rush into the more volatile pieces of an intrinsically volatile sector. He argues in this piece for slow-and-steady growers and notes that “People often forget that when you invest in emerging markets, you’re investing in something that is flawed but that you believe can eventually improve.”

Grandeur Peak Global Advisors, whose Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities was profiled in February 2012 and about whom we offer a short feature article and two fund profiles, all below.

Highlight: Lead manager Robert Gardiner and president Eric Huefner both began working for Wasatch as teenagers? (Nuts. I worked at a public library for $1.60/hour and was doing landscaping for less.) They reject the domestic/international split when it comes to doing security analysis and allow Mr. Gardiner to focus entirely on investing while Mr. Huefner obsesses about running a great firm. 

Okay, Barrons’ got it mostly right. They got the newest name of the fund wrong (it’s Reach, not Research), the photo caption wrong and a provocative quote wrong. Barron’s claimed that Gardiner is “intent on keeping Grandeur Peak, which is now on the small side, just shy of $1 billion under management.” Apparently Mr. Huefner said Grandeur Peak currently had a bit under a billion, that their strategies’ collective capacity was $3 billion but they’re apt to close once they hit $2 billion to give them room for growth.

RiverPark Advisors, five of whose funds we’ve profiled, two more of which we’ve pointed to and one of which is in my personal portfolio (and Chip’s). 

Highlight: Mitch Rubin’s reflection on the failure of their first venture, a hedge fund “Our mistake, we realized, was trying to create strategies we thought investors wanted to buy rather than structuring the portfolios around how we wanted to invest” and Mitch Rubin’s vitally important note, “Managers often think of themselves as the talent. But the ability to run these businesses well takes real talent.” Ding, ding, ding, ding! Exactly. There are only a handful of firms, including Artisan, RiverPark and Seafarer, where I think the quality of the business operation is consistently outstanding. (It’s a topic we return, briefly, to below in the discussion of “Two questions for potential fund entrepreneurs.”)  Lots of small firms handicap themselves by making the operations part of the business an afterthought. Half of the failure of Marx’s thought was his inability to grasp the vital and difficult role of organizing and managing your resources.

Will casting off at Anderson's Pier in Ephraim, WI.

Will casting off at Anderson’s Pier in Ephraim, WI.

Two questions for potential fund entrepreneurs

Where will you find your first $100 million?  And who’s got the 263 hours to spend on the paperwork?

I’d expressed some skepticism about the claim in Barron’s (see above) that mutual funds need between $100 – 200 million in AUM in order to be self-sustaining.  That is, to cover both their external expenses such as legal fees, to pay for staff beyond a single manager and to – here’s a wild thought – pay the manager a salary. 

In conversations over the past month with Andrew Foster at Seafarer and Greg Parcella at Long/Short Advisors, it became clear that the figure quoted in Barron’s was pretty reasonable.  Mr. Foster points out that the break-even is lower for a second or third fund, since a viable first fund might cover most of the firm’s overhead expenses, but for a firm with a single product (and most especially an international or global one), $100 million is a pretty reasonable target. 

Sadly, many of the managers I’ve spoken with – even guys with enormous investment management skill – have a pretty limited plan for getting there beyond the “build a better mousetrap” fiction.  In truth, lots of “better mousetraps” languish.  There are 2400 funds with fewer than $100 million in the portfolio, 10% of which are current four- or five-star funds, according to Morningstar.  (Many of the rest are too new to have a Morningstar rating.)

What I didn’t realize was how long the danged paperwork for a fund takes.  One recent prospectus on file with the SEC contained the following disclosure that’s required under a federal paperwork reduction act:

omb

Which is to say, writing a prospectus is estimated to take six weeks.  I’m gobsmacked.

The big picture at Grandeur Peak

In the course of launching their new Global Reach fund, profiled below, Grandeur Peak decided to share a bit of their firm’s long-term planning with the public. Grandeur Peak’s investment focus is small- to micro-cap stocks.  The firm estimates that they will be able to manage about $3 billion in assets before their size becomes an impediment to their performance.  From that estimate, they backed out the point at which they might need to soft close their products in order to allow room for capital growth (about $2 billion) and then allocated resource levels for each of their seven envisioned strategies.

Those strategies are:

  • Global Reach, their 300-500 stock flagship fund
  • Global Opportunities, a more concentrated version of Global Reach
  • International Opportunities, the non-U.S. sub-set of Global Reach
  • Emerging Markets Opportunities, the emerging and frontier markets subset of International Opportunities
  • US Opportunities, the U.S.-only subset of Global Opportunities
  • Global Value, the “Fallen Angels” sub-set of Global Reach
  • Global Microcap, the micro-cap subset of Global Reach

President Eric Huefner remarks that “Remaining nimble is critical for a small/micro cap manager to be world-class,” hence “we are terribly passionate about asset capping across the firm.”  With two strategies already closed and another gaining traction, it might be prudent to look into the opportunity.

Observer fund profiles

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve. 

Grandeur Peak Global Opportunity (GPGOX): this now-closed star goes where few others dare, into the realm of global and emerging markets small to micro-caps.  With the launch of its sibling, Global Reach, its portfolio is about to tighten and focus.

Grandeur Peak Global Reach (GPGRX): this is the fund that Grandeur Peak wanted to offer you two years ago.  It will be their most broadly-diversified, lowest-cost portfolio and will serve as the flagship for the Grandeur Peak fleet. 

LS Opportunity (LSOFX): Jim Hillary left Marsico in 2004 with a lot of money and the burning question, “what’s the best way to sustainably grow my wealth?”  His answer was a pure long/short portfolio that’s served him, his hedge fund investors, his European investors, and his high net worth investors really well.  LSOFX gives retail investors a chance to join the party.

Sextant Global High Income (SGHIX): what do income-oriented investors do when The Old Reliables fail?  Saturna Capital, which has a long and distinguished record of bond-free income investing at Amana Income (AMANX), offers this highly adaptable, benchmark-free fund as one intriguing option.

Elevator Talk #6: Brian Frank of Frank Value Fund (FRNKX)

elevator buttonsSince the number of funds we can cover in-depth is smaller than the number of funds worthy of in-depth coverage, we’ve decided to offer one or two managers each month the opportunity to make a 200 word pitch to you. That’s about the number of words a slightly-manic elevator companion could share in a minute and a half. In each case, I’ve promised to offer a quick capsule of the fund and a link back to the fund’s site. Other than that, they’ve got 200 words and precisely as much of your time and attention as you’re willing to share. These aren’t endorsements; they’re opportunities to learn more.

bfrank_photo_2013_smFrank Value Fund (FRNKX) is not “that other Frank Fund” (John Buckingham’s Al Frank fund VALUX). It’s a concentrated, all-cap value fund that’s approaching its 10th anniversary. It’s entirely plausible that it will celebrate its 10th anniversary with returns in the top 10% of its peer group.

Most funds that claim to be “all cap” are sorting of spoofing you; most mean “all lot of easily-researched large companies with the occasional SMID-cap tossed in.”  To get an idea of how seriously Brian Frank means “go anywhere” when he says “go anywhere,” here’s his Morningstar portfolio map in comparison to that of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index (VTSMX):

 vtsmx  frnkx

Vanguard Total Stock Market

Frank Value

Brian Frank is Frank Capital Partners’ co-founder, president and chief investment officer.  He’s been interested in stock investing since he was a teenager and, like many entrepreneurial managers, was a voracious reader.  At 19, his grandfather gave him $100,000 with the injunction, “buy me the best stocks.”  In pursuit of that goal, he founded a family office in 2002, an investment adviser in 2003 and a mutual fund in 2004. He earned degrees in accounting and finance from NYU.  Here’s Mr. Frank’s 200 words making his case:

What does the large-cap growth or small-cap value manager do when there are no good opportunities in their style box? They hold cash, which lowers your exposure to the equity markets and acts as a lead-weight in bull markets, or they invest in companies that do not fit their criteria and end up taking excess risk in bear markets. Neither one of these options made any sense when I was managing family-only money, and neither one made sense as we opened the strategy to the public through The Frank Value Fund. Our strategy is quantitative, meaning we go where we can numerically prove to ourselves there is opportunity. If there is no opportunity, we leave the space. It sounds simple, and it’s probably what you would do with your own money if you were an investment professional, but it is not how the fund industry is structured. If you believe in buying low-valuation, high-quality companies, and you allow your principles, not the Morningstar style-box to be your guide, I believe our fund has the structure and discipline to maintain this strategy, and I also believe because of this, we will continue to generate significant outperformance over the long-term.

The fund’s minimum initial investment is $1,500.  The fund’s website is clean and well-organized.  Brian’s most-recent discussion of the fund appears in his Second Quarter 2013 shareholder letter, though you might also enjoy his rant about the perils of passive investing.

Elevator Talk #7: Ian Mortimer and Matthew Page of Guinness Atkinson Inflation Managed Dividend (GAINX)

gainxGuinness Atkinson Inflation-Managed Dividend (GAINX) is about the most “normal” fund in GA’s Asia/energy/innovation-dominated line-up.  Its global equity portfolio targets “moderate current income and consistent dividend growth that outpace inflation.”  The centerpiece of their portfolio construction is what they call the “10 over 10” methodology: in order to qualify for consideration, a corporation must have demonstrated at least 10% cash flow return on investment for 10 years.  By their estimation, only 3% of corporations clear this first hurdle.

They then work their way down from a 400 stock universe to a roughly equally-weighted portfolio of 35 names, representing firms with the potential for sustained dividend growth rather than just high current yields.  Morningstar reports that their trailing twelve-month yield is 3.02% while the 10-year U.S. Treasury sits at 2.55% (both as of July 17, 2013).

Managers Ian Mortimer and Matthew Page have a curious distinction: they are British, London-based managers of a largely-U.S. equity portfolio.  While that shouldn’t be remarkable, virtually every other domestic or global fund manager of a U.S. retail fund is American and domiciled here.  Dr. Mortimer earned a Master’s degree from University College London (2003) and a doctorate from Christ College, Oxford, both in physics.  He joined GA in 2006.  Mr. Page earned a Master’s degree in physics from New College, Oxford, worked at Goldman Sachs for a year and joined GA in 2005.  The duo co-manages GA Global Innovators (IWIRX) together.  Each also co-manages an energy fund.  Here are Ian and Matt, sharing 211 words on their strategy:

In the environment of historically low bond yields, investors looking for income are concerned with the possibility of rising inflation and rising yields. We believe a rising dividend strategy that seeks either a rising dividend stream over time or the accumulation of shares through dividend reinvestment offers a systematic method of investing, where dividends provide a consistent, growing income stream through market fluctuations.

Our investment process screens for sustainable dividend paying companies.  For a company to pay a sustainable and potentially rising dividend in the future, it needs to generate consistently high return on capital, creating value each year, and distribute it in the form of a dividend.  We therefore do not seek to maximize the yield of our portfolio by screening for high yield companies, but rather focus on companies that have robust business models and settle for a moderate yield.

Companies generating consistent high return on capital exist all around the world, with 50% based in US. We also find a growing number of them in emerging markets.  They also exist across industries and market capitalisations. Given their high returns on capital 90% of these companies pay dividends.

Further, employing a bottom up value driven approach, we seek to buy these good companies when they are out of favour.

The fund’s minimum initial investment is $10,000, reduced to $5,000 for tax-advantaged accounts.  It’s available for $2500 at Fidelity and Schwab. GA is providing GAINX at 0.68%, which represents a massive subsidy for a $2 million fund.  The fund fact sheet and its homepage include some helpful and concise information about fund strategy, holdings, and performance, as well as biographies of the managers.  Given the importance of the “10 over 10” strategy to the fund’s operation, potential investors really should review their “10 over 10 Dividend Investment Strategy” white paper piece.

Our earlier Elevator Talks were:

  1. February 2013: Tom Kerr, Rocky Peak Small Cap Value (RPCSX), whose manager has a 14 year track record in small cap investing and a passion for discovering “value” in the intersection of many measures: discounted cash flows, LBO models, M&A valuations and traditional relative valuation metrics.
  2. March 2013: Dale Harvey, Poplar Forest Partners (PFPFX and IPFPX), a concentrated, contrarian value stock fund that offers “a once-in-a-generation opportunity to invest with a successful American Funds manager who went out on his own.”
  3. April 2013: Bayard Closser, Vertical Capital Income Fund (VCAPX), “a closed-end interval fund, VCAPX invests in whole mortgage loans and first deeds of trust. We purchase the loans from lenders at a deep discount and service them ourselves.”
  4. May 2013: Jim Hillary, LS Opportunity Fund (LSOFX), a co-founder of Marsico Capital Management whose worry that “the quality of research on Wall Street continues to decline and investors are becoming increasingly concerned about short-term performance” led to his faith in “in-depth research and long-term orientation in our high conviction ideas.”
  5. July 2013: Casey Frazier, Versus Capital Multi-Manager Real Estate Income Fund, a second closed-end interval fund whose portfolio “includes real estate private equity and debt, public equity and debt, and broad exposure across asset types and geographies.  We target a mix of 70% private real estate with 30% public real estate to enhance liquidity, and our objective is to produce total returns in the 7 – 9% range net of fees.”

Pre-Launch Alert: Sarofim and Robeco

This is normally the space where we flag really interested funds which had become available to the public within the past 30 days.   Oddly, two intriguing funds became legal in July but have not yet launched.  This means that the fund companies might open the fund any day now, but might also mean that they’ll sit on the option for months or years.  I’ve been trying, with limited success to uncover the back story.

Robeco Boston Partners Global Long/Short Fund could have launched July 12.  It will be a global version of their Long/Short Research Fund (BPRRX).  When queries, a representative of the fund simply reported “they have yet [to] decide when they will actually launch the fund.” About the worst you can say about Long/Short Research is that it’s not as great as their flagship Robeco Boston Partners L/S Equity Fund (BPLEX).  Since launch, BPRRX has modestly trailed BPLEX but has clubbed most of its competitors.  With $1.5 billion already in the portfolio, it’s likely to close by year’s end.  The global version will be managed by Jay Feeney, Chief Investment Officer-Equities and co-manager of Long/Short Research, and Christopher K. Hart.  $2500 minimum investment.3.77%, the only redeeming feature of which is that institutional investors are getting charged almost as much (3.52%). The recent (July 1) acquisition of 90.1% of Robeco by ORIX might be contributing to the delay since ORIX has their own strategic priorities for Robeco – mostly expanding in Asia and the Middle East – but that’s not been confirmed.

Sarofim Equity (SRFMX) didn’t launch on July 1, though it might have. Sarofim sub-advises the huge Dreyfus Appreciation Fund (DGAGX) whose “principal investment strategies” bear to striking resemblance to this fund’s. (In truth, there appears to be a two word difference between the two.) DGAGX is distinguished by its negligible turnover (typically under 1%), consistently low risk and mega-cap portfolio (the average market cap is north of $100 billion). It typically captures about 80% of the market’s movements, both up and down. Over periods of three years and longer, that translates to trailing the average large cap fund by less than a percent a year while courting a bit under 90% of the short-term volatility. So why launch a direct competitor to DGAGX, especially one that’s priced below what Dreyfus investors are charged for their shares of a $6 billion fund? Good question! Dan Crumrine, Sarofim’s CFO, explained that Sarofim would like to migrate lots of their smaller separately managed accounts (say, those with just a few hundred thousand) into the mutual fund. That would save money for both Sarofim and their clients, since the separate accounts offer a level of portfolio tuning that many of these folks don’t want and that costs money to provide. Dan expects a launch sometime this fall. The fund will have a $2500 minimum and 0.71% expense ratio after waivers (and only 0.87% – still below DGAGX – before waivers).

Sarofim will not market the fund nor will they place it on the major platforms since they aren’t seeking to compete with Dreyfus; they mostly need a “friends and family” fund to help out some of their clients. This has, with other firms, been a recipe for success since the funds don’t need to charge exorbitant amounts, are grounded in a well-tested discipline, and the managers are under no pressure to grow assets.

I’ll keep you posted.

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public. The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details. Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves. Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.

Funds in registration this month won’t be available for sale until, typically, the end of September 2013. There were 12 funds in registration with the SEC this month, through July 15th.  We’ll catch up on the last two weeks of July and all of August in our September issue; we had an early cut-off date this month to accommodate my vacation.

This month’s registrations reveal two particularly interesting developments:

The re-emergence of Stein Roe.  Stein, Roe&Farnham, founded in 1932, had a very well-respected family of no-load funds, most notably Stein Roe Young Investor. There was much drama surrounding the firm. Terrible performance in 1999 led to management shake-ups and botched mergers. Columbia (formerly FleetBoston Financial, then an arm of the Bank of America, later bought by Ameriprise which itself used to be American Express Financial Advisers – jeez, are you keeping a scorecard?) bought the Stein Roe funds in 2001, first renaming them and then merging them out of existence (2007).Somewhere in there, Columbia execs took the funds hip deep in a timing scandal. In 2004, Stein Roe Investment Council – which had been doing separate accounts after the departure of its mutual funds – was purchased by Invesco and became part of their Atlantic Trust private investment group.  In the last two months, Stein Roe has begun creeping back into the retail, no-load fund world as adviser to the new family of AT funds.  Last month it announced the rebranding of Invesco Disciplined Equity (AWIEX) as AT Disciplined Equity.  This month it’s added two entirely new funds to the line-up: AT Mid Cap Equity Fundand AT Income Opportunities Fund.  The former invests in mid-cap stocks while the latter pursues income and growth through a mix of common and preferred stocks and bonds.  The minimum initial investment is $3000 for either and the expense ratios are 1.39% and 1.25%, respectively. 

The first fund to advertise training wheels. Baron is launching Baron Discovery Fund, whose market cap target is low enough to qualify it as a micro-cap fund.  It will be co-managed by two guys who have been working as Baron analysts for more than a decade.  Apparently someone at Baron was a bit ambivalent about the promotion and so they’ve created an entirely new position at the fund: “Portfolio Manager Adviser.”   They’ve appointed the manager of Baron Small Cap, Cliff Greenberg, to make sure that the kids don’t get in over their heads.  His responsibility is to “advise the co-managers of the Fund on stock selection and buy and sell decisions” and, more critically, he’s responsible “for ensuring the execution of the Fund’s investment strategy.”  Uhh … what does it tell you when the nominal managers of the fund aren’t trusted to execute the fund’s investment strategy? Perhaps that they shouldn’t be the managers of the fund?  Make no mistake: many funds have “lead” managers and “co-managers,” who presumably enact the same sort of mentorship role and oversight that Baron is building here. The difference is that, in all of the other cases that come to mind, the guy in charge is the manager.  The minimum initial investment is $2000, reduced to $500 for accounts set up with an AIP. Expenses not yet announced.

Details and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

Manager Changes

On a related note, we also tracked down a near-record 64 fund manager changes.  Freakishly, that’s the exact number of changes we identified last month.  Investors should take particular note of Bill Frels’ year-end departure from Mairs and Power and Jesper Madsen’s impended exit from Matthews and from the finance industry.  Both firms have handled past transitions very smoothly, but these are both lead managers with outstanding records.

Update #1: Celebrating three years for the ASTON/River Road Long-Short strategy

ASTON/River Road Long/Short Fund (ARLSX) launched on May 4, 2011.  It will have to wait until May 2014 to celebrate its third anniversary and June 2014 to receive its first Morningstar rating.  The strategy behind the fund, though, began operating in a series of separate accounts in June 2010.  As a result, the strategy just completed its third year and we asked manager Matt Moran about the highlights of his first three years.  He points to two in particular:

We are thrilled to have just completed our third year for the composite.  The mutual fund track record is now just a bit over two years.

[Co-manager] Daniel [Johnson] and I think there are two important points about our strategy now that we’ve hit three years:

  1. Based on the Sharpe ratio, our composite ranks as the #1 strategy (attached with disclosures) of all 129 funds in the Morningstar Long-Short category over the past three years.

    We like what legendary investor Howard Marks wrote about the Sharpe ratio on page 39-40 of his 2011 masterpiece The Most Important Thing, “…investors who want some objective measure of risk-adjusted return…can only look to the so-called Sharpe ratio…this calculation seems serviceable for public market securities that trade and price often…and it truly is the best we have (my emphasis)”.

  2. We’ve grown our AUM from $8 MM at the beginning of 2013 to $81.7 MM as of [mid-July, 2013].

    We are very pleased to have returned +14.1% annualized (gross) versus the Russell 3000 at +18.6% over the past three years with just [about] 45% of the volatility, a beta of 0.36, and a maximum drawdown of [about] 7.65% (vs. 20.4% for the Russell 3000).

Their long/short strategy has a nicely asymmetrical profile: it has captured 59% of the market’s upside but only 33% of the downside since inception.  ARLSX, the mutual fund which is one embodiment of the strategy, strikes us as one of three really promising “pure” long/short funds.  Folks anxious about abnormal market highs and considerable sensitivity to risk might want to poke around ARLSX’s homepage. There’s a separate and modestly more-detailed discussion on the River Road Asset Management Long-Short Equity Strategy homepage, including a nicely-done factsheet.

Update #2: Celebrating the new website for Oakseed Opportunity Fund

Okay, I suppose it’s possible that, at the end of our profile of Oakseed Opportunity Fund (SEEDX), I might have harshed on the guys just a little bit about the quality of their website:

Mr. Park mentioned that neither of them much liked marketing.  Uhhh … it shows.  I know the guys are just starting out and pinching pennies, but really these folks need to talk with Anya and Nina about a site that supports their operations and informs their (prospective) investors.  

One of the great things about the managers of small funds is that they’re still open to listening and reacting to what they’ve heard.  And so with some great delight (and a promise to edit the snarky comment at the end of their profile), we note the appearance of an attractive and far more useful Oakseed website: oakseed

Welcome, indeed.  Nicely done, guys!

Briefly Noted . . .

DWS Enhanced Emerging Markets Fixed Income Fund (SZEAX), an emerging markets junk bond fund (and don’t you really need more exposure to the riskiest of e.m. bonds?) changed its principal investment strategy from investing in emerging markets junk to strike the proviso “the fund invests at least 50% of its total assets in sovereign debt securities issued or guaranteed by governments, government-related entities, supranational organizations and central banks based in emerging markets.”

ING International Growth Fundbecame ING Multi-Manager International Equity Fund (IIGIX) on July 1, 2013. More Marsico fallout: the nice folks from Marsico Capital Management were shown the door by Harbor International Growth (HIIGX) in May.  Baillie Gifford pulled two managers from the ING fund to help manage the Harbor one.  ING then decided to add Lazard and J.P. Morgan as sub-advisers to the fund, in addition to Baillie Gifford and T. Rowe Price.

As of August 1, TIAA-CREF LIFECYCLE FUNDS added TIAA-CREF International Opportunities Fund to their investable universe and increased their exposure to international stocks.

As set forth more fully below, effective as of August 1, 2013, Teachers Advisors, Inc. has increased the maximum exposure of the Funds to the international sector. In addition, the Advisor has begun investing in the and, effective August 1, 2013, the international component of each Fund’s composite benchmark has been changed from the MSCI EAFE® + EM Index to the MSCI ACWI ex-USA® Index.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Hmmm … a bit thin this month.

The folks at Fleishman/Hillard report that Cognios Market Neutral Large Cap (COGMX) has been added to the Charles Schwab, Fidelity and Pershing platforms. It’s a new no-load that’s had a bit of a shaky start.

Melissa Mitchell of CWR & Partners reports some success on the part of the Praxis funds (socially responsible, faith-based, front loaded and institutional classes) in getting Hershey’s to commit to eliminating the use of child slaves in the cocoa plantations that serve it:

The chocolate industry’s history is riddled with problems related to child slavery on African cocoa bean farms. Everence, through its Praxis Mutual Funds, is actively working with chocolate companies to address the conditions that lead to forced child labor. For the last three years, Praxis has co-led shareholders in working with Hershey – one of the world’s largest chocolatiers – to shape new solutions to this long-standing problem.

Their Intermediate Income Fund (MIIAX) has purchased $2 million in International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) bonds, funding a program which will help save millions of children from preventable diseases. Okay, those aren’t wins for investors per se but they’re danged admirable pursuits regardless and deserve some recognition.

CLOSINGS (and related inconveniences)

Fidelity will close Fidelity Ultra-Short Bond (FUSFX) to most investors on Aug. 2, 2013. It’s one of the ultra-short funds that went off a cliff in last 2007 and never quite regained its stride. Given that the fund’s assets are far below their peak, the closure might be a sign of some larger change on the way.

Artisan is closing Artisan Small Cap (ARTSX), the flagship fund, on August 2nd. This is the second closure in the fund’s history. In October 2009, Artisan rotated a new management team in: Andrew Stephens and the folks responsible for Artisan Midcap.  Since that time, the fund’s performance has improved dramatically and assets have steadily accumulated to $1.2 billion now.  Artisan has a long tradition of closing their funds in order to keep them manageable, so the move is entirely laudable.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Marsico has gotten the boot so often that they’re thinking of opening a shoe store. The latest round includes their dismissal from the AST Marsico Capital Growth Portfolio, which became the AST Loomis Sayles Large-Cap Growth Portfolio on July 15, 2013.  This is the second portfolio that AST pulled from Marsico in recent weeks.  The firm’s assets are now down by $90 billion from their peak.  At the same time, The New York Times celebrated Marsico Global (MGLBX) as one of three “Mutual Funds that Made Sense of a Confusing Market” (July 6, 2013).

Invesco Global Quantitative Core (GTNDX) changed its name to Invesco Global Low Volatility Equity Yield on July 31, 2013.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

Compak Dynamic Asset Allocation Fund (CMPKX) will be liquidated on or about September 13, 2013.  It closed to all new investment on July 31, 2013.  It’s a little fund-of-funds run by Moe and Faroz Ansari, both of whom appear to be interesting and distinguished guys.  High expenses, front load, undistinguished – but not bad – performance.

Invesco Dynamics (IDYAX) merged into Invesco Mid Cap Growth (VGRAX) and Invesco Municipal Bond (AMBDX) merged into Invesco Municipal Income (VKMMX).

John Hancock Funds liquidated two tiny funds on July 30: the $1.9 million JHancock Leveraged Companies (JVCAX) and the $3.5 million JHancock Small Cap Opportunities (JCPAX).  Do you suppose it’s a coincidence that JHancock Leveraged Companies was launched at the very peak of Fidelity Leverage Company’s performance?  From inception to April 28, 2008, FLVCX turned $10,000 into $41,000 while its midcap peers reached only $16,000. Sadly, and typically, Fidelity trailed its peers and benchmark noticeably from that day to this. JHancock did better but with its hopes of riding Fidelity’s coattails smashed …

Lord Abbett Small Cap Blend Fund melted into the Lord Abbett Value Opportunities Fund (LVOAX) on July 19, 2013. The fact that Value Opps doesn’t particularly invest in small cap stocks and has struggled to transcend “mediocre” in the last several years makes this a less-than-ideal merger.

My favorite liquidation notice, quoted in its entirety: “On July 31,2013, the ASG Growth Markets Fund (AGMAX) was liquidated. The Fund no longer exists, and as a result, shares of the Fund are no longer available for purchase or exchange.” It appears mostly to have bet on emerging markets currencies. Over its short life, it managed to transform $10,000 into $9,400.

COUNTRY Bond Fund (CTLAX) and COUNTRY Growth Fund (CGRAX) will be liquidated “on or before October 31, 2013, and in any event no later than December 31, 2013.” I have no idea (1) why the word “Country” is supposed to appear in all caps (same with ASTON) or (2) why you’d liquidate a reasonably solid fund with over $300 million in assets or a mediocre one with $250 million. No word of explanation in the filing.

The King is Dead: Fountainhead Special Value Fund (KINGX) has closed to new investors in anticipation of an October liquidation. Twas a $7 million midcap growth fund that had a promising start, cratered in the 2007-09 crisis and never recovered.

In Closing . . .

That’s about it from Door County.  I’ll soon be back at my desk as we pull together the September issue.  We’ll have a look inside your target-date funds and will share four more fund profiles (including one that we’ve dubbed “Dodge and Cox without all the excess baggage”).  It’s work, but joyful.

dave-on-bench

It wouldn’t be worthwhile without your readership and your thoughtful feedback.  And it wouldn’t be possible without your support, either directly or by using our Amazon link.   Our readership, curiously enough, has spiked to 15,014 “unique visitors” this month, though our revenue through Amazon is flat.  So, we thought we’d mention the system for the benefit of the new folks.  The Amazon system is amazingly simple and painless.  If you set our link as your default bookmark for Amazon (or, as I do, use Amazon as your homepage), the Observer receives a rebate from Amazon equivalent to 6% or more of the amount of your purchase.  It doesn’t change your cost by a penny since the money comes from Amazon’s marketing budget.  While 6% of the $11 you’ll pay for Bill Bernstein’s The Investor’s Manifesto (or 6% of a pound of coffee beans, back-to-school loot or an Easton S1 composite big barrel bat) seems trivial, it adds up to about 75% of our income.  Thanks for both!

We’ll look for you.

 David

LS Opportunity Fund (LSOFX), August 2013

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

The Fund aims to preserve capital while delivering above-market returns and managing volatility.  They invest, long and short, in a domestic equity portfolio.  The portfolio is driven by intensive company research and risk management protocols. The long portfolio is typically 30-50 names, though as of mid-2013 it was closer to 70.  The short portfolio is also 30-50 names.  The average long position persists for 12-24 months while the average short position is closed after 3-6.  The fund averages about 50% net long, though at any given point it might be 20-70% long.  The fund’s target standard deviation is eight.

Adviser

Long Short Advisors, LLC.   LSA launched the LS Opportunity Fund to offer access to Independence Capital Asset Partners’ long/short equity strategy. ICAP is a Denver-based long/short equity manager with approximately $500 million in assets under management.

Manager

James A. Hillary, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Investment Officer, and Portfolio Manager at ICAP.  Mr. Hillary founded Independence Capital Asset Partners (ICAP) in 2004. From 1997-2004, Mr. Hillary was a founding partner and portfolio manager at Marsico Capital Management.  While there he managed the 21st Century Fund (MXXIX) and co-managed several other products. Morningstar noted that during Mr. Hillary’s tenure “the fund [MXXIX] has sailed past the peer-group norm by a huge margin.” Bank of America bought Marsico in 2000, at which time Mr. Hillary received a substantial payout.  Before Marsico, he managed a long/short equity fund for W.H. Reaves. Effective June 1, 2013, Mr. Chris Hillary was added as a co-portfolio manager of the Fund. Messrs Hillary are supported by seven other investment professionals.

Strategy capacity and closure

The strategy, which is manifested in the mutual fund, a hedge fund (ICAP QP Absolute Return Fund), a European investment vehicle (Prosper Stars and Stripes, no less) and separate accounts, might accommodate as much as $2 billion in assets but the advisor will begin at about $1 billion to look at the prospect of soft closing the strategy.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

The senior Mr. Hillary has between $100,000 and 500,000 in the fund.  Most of his investable net wealth is invested here and in other vehicles using this strategy.  The firm’s principals and employees account for about 14% of ICAP’s AUM, though the fund’s trustees have no investment in the fund.

Opening date

September 9, 2010, though the hedge fund which runs side-by-side with it was launched in 2004.

Minimum investment

$5,000

Expense ratio

1.95% on fund assets of $40 million.  The limit was reduced in early 2013 from 2.50%.

Comments

In 2004, Jim Hillary had a serious though delightful problem.  As one of the co-founders of MCM, he had received a rich payout from the Bank of America when they purchased the firm.  The problem was what to do with that payout.

He had, of course, several options.  He might have allowed someone else to manage the money, though I suspect he would have found that option to be laughable.  In managing it himself, he might reasonably have chosen a long-only equity portfolio, a long-short equity portfolio or a long equity portfolio supplemented by some sort of fixed-income position.  He had success in managing both of the first two approaches and might easily have pursued the third.

The decision that Mr. Hillary made was to pursue a long-short equity strategy as the most prudent and sustainable way to manage his own and his family’s wealth.  That strategy achieved substantial success, measured both by its ability to achieve sustainable long-term returns (about 9% annually from 2004) and to manage volatility (a standard deviation of about 12, both better than the Total Stock Market’s performance). 

Mr. Hillary’s success became better known and he chose, bit by bit, to make the strategy available to others.  One manifestation of the strategy is that ICAP QP Absolute Return L.P. hedge fund, a second is the European SICAV Prosper Star & Stripes, and a third are separately managed accounts.  The fourth and newest manifestation, and the only one available to retail investors, is LS Opportunity Fund.  Regardless of which vehicle you invest in, you are relying on the same strategy and the portfolio in which Mr. Hillary’s own fortune resides.

Mr. Hillary’s approach combines intensive fundamental research in individual equities, both long and short. 

There are two questions for potential investors:

  • Does a long-short position make sense for me?
  • Does this particular long-short vehicle make the most sense for me?

The argument for long-short investing is complicated by the fact that there are multiple types of long-short funds which, despite having similar names or the same peer group assigned by a rating agency, have strikingly different portfolios and risk/return profiles.  A fund which combines an ETF-based long portfolio and covered calls might, for example, offer far more income but far fewer opportunities for gain than a “pure” long/short strategy such as this one.

The argument for pure long/short is straightforward: investors cannot stomach the volatility generated by unhedged exposure to the stock market.  That volatility has traditionally been high (the standard deviation for large cap stocks this century has been over 16 while the mean return has been 4; the translation is that you’ve been averaging a measly 4% per year while routinely encountering returns in the range of minus-12 to plus-20 with the occasional quarterly loss of 17% and annual loss of 40% thrown in) and there’s no reason to expect it to decline.   The traditional hedge has been to hold a large bond position, which worked well during the 30-year bond bull market just ended.  Going forward, asset allocation specialists expect the bond market to post negative real returns for years.  Cash, which is also posting negative real returns, is hardly an attractive option.

The alternative is a portfolio which offsets exposure to the market’s most attractive stocks with bets against its least attractive ones.  Research provided by Long Short Advisors makes two important points:

  • since 1998, an index of long/short equity hedge funds has outperformed a simple 60/40 allocation with no material change in risk and
  • when the market moves out of its panic mode, which are periods in which all stocks move in abnormal unison, both the upside and downside advantages of a hedged strategy rises in comparison to a long-only portfolio.

In short, a skilled long-short manager can offer more upside and less downside than either a pure stock portfolio or a stock/bond hybrid one.

The argument for LS Opportunity is simpler.  Most long/short managers have limited experience either with shorting stocks or with mutual funds as an investment vehicle.  More and more long/short funds are entering the market with managers whose ability is undocumented and whose prospects are speculative.  Given the complexity and cost of the strategy, I’d avoid managers-with-training-wheels.

Mr. Hillary, in contrast, has a record worth noticing.  He’s managed separate accounts and hedge funds, but also has a fine record as a mutual fund manager.  He’s been working with long/short portfolios since his days at W.H. Reaves in the early 1990s.  The hedge fund on which LS Opportunity is based has survived two jarring periods, including the most traumatic market since the Great Depression.  The mutual fund itself has outperformed its peers since launch and has functioned with about half of the market’s volatility.

Bottom Line

This is not a risk-free strategy.  The fund has posted losses in 15 of its first 34 months of operation.  Eight of those losses have come in months when the S&P500 rose.  The fund’s annualized return from inception through the end of June 2013 is 6.32% while the S&P moved relentlessly and, many fear, irrationally higher.  In the longer term, the strategy has worked to both boost returns and mute volatility.  And, with his personal fortune and professional reputation invested in the strategy, you’d be working with an experienced team which has committed “our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor” to making it work.  It’s worth further investigation.

Fund website

LS Opportunity Fund

3Q 2013 Fact Sheet

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Sextant Global High Income (SGHIX), August 2013

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

The fund seeks high income, with a secondary objective of capital preservation.  They invest in a global, diversified portfolio of income-producing debt and equity securities.  They manage risk at the level of individual security selection, but also through their ability to allocate between stocks and bonds, sectors, countries and currencies.  Their portfolio may invest in up to 50% in equities, 50% in the U.S., 50% in investment grade bonds, and 33% in emerging markets.  They won’t engage in hedging, leverage or credit default swaps. 

Adviser

Saturna Capital Corporation, which was founded in 1989.  Saturna has about $3.9 billion in assets under management and advises the Sextant, Idaho and Amana funds.  Their funds are universally and continually solid, sensible and risk-conscious.

Manager

Bryce Fegley and John Scott. Mr. Fegley joined Saturna 2001, served as an analyst and then as director of research at their Malaysian subsidiary, Saturna Sdn Bhd.  Mr. Scott joined Saturna 2009.  He has worked with Morgan Stanley Smith Barney in  California and Hyundai Securities in Seoul, S. Korea.

Strategy capacity and closure

They haven’t really discussed the matter formally.  Mr. Fegley’s general sense is that the fund’s stake in preferred shares (currently 8% of the portfolio) would represent the largest constraint because the preferred market is small ($200 billion) compared to the common stock market ($14 trillion) and might well shrink by half over the next few years as new banking regulations kick in.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

As of November 30, 2012, Mr. Fegley had invested between $100,000 and 500,000 in the fund while Mr. Scott had between $50,000 and 100,000.  As of the most recent SAI, their boss, Nick Kaiser, owned 30% of all of the fund’s shares which would be rather more than a million in the fund.

Opening date

March 30, 2012.

Minimum investment

$1,000 for regular accounts, $100 for IRAs.

Expense ratio

0.75% on assets of $9.4 million.

Comments

SGHIX, positioned as “a retirees’ fund,” responds to two undeniable realities: (1) investors need income and (2) the old stand-by – toss money into an aggregate bond index full of Treasuries – will, for a generation or more, no longer work.  Grantham, Mayo, van Otterloo (a/k/a GMO) forecast “The Purgatory of Low Returns” (July 2013) for investors over the next seven years with a tradition 60/40 hybrid earning a real return under 1% per year and most classes of U.S. bonds posting negative real returns.  Their recommendations for possible paths forward: concentrate on the highest return asset classes and rebalance frequently, seek alternatives, use leverage, and be patient.

With the exception of “use leverage,” Sextant does.  SGHIX explicitly targets “high current income” and has broad flexibility to seek income almost anywhere, though they do so with a prudent concern for risk.  John Scott describes himself as “the offensive manager,” the guy charged with finding the broadest possible array of reasonably-priced, income-producing securities.  Bryce Fegley is “the defensive manager,” a self-described “asset allocation nerd” who aims to balance the effects of many sources of risk – country, valuation, interest rate, currency – while still pursuing a high-income mandate.  Their strategy is to buy and hold for as long as possible: they hope to hold bonds to redemption and stocks as long as their dividends seem secure.  With hard work, luck and skill, their ability to move between dividend-paying common stock, preferred shares (currently 8% of the portfolio) and relatively high-quality high yield bonds might allow them to achieve their goal of high income.

How high?  The managers estimate that they might earn 300-400 bps more than a 10-year Treasury.  In a “normal” world, a 10-year might earn 4.5%; this fund might earn 7.5 – 8.5%.  In addition, the managers believe they might be able to add 2% per year in capital appreciation.

What concerns should prospective investors have?  Three come immediately to mind:

  1. To date, execution of the strategy has been imperfect. From inception through mid-July 2013, a period of about 15 months, the fund posted a total return of 5.2%.  Much of their portfolio was, for about six months, in cash which certainly depressed returns.  The managers are very aware of the fact that many investments are not paying investors for the risk they’re taking and have, as a result, positioned the portfolio conservatively.  In addition, it’s almost impossible to construct a true peer group for this fund since its combination of a high income mandate, equities and tactical asset allocation changes is unique.  There are four other funds with “global high income” in their names (Aberdeen, DWS, Fidelity, and MainStay plus one closed-end fund), but all are essentially high-yield bond funds with 0-3% in equities.

    That having been said, a 4% annual return – roughly equivalent to the fund’s yield – is pretty modest.  Investors interested in high income derived from a globally diversified portfolio might consider Sextant in the company with any of a number of funds or ETFs that advertise themselves as providing “multi-asset income.”  An incomplete roster of such options and their total return from the date of Sextant’s launch through 7/29/13 includes:

     

    10K at SGHIX inception became

    30-day SEC yield

    Stock/bond allocation

    Guggenheim Multi-Asset Income (CVY)

    11,800

    5.9

    91 / 6

    Arrow Dow Jones Global Yield ETF (GYLD)

    11,300

    5.8

    60 / 40

    BlackRock Multi-Asset Income (BAICX)

    11,200

    4.5

    23 / 53

    iShares Morningstar Multi-Asset Income (IYLD)

    10,700

    6.1

    35 / 58

    T. Rowe Price Spectrum Income (RPSIX)

    10,700

    2.9

    13 / 77

    SPDR SSgA Income Allocation (INKM)

    10,600

    4.2

    50 / 40

    Sextant

    10,500

    4.0

    45 / 34

    The portfolio composition stats illustrate the fact that none of these funds are pure peers.  They are, however, plausible competitors: that is, they represent alternatives that potential SGHIX investors might consider. The other consideration, though, is that many of these funds are substantially more volatile than Sextant is.  Below are the funds with launch dates near Sextant’s, along with their maximum draw down (that is, it measures the magnitude of a fund’s worst decline) and Ulcer Index (which factors-in both magnitude and duration of a decline).  In both cases, “smaller” is “better.”

     

    Maximum drawdown

    Date

    Ulcer Index

    iShares Morningstar Multi-Asset Income (IYLD)

    7.9

    06/13

    2.7

    SPDR SSgA Income Allocation (INKM)

    6.9

    06/13

    2.3

    Arrow Dow Jones Global Yield ETF (GYLD)

    6.8

    06/13

    2.3

    Sextant

    4.7

    06/13

    1.6

  2. The decision to provide a payout only once a year may not meet retirees’ needs for steady income.  For investors who choose to receive their income in a check, rather than reinvesting it in fund shares, Sextant’s policy of paying out dividends and interest only once each year may be sub-optimal.  The likeliest work-around would be to establish a systematic withdrawal plan, whereby an investor automatically redeems shares of the fund at regular intervals.
  3. The fund’s risk calculus is not clearly articulated.  This is a relative, rather than absolute, value portfolio.  The managers feel compelled to remain fully invested in something. They’re currently moving around, looking to find income-producing assets where the income is relatively high and steady and the risk of loss of principal is manageable.  That’s led them to a relatively low-yielding portfolio.  When we talked about what level of risk they targeted or were willing to accept, the answer was pretty close to “it depends on what’s available.”  While some funds have target volatility levels or drawdowns, the Sextant team seems mostly to be feeling their way along, taking the best deals they can find.  That strategy would be a bit more palatable if the managers had a longer record, here or elsewhere, of navigating markets with the strategy.

Bottom Line

Sextant Global High Income has a lot to recommend it.  The fund’s price (0.90%) is low, especially for such a tiny fund, as is its minimum investment.  Saturna has an excellent reputation for patient, profitable, risk-conscious investing.  The ability to travel globally and to tap into multiple asset classes is distinctive and exceedingly attractive. The question is whether the two young managers will pull it off.  They’re both bright and dedicated guys, we’re pulling for them and we’ll watch the fund closely to see how it matures.

Fund website

Sextant Global High Income

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Grandeur Peak Global Reach (GPROX), August 2013

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

Global Reach pursues long-term capital growth primarily by investing globally in a small and micro-cap portfolio.  Up to 90% of the fund might normally be invested in microcaps (stocks with market cap under $1 billion at the time of purchase), but they’re also allowed to invest up to 35% in stocks over $5 billion.  The managers seek high quality companies that they place in one of three classifications:

Best-In-Class Growth Companies: fast earnings growth, good management, strong financials.  The strategy is to “find them small and undiscovered; buy and hold” until the market catches on.  In the interim, capture the compounded earnings growth.

Fallen Angels: good growth companies that hit “a bump in the road” and are priced as value stocks.  The strategy is to buy them low and hold through the recovery.

Stalwarts: basically, blue chip mid-cap stocks.  Decent but not great growth, great financials, and the prospect of dividends or stock buy-backs.  The strategy is to buy them at a fair price, but be careful of overpaying since their growth may be decelerating.

Grandeur Peak considers this “our flagship … strategy.”  It is their most broadly diversified and team-based strategy.  Global Reach will typically own 300-500 stocks, somewhere around 1-2% of their investible universe.

Adviser

Grandeur Peak Global Advisors is a small- and micro-cap focused global equities investment firm, founded in mid-2011, and comprised of a very experienced and collaborative investment team that worked together for years managing some of the Wasatch funds.  They advise three Grandeur Peak funds and one “pooled investment vehicle.”  The adviser passed $1 billion in assets under management in July, 2013.

Managers

Robert Gardiner and Blake Walker, assisted by three associate managers.   Robert Gardiner is co-founder, CEO and Director of Research for Grandeur Peak Global.  Prior to founding Grandeur Peak, he managed or co-managed Wasatch Microcap (WMICX), Small Cap Value (WMCVX) and Microcap Value (WAMVX, in which I own shares).  In 2007, he took a sort of sabbatical from active management, but continued as Director of Research.  During that sabbatical, he reached a couple conclusions: (1) global small/micro-cap investing was the world’s most interesting sector, and (2) he wanted to get back to managing a fund.  He returned to active management with the launch of Wasatch Global Opportunities (WAGOX), a global small/micro-cap fund.  From inception in late 2008 to July 2011 (the point of his departure), WAGOX turned a $10,000 investment into $23,500, while an investment in its average peer would have led to a $17,000 portfolio.  Put another way, WAGOX earned $13,500 or 92% more than its average peer managed.

Blake Walker is co-founder of and Chief Investment Officer for Grandeur Peak. Mr. Walker was a portfolio manager for two funds at Wasatch Advisors. Mr. Walker joined the research team at Wasatch Advisors in 2001 and launched his first fund, the Wasatch International Opportunities Fund (WAIOX) in 2005. He teamed up with Mr. Gardiner in 2008 to launch the Wasatch Global Opportunities (WAGOX).

The associate managers, all Wasatch alumni, are Amy Hu Sunderland, Randy Pearce, and Spencer Stewart.

Strategy capacity and closure

$400-500 million.  Grandeur Peak specializes in global small and micro-cap investing.  Their estimate, given current conditions, is that they could effectively manage about $3 billion in assets.  They could imagine running seven distinct small- to micro-cap funds and tend to close all of them (likely a soft close) when the firm’s assets under management reach about $2 billion.  The adviser has target closure levels for each current and planned fund.

Management’s stake in the fund

None yet disclosed, but the Grandeur Peak folks tend to invest heavily in their funds.

Opening date

June 19, 2013.

Minimum investment

$2,000, reduced to $1,000 for an account established with an automatic investment plan.

Expense ratio

1.25% on assets of $252.3 (as of July 2023). 

Comments

When Grandeur Peak opened shop in 2011, passion declared that this should be their first fund.  Prudence dictated otherwise.

Prudence prevailed.

I approached this prevail with some combination of curiosity bordering on skepticism.  The fact that Grandeur Peak closed two funds – presumably a signal that they had reached the limit of their ability to productively invest in this style – and then immediately launched a third, near-identical fund, raised questions about whether this was some variety of a marketing ploy.  Some reflection and a long conversation with Eric Huefner, Grandeur Peak’s president, convinced me otherwise. 

To understand my revised conclusion, and the conflict between passion and prudence, it’s important to understand the universe within which Grandeur Peak operates. 

Their investable universe is about 30,000 publicly-traded stocks, most particularly small and microcap, from around the globe, many with little external analyst coverage.  At the moment of launch, Grandeur Peak had six full-time investment professionals on staff.  Fully covering all 30,000 would have been a Herculean task.  Quite beyond that, Grandeur Peak faced the question: “How do we make our business model work?”  Unlike many fund companies, Grandeur Peak chose to focus solely on its mutual funds and not on separately-managed accounts or private partnerships.  Making that model work, especially with a fair amount of overhead, required that they be able to gather attention and assets.  The conclusion that the Grandeur Peak executives reached was that it was more prudent to launch two more-focused, potentially more newsworthy funds as their opening gambit.  Those two funds, Global Opportunities and International Opportunities, performed spectacularly in their two years of operations, having gathered a billion in assets and considerable press attention.

The success of Grandeur Peak’s first two funds allowed them to substantially increase their investment staff to fourteen, including seven senior investment professionals and seven junior ones.  With the greater staff available, they felt now that prudence called them to launch the fund that Mr. Gardiner hoped would be the firm’s flagship and crown jewel.

The structure of the Grandeur Peak funds is intriguing and distinctive.  The plan is for Global Reach to function as a sort of master portfolio, holding all of the stocks that the firm finds, at any given point, to be compelling.  They estimate that that will be somewhere between 300 and 500 names.  Those stocks will be selected based on the same criteria that drove portfolio construction at GPGOX and GPIOX and at the Wasatch funds before them.   Those selection criteria drive Grandeur Peak to seek out high quality small companies with a strong bias toward microcap stocks.  This has traditionally been a distinctive niche and a highly rewarding one.   Of all of the global stock funds in existence, Grandeur Peak has the smallest market cap by far and, in its two years of existence, it has posted some of its category’s strongest returns.

The plan is to offer Global Reach as the flagship portfolio and, for many investors, the most logical place for them to invest with Grandeur Peak.  It will offer the broadest and most diversified take on Gardiner and Walker’s investing skills.  It will be part of an eventual constellation of seven funds.  Global Reach will offer the most complete portfolio.  Each of the remaining funds will offer a way for investors to “tilt” their portfolios.  An investor who has a particular desire for exposure to frontier and emerging markets might choose to invest in Global Reach (which currently has 16% in emerging markets), but then to supplement it with a position in the eventual Emerging Markets Opportunities fund.  But for the vast majority of investors who have no particular justification for tilting their portfolio toward any set of attributes (domestic, value, emerging), the logical core holding is Global Reach. 

Are there reasons for concern?  Two come to mind.

Managing seven funds could, eventually, stretch the managers’ resources.  Cutting against this is the unique relationship of Global Reach to its sister portfolios.  The great bulk of the research effort will manifest itself in the Global Reach portfolio; the remaining funds will remain subsidiary to it.  That is, they will represent slices of the larger portfolio, not distinct burdens in addition to it.

The fund’s expense ratios are structurally, persistently high.  The fund will charge 1.60%, below the 1.88% at GPGOX, but substantially above the 1.20% charged by the average no-load global fund.  The management fee alone is 1.10%.  Cutting against that, of course, is the fact that Mr. Gardiner has for nearly three decades now, more than earned the fees assessed to his investors. It appears that you’re getting more than what you are paying for; while the fee is substantial, it seems to be well-earned.

Bottom Line

This is a very young, but very promising fund.  It is the fund that Grandeur Peak has wanted to launch from Day One, and it is understandably attracting considerable attention, drawing nearly $20 million in its first 30 days of operation.  For investors interested in a portfolio of high-quality, growth-oriented stocks from around the globe, there are few more-attractive opportunities available to them.

Website

Grandeur Peak Global Reach

[cr2013]

Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities (GPGOX), August 2013 update

By David Snowball

THIS IS AN UPDATE OF THE FUND PROFILE ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN February 2012. YOU CAN FIND THAT PROFILE HERE.

Objective and Strategy

Global Opportunities pursues long-term capital growth by investing in a portfolio of global equities with a strong bias towards small- and micro-cap companies. Investments may include companies based in the U.S., developed foreign countries, and emerging/frontier markets. The portfolio has flexibility to adjust its investment mix by market cap, country, and sector in order to invest where the best global opportunities exist.  The managers expect to move towards 100-150 holdings (currently just over 200).

Adviser

Grandeur Peak Global Advisors is a small- and micro-cap focused global equities investment firm, founded in mid-2011, and comprised of a very experienced and collaborative investment team that worked together for years managing some of the Wasatch funds.  They advise three Grandeur Peak funds and one “pooled investment vehicle.”  The adviser passed $1 billion in assets under management in July, 2013.

Managers

Robert Gardiner and Blake Walker.   Robert Gardiner is co-founder, CEO and Director of Research for Grandeur Peak Global.  Prior to founding Grandeur Peak, he managed or co-managed Wasatch Microcap (WMICX), Small Cap Value (WMCVX) and Microcap Value (WAMVX, in which I own shares).  In 2007, he took a sort of sabbatical from active management, but continued as Director of Research.  During that sabbatical, he reached a couple conclusions: (1) global microcap investing was the world’s most interesting sector, and (2) he wanted to get back to managing a fund.  He returned to active management with the launch of Wasatch Global Opportunities (WAGOX), a global small/micro-cap fund.  From inception in late 2008 to July 2011 (the point of his departure), WAGOX turned a $10,000 investment into $23,500, while an investment in its average peer would have led to a $17,000 portfolio.  Put another way, WAGOX earned $13,500 or 92% more than its average peer managed.

Blake Walker is co-founder of and Chief Investment Officer for Grandeur Peak. Mr. Walker was a portfolio manager for two funds at Wasatch Advisors. Mr. Walker joined the research team at Wasatch Advisors in 2001 and launched his first fund, the Wasatch International Opportunities Fund (WAIOX) in 2005. He teamed up with Mr. Gardiner in 2008 to launch the Wasatch Global Opportunities (WAGOX).

Strategy capacity and closure

Grandeur Peak specializes in global small and micro-cap investing.  Their estimate, given current conditions, is that they could profitably manage about $3 billion in assets.  They could imagine running seven distinct small- to micro-cap funds and tend to close all of them (likely a soft close) when the firm’s assets under management reach about $2 billion.  The adviser has target closure levels for each current and planned fund.

Management’s stake in the fund

As of 4/30/2012, Mr. Gardiner had invested over $1 million in each of his funds, Mr. Walker had between $100,000 and 500,000 in each.  President Eric Huefner makes an argument that I find persuasive: “We are all highly vested in the success of the funds and the firm. Every person took a significant pay cut (or passed up a significantly higher paying opportunity) to be here.”   The fund’s trustees are shared with 24 other funds; none of those trustees are invested with the fund.

Opening date

October 17, 2011.

Minimum investment

The fund closed to new investors on May 1, 2013.  It remains open for additional investments by existing shareholders.

Expense ratio

1.34% on $674.2 million in assets (as of July 2023). 

Comments

As part of a long-established plan, Global Opportunities closed to new investors in May, 2013.  That’s great news for the fund’s investors and, with the near-simultaneous launch of Grandeur Peak Global Reach (GPROX/GPRIX), not terrible news for the rest of us.

There are three matters of particular note:

  1. This is a choice, not an echo.  Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities goes where virtually no one else does: tiny companies across the globe.  Most “global” funds invest in huge, global corporations.  Of roughly 280 global stock funds, 90% have average market caps over $10 billion with the average being $27 billion.  Only eight, or just 3%, are small cap funds.  GPGOX has the lowest average market capitalization of any global fund (as of July, 2013). While their peers’ large cap emphasis dampens risk, it also tends to dampen rewards and produces rather less diversification value for a portfolio.
  2. This has been a tremendously rewarding choice. While these are intrinsically risky investments, they also offer the potential for huge rewards.  The managers invest exclusively in what they deem to be high-quality companies, measured by factors such as the strength of the management team, the firm’s return on capital and debt burden, and the presence of a sustainable competitive advantage.  Together the managers have 35 years of experience in small cap investing and have done consistently excellent work.  From inception through June 30, 2013, GPGOX returned 23.5% per year while its peers have returned about 14.5%.  In dollar terms, a $10,000 investment at inception would have grown to $14,300 here, but only $12,500 in their average peer.
  3. The portfolio is evolving.  While Global Opportunities is described in the prospectus as being non-diversified, the managers have never chosen to construct such a portfolio.  The fund typically holds more than 200 names spread over a couple dozen countries.  With the launch of its sibling Global Reach, the managers will begin slimming down the Global Opportunities portfolio.  They imagine holding closer to 100-150 names in the future here versus 300 or more in Global Reach. 

Eric Huefner, Grandeur Peak’s president, isn’t exactly sure how the evolution will change Global Opportunities long-term risk/return profile.  “There will be a higher bar” for getting into the portfolio going forward, which means fewer but larger individual positions, in the stocks where the managers have the greatest confidence.  A hundred or so 10-25 bps positions will be eliminated; after the transition period, the absolute minimum position size will be 35 bps and the targeted minimum will be 50 bps.  That will eliminate a number of intriguing but higher risk stocks, the fund’s so-called “long tail.”  While more-concentrated portfolios are generally perceived to be more volatile, here the concentration is achieved by eliminating a bunch of the portfolio’s most-volatile stocks.

Bottom Line

If you’re a shareholder here, you have reason to be smug and to stay put.  If you’re not a shareholder here and you regret that fact, consider Global Reach as a more diversified application of the same strategy.

Website

Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities

Grandeur Peak Funds Investment Process

Grandeur Peak Funds Annual Report

3/31/2023 Quarterly Fact Sheet

[cr2013]