Author Archives: David Snowball

About David Snowball

David Snowball, PhD (Massachusetts). Cofounder, lead writer. David is a Professor of Communication Studies at Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois, a nationally-recognized college of the liberal arts and sciences, founded in 1860. For a quarter century, David competed in academic debate and coached college debate teams to over 1500 individual victories and 50 tournament championships. When he retired from that research-intensive endeavor, his interest turned to researching fund investing and fund communication strategies. He served as the closing moderator of Brill’s Mutual Funds Interactive (a Forbes “Best of the Web” site), was the Senior Fund Analyst at FundAlarm and author of over 120 fund profiles.

December 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

And now, we wait.  After the frenzy of recent months, that seems odd and unnatural.

Will and his minions wait for the holidays, anxious for the last few weeks of school to pass but secure in the knowledge that their folks are dutifully keeping the retail economy afloat.

Campus Beauty

Photo by Drew Barnes ’14, Augustana Photo Bureau

My colleagues at Augustana are waiting for winter and then for spring.  The seemingly endless string of warm, dry weeks has left much of our fall foliage intact as we enter December. As beautiful as it is, we’re sort of rooting for winter, or at least the hope of seasonal weather, to reassert itself. And we’re waiting for spring, when the $13 million renovation of Old Main will be complete and we escape our warren of temporary offices and ersatz classrooms. I’ve toured the half-complete renovation. It’s going to be so cool.

And investors wait. Most of us are waiting for a resolution of “the fiscal cliff” (alternately: fiscal slope, obstacle course, whatchamacallit or, my favorite, Fiscal Clifford the Big Red Dog), half fearful that they won’t find a compromise and half fearful that they will.

Then there are The Two Who Wouldn’t Wait. And they worry me. A lot. We’ve written for a year or so about our concerns that the bond market is increasingly unstable. That concern has driven our search for tools, other than Treasuries or a bond aggregate, that investors might use to manage volatility. In the past month, the urgency of that search has been highlighted by The Two. One of The Two is Jeffrey Gundlach, founder of the DoubleLine funds and widely acknowledged as one of the best fixed-income managers anyway. Gundlach believes that “[d]eeply indebted countries and companies, which Gundlach doesn’t name, will default sometime after 2013” (Bond Investor Gundlach Buys Stocks, Sees ‘Kaboom’ Ahead, 11/30/2012). Gundlach says, “I don’t believe you’re going to get some sort of an early warning. You should be moving now.”  Gundlach, apparently, is moving into fine art.

GMO, the other of The Two, has moved. GMO (Grantham, Mayo, van Otterloo) has an outstanding record for anticipating asset class crashes. They moved decisively in 2000 and again in 2007, knowing that they were likely early and knowing that leaving the party early would cost them billions (one quarter of the firm’s assets) as angry investors left. But when the evidence says “run,” they ran. In a late-November interview with the Financial Times, GMO’s head of asset allocation revealed that, firm-wide, GMO had sold off all of their bond holdings (GMO abandons bond market, 11/26/2012). “We’ve largely given up on traditional fixed income,” Inker says, including government and corporate debt in the same condemnation. They don’t have any great alternatives (high quality US stocks are about the best option), but would prefer to keep billions in cash to the alternatives.

I don’t know whether you should wait. But I do believe that you should acquaint yourself with those who didn’t.

The Last Ten: PIMCO in the Past Decade

In October we launched “The Last Ten,” a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.

Here are our findings so far:

Fidelity, once fabled for the predictable success of its new fund launches, has created no compelling new investment option and only one retail fund that has earned Morningstar’s five-star designation, Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX).  We suggested three causes: the need to grow assets, a cautious culture and a firm that’s too big to risk innovative funds.

T. Rowe Price continues to deliver on its promises.  Of the 22 funds launched, only Strategic Income (PRSNX) has been a consistent laggard; it has trailed its peer group in four consecutive years but trailed disastrously only once (2009).  Investing with Price is the equivalent of putting a strong singles-hitter on a baseball team; it’s a bet that you’ll win with consistency and effort, rather than the occasional spectacular play.

And just as you’re about to conclude that large fund companies will necessarily produce cautious funds that can aspire just to “pretty good,” along comes PIMCO.  PIMCO was once known as an almost purely fixed-income investor.  Its flagship PIMCO Total Return Fund has gathered over a quarter trillion dollars in assets and tends to finish in the top 10% of its peer group over most trailing time periods.

But PIMCO has become more.  This former separate accounts managers for Pacific Life Insurance Company now declares, “We continue to evolve. Throughout our four decades we have been pioneers and continue to evolve as a provider of investment solutions across all asset classes.”

Indeed they have.  PIMCO has spent more time thinking about, and talking about, the global economic future than any firm other, perhaps, than GMO.  More than talk about the changing sources of alpha and the changing shape of risk, PIMCO has launched a bunch of unique funds targeting emerging challenges and opportunities that other firms would prefer simply to ignore (or to eventually react to).

Perhaps as a result, PIMCO has created more five-star funds in the last decade than any other firm and, among larger firms, has a greater fraction of their funds earning four- or five-stars than anyone else.  Here’s the snapshot:

    • PIMCO has 84 funds (which are sold in over 536 packages or share classes)
    • 56 of their funds were launched in the past decade
    • 61 of them are old enough to have earned Morningstar ratings
    • 20 of them have five-star ratings (as of 11/14/12)
    • 15 more earned four-star ratings.

How likely this that?  In each Morningstar category, the top 10 percent of funds receive five stars, the next 22.5 percent receive four stars, and the next 35 percent receive three.  In the table below, those are the “expected values.”  If PIMCO had just ordinary skill or luck, you’d expect to see the numbers in the expected values column.  But you don’t.

 

Expected Value

Observed value

PIMCO, Five Star Funds, overall

8

20

PIMCO, Four and Five Star Funds, overall

20

35

Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

3

9

Four and Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

11

14

Only their RealRetirement funds move between bad and mediocre, and even those funds made yet be redeemed.  The RealRetirement funds, like PIMCO’s other “Real” funds, are designed to be especially sensitive to inflation.  That’s the factor that poses the greatest long-term risk to most of our portfolios, especially as they become more conservative.  Until we see a sustained uptick in inflation, we can’t be sure of how well the RealRetirement funds will meet their mandates.  But, frankly, PIMCO’s record counsels patience.

Here are all of the funds that PIMCO has launched in the last 10 years, which their Morningstar rating (as of mid-November, 2012), category and approximate assets under management.

All Asset All Authority ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

World Allocation

25,380

CA Short Duration Muni Income

Muni Bond

260

Diversified Income  ★ ★ ★ ★

Multisector Bond

6,450

Emerging Markets Fundamental IndexPLUS TR Strategy ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Emerging Markets Stock

5,620

Emerging Local Bond ★ ★

Emerging Markets Bond

13,950

Emerging Markets Corporate Bond ★ ★

Emerging Markets Bond

1,180

Emerging Markets Currency

Currency

7060

Extended Duration ★ ★ ★ ★

Long Government

340

Floating Income ★ ★

Nontraditional Bond

4,030

Foreign Bond (Unhedged) ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

World Bond

5,430

Fundamental Advantage Total Return ★ ★ ★

Intermediate-Term Bond

2,730

Fundamental IndexPLUS TR ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Large Blend

1,150

Global Advantage Strategy ★ ★ ★

World Bond

5,220

Global Multi-Asset ★ ★

World Allocation

5,280

High Yield Municipal Bond ★ ★

Muni Bond

530

Income ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Multisector Bond

16,660

International StocksPLUS ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Foreign Large Blend

210

International StocksPLUS TR Strategy (Unhedged) ★ ★ ★ ★

Foreign Large Blend

1,010

Long Duration Total Return ★ ★ ★ ★

Long-Term Bond

6,030

Long-Term Credit ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Long-Term Bond

2,890

Real Estate Real Return ★ ★ ★

Real Estate

2,030

Real Income 2019

Retirement Income

30

Real Income 2029 ★ ★ ★ ★

Retirement Income

20

RealRetirement 2020

Target Date

70

RealRetirement 2030

Target Date

70

RealRetirement 2040 ★ ★

Target Date

60

RealRetirement 2050 ★ ★

Target Date

40

RealRetirement Income & Distribution ★ ★

Retirement Income

40

Small Cap StocksPLUS TR ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Small Blend

470

StocksPLUS Long Duration ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Large Blend

790

Tax Managed Real Return

Muni Bond

70

Unconstrained Bond ★ ★ ★

Nontraditional Bond

17,200

Unconstrained Tax Managed Bond ★ ★

Nontraditional Bond

350

In January, we’ll continue the series of a look at Vanguard.  We know that Vanguard inspires more passion among its core investors than pretty much any other firm.  Since we’re genial outsiders to the Vanguard culture, if you’ve got insights, concerns, tips, kudos or rants you’d like to share, dear Bogleheads, drop me a note.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Conference Call

Volatility is tremendously exciting for many investment managers.  You’d be amazed by the number who get up every morning, hoping for a market panic.  For the rest of us, it’s simply terrifying.

For the past thirty years, the simple, all-purpose answer to unacceptable volatility has been “add Treasuries.”  The question we began debating last spring is, “where might investors look if Treasuries stop functioning as the universal answer?”  We started by looking at long/short equity funds as one possible answer.  Our research quickly led to one conclusion, and slowly to a second.

The quick conclusion: long/short funds, as a group, are a flop. They’re ridiculously expensive, with several dozen charging 2.75% or more plus another 1.5-2% in short interest charges.  They offered some protection in 2008, though several did manage to lose more that year than did the stock market.  But their longer term returns have been solidly dismal.  The group returned 0.15% over the past five years, which means they trailed far behind the stock market, a simple 60/40 hybrid, moderate allocation funds, very conservative short-term bond funds . . . about the only way to make this bunch look good is to compare them to “market neutral” funds (whose motto seems to be, “we can lose money in up markets and down!”).

The slower conclusion: some long-short funds have consistently, in a variety of markets, managed to treat their investors well and a couple more show the real promise of doing so. The indisputable gold standard among such funds, Robeco Long Short (BPLEX) returned 16% annually over the past five years.  The second-best performer, Marketfield (MFLDX) made 9% while funds #3 (Guggenheim Alpha) and #4 (Wasatch Long/Short) made 4%. Sadly, BPLEX is closed to new investors, Guggenheim has always had a sales load and Marketfield just acquired one. Wasatch Long-Short (FMLSX), which we first profiled three years ago, remains a strong, steady performer with reasonable expenses.

Ultimately we identified (and profiled) just three, newer long-short funds worthy of serious attention: Marketfield, RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity (RPLSX) and ASTON/River Road Long Short (ARLSX).

For about an hour on November 29th, Mitch Rubin, manager of RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity(RLSFX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile.  Nearly 60 people signed up for the call.

For folks interested but unable to join us, here’s the complete audio of the hour-long conversation.  It starts with Morty Schaja, RiverPark’s president, talking about the fund’s genesis and Mr. Rubin talking about its strategy.  After that, I posed five questions of Rubin and callers chimed in with another half dozen.

http://78449.choruscall.com/dataconf/productusers/riverpark/media/riverpark121129.mp3
When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded. If the file downloads, instead, you may have to double-click to play it.

If you’d like a preview before deciding whether you listen in, you might want to read our profile of RLSFX (there’s a printable .pdf of the profile on RiverPark’s website).  Here are some of the highlights of the conversation:

Rubin believes that many long/short mutual fund managers (as opposed to the hedge fund guys) are too timid about using the leverage allowed them.  As a result, they’re not able to harvest the full returns potential of their funds.  Schaja describes RLSFX’s leverage as “moderate,” which generally means having investments equal to 150-200% of assets.

The second problem with long/short managers as a group, he believes, is that they’re too skittish.  They obsess about short-term macro-events (the fiscal cliff) and dilute their insights by trying to bet for or against industry groups (by shorting ETFs, for example) rather than focusing on identifying the best firms in the best industries.

One source of RLSFX’s competitive advantage is the team’s long history of long investing.  They started following many of the firms in their portfolio nearly two decades ago, following their trajectory from promising growth stocks (in which they invested), stodgy mature firms (which they’d sold) and now old firms in challenged industries (which are appearing in the short portfolio).

A second source of advantage is the team’s longer time horizon.  Their aim is to find companies which might double their money over the next five years and then to buy them when their price is temporarily low.

I’d like to especially thank Bill Fuller, Jeff Mayer and Richard Falk for the half dozen really sharp, thoughtful questions that they posed during the closing segment.  If you catch no other part of the call, you might zoom in on those last 15 minutes to hear Mitch and the guys in conversation.

Mr. Rubin is an articulate advocate for the fund, as well as being a manager with a decades-long record of success.  In addition to listening to his conversation, there are two documents on the Long/Short fund’s homepage that interested parties should consult.  First, the fund profile has a lot of information about the fund’s performance back when it was a hedge fund which should give you a much better sense of its composition and performance over time.  Second, the manager’s commentary offers an intriguing list of industries which they believe to be ascendant or failing.  It’s sort of thought-provoking.

Conference Calls Upcoming: Great managers on-deck

As promised, we’re continuing our moderated conference calls through the winter.  You should consider joining in.  Here’s the story:

    • Each call lasts about an hour
    • About one third of the call is devoted to the manager’s explanation of their fund’s genesis and strategy, about one third is a Q&A that I lead, and about one third is Q&A between our callers and the manager.
    • The call is, for you, free.  Your line is muted during the first two parts of the call (so you can feel free to shout at the danged cat or whatever) and you get to join the question queue during the last third by pressing the star key.

Our next conference call features Matt Moran and Dan Johnson, co-managers of ASTON / River Road Long Short (ARLSX).   I’ve had several conversations with the team and they strike me as singularly bright, articulate and disciplined.  When we profiled the fund in June, we noted:

The strategy’s risk-management measures are striking.  Through the end of Q1 2012, River Road’s Sharpe ratio (a measure of risk-adjusted returns) was 1.89 while its peers were at 0.49.  Its maximum drawdown (the drop from a previous high) was substantially smaller than its peers, it captured less of the market’s downside and more of its upside, in consequence of which its annualized return was nearly four times as great.

Among the crop of newer offerings, few are more sensibly-constructed or carefully managed that ARLSX seems to be.  It deserves attention.

If you’d like to share your attention with them, our call with ASTON / River Road Long  Short is Monday, December 17, from 7:00 – 8:00 Eastern.  To register for the call, just click on this link and follow the instructions.  I’ll send a reminder email on the day of the call to all of the registered parties.

We’re hoping to start 2013 with a conversation with Andrew Foster of Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX), one of the best of a new generation of emerging markets funds.  We’re also in conversation with the managers of several seriously concentrated equity funds, including David Rolfe of RiverPark/Wedgewood Fund (RWGFX) and Steve Dodson of Bretton Fund (BRTNX).

As a service to our readers, we’ve constructed a mailing list that we’ll use to notify folks of upcoming conference call opportunities.  If you’d like to join but haven’t yet, feel free to drop me a note.

Fidelity’s Advice to Emerging Markets Investors: Avoid Us

Fidelity runs several distinct sets of funds, including Fidelity, Fidelity Advisor, Fidelity Select, and Fidelity Series.  In many ways, the most interesting are their Strategic Adviser funds which don’t even bear the Fidelity name.  The Strategic Adviser funds are “exclusive to clients of Portfolio Advisory Services. . . They allow Strategic Advisers to hire (and fire) sub-advisers as well as to buy, sell, and hold mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) within the fund.”  In short, these are sort of “best ideas”  funds, two of which are funds of funds.

Which led to the question: would the smartest folks Fidelity could find, who could choose any funds around which to build a portfolio, choose Fidelity?

In the case of emerging markets, the answer is “uhh … no.”  Here’s the portfolio for Strategic Advisers Emerging Markets Fund of Funds (FLILX).

Total portfolio weights as of

10/2012

03/2012

Aberdeen Emerging Markets

14.7%

11.4%

GMO Emerging Markets V

14.5

13.6

Lazard Emerging Markets Equity

14.2

15.7

Acadian Emerging Markets

13.9

8.2

T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Stock

10.7

12.9

Fidelity Emerging Markets

10.2

13.4

SSgA Emerging Markets Select

6.9

7.2

Oppenheimer Developing Markets

5.2

4.9

Eaton Vance Parametric Structured Em Mkts

5.0

5.1

Thornburg Developing World

4.14

n/a

Vanguard MSCI Emerging Markets ETF

0.70

n/a

What should you notice?

  1. The fund’s managers seem to find many funds more compelling than Fidelity Emerging Markets, and so it ends up sixth on the list.  Fidelity’s corporate folks seem to agree and they replaced the long-time manager of this one-star fund in mid October, 2012.
  2. Measured against the March 2012 portfolio, Fidelity E.M. has seen the greatest decrease in its weighing (about 3.2%) of any fund in the portfolio.
  3. Missing entirely from the list: Fidelity’s entire regional lineup including China Region, Emerging Asia, Emerging Middle East and Latin America.
  4. For that matter, missing entirely from the list are anything but diversified large cap emerging markets stock funds.

Fidelity does noticeably better in the only other Strategic Advisers fund of funds, the Strategic Advisers® Income Opportunities Fund of Funds (FSADX).

 

% of fund’s
net assets

T. Rowe Price High Yield Fund

24.2

Fidelity Capital & Income Fund

20.5

Fidelity High Income Fund

14.7

PIMCO High Yield Fund

9.6

Janus High-Yield Fund

9.0

BlackRock High Yield Bond Portfolio

8.2

MainStay High Yield Corporate Bond

4.5

Eaton Vance Income Fund of Boston

3.3

Fidelity Advisor High Income Advantage Fund

3.2

Fidelity Advisor High Income Fund

2.8

Why, exactly, the managers have invested in three different classes of the same Fidelity fund is a bit unclear but at least they are willing to invest with Fido.  It may also speak to the continuing decline of the Fidelity equity-investing side of the house while fixed-income becomes increasingly

A Site Worth Following: Learn Bonds

Junior Yearwood, our friend and contributing editor who has been responsible for our Best of the Web reviews, has been in conversation with Marc Prosser, a Forbes contributor and proprietor of the Learn Bonds website.  While the greatest part of Marc’s work focuses broadly on bond investing, he also offers ratings for a select group of bond mutual funds.  He has a sort of barbell approach, focusing on the largest bond fund companies and on the smallest.  His fund ratings, like Morningstar’s analyst ratings, are primarily qualitative and process-focused.

Marc doesn’t yet have data by which to assess the validity of his ratings (and, indeed, is articulately skeptical of that whole venture), so we can’t describe him as a Best of the Web site.  That said, Junior concluded that his site was clean, interesting, and worth investigating.  It was, he concluded, a new and notable site.

Launch Alert: Whitebox Long Short Equity (WBLSX,WBLRX,WBLFX)

On November 1, Whitebox Advisors converted their Whitebox Long Short Equity Partners hedge fund into the Whitebox Long Short Equity Fund which has three share classes.  As a hedge fund, Whitebox pretty much kicked butt.  From 2004 – 2012, it returned 15.8% annually while the S&P500 earned 5.2%.  At last report, the fund was just slightly net-long with a major short against the Russell 2000.

There’s great enthusiasm among the Observer’s discussion board members about Whitebox’s first mutual fund, Whitebox Tactical Opportunities (WBMAX) , which strongly suggests this one warrants some attention, if only from advisors who can buy it without a sales load. The Investor shares carry at 4.5% front load, 2.48% expense ratio and a $5000 minimum initial investment.  You might check the fund’s homepage for additional details.

Observer Fund Profiles

Had I mentioned that we visited RiverNorth?

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features

Artisan Global Equity Fund (ARTHX):  you know a firm is in a good place when the most compelling alternatives to one of their funds are their other funds.  Global, run by Mark Yockey and his team, extends on the long-term success of Artisan International and International Small Cap.

RiverNorth Dynamic Buy Write (RNBWX): one of the most consistently successful (and rarely employed) strategies for managing portfolios in volatile markets is the use of covered calls.  After spending several hours with the RiverNorth team and several weeks reading the research, we may have an answer to a version of the old Ghostbusters question, “who you gonna (covered) call?”

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves. Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Funds in registration this month won’t be available for sale until, typically, the beginning of February 2013. Since firms really like launching by December 31st if they can, the number of funds in the pipeline is modest: seven this month, as compared to 29 last month.  That said, two of the largest fixed-income teams are among those preparing to launch:

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund, the tenth fund advised or sub-advised by DoubleLine, will seek a high level of current income by investing in floating rate loans and “other floating rate investments.”  The fund will be managed by Bonnie Baha and Robert Cohen.  Ms. Baha was part of Mr. Gundlach’s original TCW team and co-manages Multi-Asset Growth, Low-Duration Bond and ASTON/DoubleLine Core Plus Fixed Income.

PIMCO Emerging Markets Full Spectrum Bond Fund will invest in “a broad range of emerging market fixed income asset classes, such as external debt obligations of sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and corporate entities; currencies, and local currency-denominated obligations of sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns, and corporate issuers.”  The manager has not yet been named but, as we noted in our lead story, the odds are that this is going to be a top-of-class performer.

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down 40 fund manager changes, down from last month’s bloodbath in which 70 funds changed management.

The Observer in the News

Last month, we ran our annual Honor Roll of Consistently Bearable Funds, which asks the simple question:  “which mutual funds are never terrible?”  Our basic premise is that funds that earn high returns but crash periodically are, by and large, impossible for investors to hold.  And so we offered up a list of funds that have avoided crashing in any of the past ten years.  As it turns out, by managing beta, those funds ended up with substantial alpha.  In English: they made good money by avoiding losing money.

Chuck Jaffe has been looking at a related strategy for years, which led him to talk about and elaborate on our article.  His story, “A fund-picking strategy for nervous investors,” ran on November 19th, ended up briefly (very briefly: no one can afford fifteen minutes of fame any more) on the front page of Google News and caused a couple thousand new folks to poke their heads in at the Observer.

Briefly Noted . . .

Artisan Partners has again filed for an initial public offering.  They withdrew a 2011 filing in the face of adverse market conditions.  Should you care?  Investors can afford to ignore it since it doesn’t appear that the IPO will materially change operations or management; it mostly generates cash to buy back a portion of the firm from outsiders and to compensate some of the portfolio guys.  Competitors, frankly, should care.  Artisan is about the most successful, best run small firm fund that I know of: they’ve attracted nearly $70 billion in assets, have a suite of uniformly strong funds, stable management teams and a palpable commitment to serving their shareholders.  If I were in the business, I’d want to learn a lot – and think a lot – about how they’ve managed that feat.  Sudden access to a bunch more information would help.

One of The Wall Street Journal columnists surveyed “financial advisers, mutual-fund experts and academics” in search of the five best books for beginning investors.  Other than for the fact that they missed Andrew Tobias’s The Only Investment Guide You’ll Ever Need, it’s a pretty solid list with good works from the efficient market and behavioral finance folks.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Clipper (CFIMX), Davis New York Venture (NYVTX), and Selected American Shares (SLASX) have waived their 30-day trading restriction for the rest of 2012, in case investors want to do some repositioning in anticipation of higher capital gains tax rates in 2013.

Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Growth (SSETX) reopened to new investors on Nov. 1.

Victoria 1522 (VMDIX/VMDAX), an emerging markets stock fund, is cutting its expense ratio by 40 basis points. That’s much better news than you think. Glance at Morningstar’s profile of the lower-minimum Advisor shares and you’ll see a two-star fund and move on.  That reading is, for two reasons, short-sighted.  First, the lower expense ratio would make a major difference; the institutional shares, at 25 bps below the Advisor shares, gain a star (as of 11/30/12) and this reduction gives you 40 bps.  Second, the three-year record masks an exceedingly strong four-plus year record.  From inception (10/08) through the end of 11/12, Victoria 1522 would have turned a $10,000 investment into $19,850.  Its peer over the same period would have returned $13,500. That’s partly attributable to good luck: the fund launched in October 2008 and made about 3% in the quarter while its peers dropped nearly 21%.  Even excluding that great performance (that is, looking at 1/09 – 11/12), the fund has modestly outperformed its peer group despite the drag of its soon-to-be-lowered expenses.  ManagerJosephine Jiménez has a long, distinguished record, including long stints running Montgomery Asset Management’s emerging markets division.  (Thanks to Jake Mortell of Candlewood Advisory for the heads up!)

Wells Fargo has reopened the Class A shares of its Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target funds: Target Today, 2010, 2020, 2030 and 2040.

CLOSINGS

AllianceBernstein Small Cap Growth (QUASX) will close to new investors on January 31, 2013. That’s all I noticed this month.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Calvert Enhanced Equity (CMIFX) will be renamed Calvert Large Cap Core in January 2013.

Actually, this one is a little bit more like “old vinegar in new bottles.”  Dominion Insight Growth Fund was reorganized into the Shepherd Large Cap Growth Fund in 2002.  Shepherd LCG changed its name to the Shepherd Fund in 2008. Then Shepherd Fund became Foxhall Global Trends Fund in 2009, and now Foxhall Global Trends has become Fairfax Global Trends Fund (DOIGX). In all of the name changes, some things have remained constant: low assets, high expenses, wretched performance (they’ve finished in the 98th -99th percentile for the trailing one, three, five and ten year periods).

Forward Aggressive Growth Allocation Fund became Forward Multi-Strategy Fund on December 3, 2012, which is just a bit vanilla. The 50 other multi-strategy funds in Morningstar’s database include Dynamic, Ethical, Global, Hedged and Progressive flavors of the marketing flavor du jour.

In non-news, Marathon Value Portfolio (MVPFX) is moving from the Unified Series Trust to  Northern Lights Fund Trust III. That’s their third move and I mention it only because the change causes the SEC to flag MVPFX as a “new” fund.  It isn’t new, though it is a five-star, “Star in the Shadows” fund and worth knowing about.

Wells Fargo Advantage Total Return Bond (MBFAX) will be renamed Wells Fargo Advantage Core Bond sometime in December.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

Geez, the dustbin of history is filling up fast . . .

BNY Mellon Intermediate U.S. Government (MOVIX) is merging into BNY Mellon Intermediate Bond (MIIDX) in February, though the manager is the same for both funds.

Buffalo plans to merge Buffalo China (BUFCX) into Buffalo International (BUFIX) in January, 2013. The fund was originally sub-advised by Jayhawk Capital and I long ago wrote a hopeful profile of the then-new fund. Jayhawk ran it for three years, making huge amounts twice (2007 and 2009), lost a huge amount once (2008), lived in the basement of a highly volatile category and were replaced in 2009 by an in-house management team. The fund has been better but never rose to “good” and never drew assets.

Dreman is killing off five of the six funds: Contrarian International Value (DRIVX), Contrarian Mid Cap Value (DRMVX), Contrarian Value Equity (DRVAX), High Opportunity (DRLVX), and Market Over-Reaction (DRQLX).  Mr. Dreman has a great reputation and had a great business sub-advising load-bearing funds.  Around 2003, Dreman launched a series of in-house, no-load funds.  That experiment, by and large, failed.  The funds were rebranded and repriced, but never earned their way.  The fate of their remaining fund, Dreman Contrarian Small Cap Value (DRSVX), is unknown.

Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Tax-Sensitive Equity (SDCEX) will liquidate on January 8, 2013 and Dreyfus Small Cap (DSVAX) disappears a week later. Dreyfus is also liquidating a bunch of money market and state bond funds.

Fidelity is pulling a rare 5:1 reverse split by merging Tax Managed Stock (FTXMX), Advisor Strategic Growth (FTQAX), Advisor 130/30 Large Cap (FOATX), and Large Cap Growth (FSLGX) into Fidelity Stock Selector All Cap (FSSKX).

Guggenheim Flexible Strategies (RYBSX) (formerly Guggenheim Long Short Interest Rate Strategies) is slated to merge into Guggenheim Macro Opportunities (GIOAX).

Henderson Global is liquidating their International All Cap Equity (HFNAX) and the Japan Focus (HFJAX) funds in December.

Legg Mason has decided to liquidate Legg Mason Capital Management Disciplined Equity Research (LGMIX), likely on the combination of weak performance and negligible assets.

Munder International Equity (MUIAX) will merge into Munder International Core Equity (MAICX) on Dec. 7.

The board of Northern Funds approved the liquidation of Northern Global Fixed Income (NOIFX) for January 2013.

Pear Tree Columbia Micro Cap (MICRX) just liquidated.  They gave the fund all of one year before declaring it to be a failed experiment.

RidgeWorth plans to merge RidgeWorth Large Cap Core Growth Stock (CRVAX) will be absorbed by RidgeWorth Large Cap Growth Stock (STCIX).

Turner is merging Turner Concentrated Growth (TTOPX) into Turner Large Growth (TCGFX) in early 2013.

Westwood has decided to liquidate Westwood Balanced (WHGBX) less than a year after the departure of longtime lead manager Susan Byrne.

In February, Wells Fargo Advantage Diversified Small Cap (NVDSX) disappears into Wells Fargo Advantage Small Company Growth (NVSCX), Advantage Equity Value (WLVAX) into Advantage Intrinsic Value (EIVAX) and Advantage Small/Mid Cap Core (ECOAX) into Advantage Common Stock (SCSAX).

Well Fargo is also liquidating its Wells Fargo Advantage Core builder Series (WFBGX) in early 2013.

Coming Attractions!

The Observer is trying to help two distinct but complementary groups of folks.  One group are investors who are trying to get past all the noise and hype.  (CNBC’s ratings are dropping like a rock, which should help.)  We’re hoping, in particular, to help folks examine evidence or possibilities that they wouldn’t normally see.  The other group are the managers and other folks associated with small funds and fund boutiques.  We believe in you.  We believe that, as the industry evolves, too much emphasis falls on asset-gathering and on funds launched just for the sake of dangling something new and shiny (uhh … the All Cap Insider Sentiment ETF).  We believe that small, independent funds run by smart, passionate investors deserve a lot more consideration than they receive.  And so we profile them, write about them and talk with other folks in the media about them.

As the Observer has become a bit more financially sustainable, we’re now looking at the prospect of launching two sister sites.  One of those sites will, we hope, be populated with the best commentaries gathered from the best small fund managers and teams that we can find.  Many of you folks write well and some write with grace that far exceeds mine.  The problem, managers tell me, is that fewer people than you’d like find their way to your sites and to your insights.

Our technical team, which Chip leads, thinks that they can create an attractive, fairly vibrant site that could engage readers and help them become more aware of some of the smaller fund families and their strategies.  We respect intellectual property, and so we’d only use content that was really good and whose sharing was supported by the adviser.

That’s still in development.  If you manage a fund or work in support of one and would like to participate in thinking about what would be most helpful, drop Chip a note and we’ll find a way to think through this together.  (Thanks!)

Small cap funds tend to have their best performance in the first six weeks of each year and so we’re planned a smallcapfest for our January issue, with new or revised profiles of the most sensible small cap funds as well as a couple outside perspectives on where you might look.

In Closing . . .

I wanted to share leads on three opportunities that you might want to look in on.  The Observer has no financial stake in any of this stuff but I like sharing word of things that strike me as really first-rate.

QuoteArts.com is a small shop that consistently offers a bunch of the most attractive, best written greeting cards (and refrigerator magnets) that I’ve seen.  Steve Metivier, who runs the site, gave us permission to reproduce one of their images (normally the online version is watermarked):

The text reads “A time to quiet our hearts… (inside) to soften our edges, clear our minds, enjoy our world, and to share best wishes for the season. May these days and all the new year be joyful and peaceful.”  It strikes me as an entirely-worthy aspiration.

Robert CialdiniThe best book there is on the subject of practical persuasion is Robert Cialdini’s Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (revised edition, 2006).  Even if you’re not impressed that I’ve used the book in teaching persuasion over the past 20 years, you might be impressed by Charlie Munger’s strong endorsement of it.  In a talk entitled “The Psychology of Human Misjudgment,” Munger reports being so impressed with Cialdini’s work that he read the book, gave copies of it to all his children and sent Cialdini (“chawl-dee-nee,” if you care) a share of Berkshire Hathaway in thanks.   Cialdini has since left academe, founded the consulting group Influence at Work and now offers Principles of Persuasion workshops for professionals and the public. While I have not researched the workshops in any depth, I suspect that if I were a small business owner, marketer or financial planner who needed to both attract clients and change their behavior for the better. I’d take a serious look.

Finally, at Amazon’s invitation, I contributed an essay that will be posted at their new “Money and Markets” store from December 5th until about the 12th.  Its original title was, “It’s time to go,” but Amazon’s project director and I ended up settling on the less alarming “Trees don’t grow to the sky.”  If you’ve shopped at, say, Macy’s, you’re familiar with the store-within-a-store notion: free-standing, branded specialty shops (Levenger’s, LUSH, FAO Schwarz) operating within a larger enterprise.  It looks like Amazon is trying an experiment in the same direction and, in November, we mentioned their “Money and Markets” store.  Apparently the Amazonians noticed the fact that some of you folks went to look around, they followed your footprints back here and did some reading of their own.  One feature of the Money and Markets store is a weekly guest column and the writers have included Jack Bogle and Tadas Viskanta, the founder of Abnormal Returns which is one of the web’s two best financial news aggregators.  In any case, they asked if I’d chip in a piece during the second week of December.   We’re not allowed to repost the content for a week or so, but I’ll include it in the January cover essay.  Feel free to drop by if you’re in the area.

In the meanwhile, I wanted to extend sincere thanks from all of the folks here (chip, Anya, Junior, Accipiter and me) for the year you’ve shared with us.  You really do make it all worthwhile and so blessings of the season on you and yours.

As ever,

Artisan Global Equity Fund (ARTHX) – December 2012

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

The fund seeks to maximize long-term capital growth.  They invest in a global, all-cap equity portfolio which may include common and preferred stocks, convertible securities and, to a limited extent, derivatives.  They’re looking for high-quality growth companies with sustainable growth characteristics.  Their preference is to invest in firms that benefit from long-term growth trends and in stocks which are selling at a reasonable price.  Typically they hold 60-100 stocks. No more than 30% of the portfolio may be invested in emerging markets.  In general they do not hedge their currency exposure but could choose to do so if they owned a security denominated in an overvalued currency.

Adviser

Artisan Partners of Milwaukee, Wisconsin with Artisan Partners UK LLP as a subadvisor.   Artisan has five autonomous investment teams that oversee twelve distinct U.S., non-U.S. and global investment strategies. Artisan has been around since 1994.  As of 9/30/2012, Artisan Partners had approximately $70 billion in assets under management.  That’s up from $10 billion in 2000. They advise the 12 Artisan funds, but only 5% of their assets come from retail investors.

Manager

Barry P. Dargan is lead portfolio manager and Mark L. Yockey is portfolio manager.  Dargan and Yockey are jointly responsible for management of the fund, they work together to develop investment strategies but Mr. Dargan generally exercises final decision-making authority.  Previously, Mr. Dargan worked for MFS, as an investment analyst from 1996 to 2001 and as a manager of MFS International Growth (MGRAX) from 2001 to 2010.  Mr. Yockey joined Artisan in 1995 and is the lead manager for Artisan International (ARTIX) and Artisan International Small Cap (ARTJX).  The fact that Mr. Dargan’s main charge handily outperformed ARTIX over nearly a decade might have helped convince Artisan to bring him on-board.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Mr. Dargan has over $1 million invested with the fund, and Mr. Yockey has between $500,000 and $1 million invested.  As of December 31, 2011, the officers and directors of Artisan Funds owned 16.94% of Artisan Global Equity Fund.

Opening date

March 29, 2010

Minimum investment

$1,000, which Artisan will waive if you establish an account with an automatic investment plan.

Expense ratio

1.50%, after waivers, on assets of $16.7 million. There is a 2% redemption fee for shares held less than 90 days.

Comments

Q:   What do you get when you combine the talents of two supremely successful international stock managers, a healthy corporate culture and a small, flexible fund?

A:   Artisan Global Equity.

The argument for considering ARTHX is really straightforward.  First, both managers have records that are both sustained and excellent.  Mr. Dargan managed, or co-managed, six funds, including two global funds, while at MFS.  Those included funds targeting both U.S. and non-U.S. investors.  While I don’t have a precise calculation, it’s clear he was managing more than $3 billion.  Mr. Yockey has famously managed two Artisan international funds since their inception, was once recognized as Morningstar’s International Fund Manager of the Year (1998).  For most trailing time periods, his funds have top 10% returns.  International Small Cap received Morningstar’s highest accolade when it was designated as the only “Gold” fund in its peer group while International was recognized as a “Silver” fund.  Based on head-to-head comparisons from 2001-2010, Mr. Yockey is really first rate and Mr. Dargan might be better.  (Being British, it’s almost certain that he has a cooler accent.)

Second, Artisan is a good steward.  The firm’s managers are divided into five teams, each with a distinctive philosophy and portfolio strategy.  The Global Equity team has four members (including Associate Portfolio Managers Charles Hamker and Andrew Euretig who also co-manage International Small Cap) and their discipline grows from the strategies first employed in ARTIX then extended to ARTJX.  Artisan has a very good record for lowering expenses, being risk conscious, opening funds only when they believe they have the capacity to be category-leaders (and almost all are) and closing funds before they’re bloated.

Third, ARTHX is nimble.  Its mandate is flexible: all sizes, all countries, any industry.  The fund’s direct investment in emerging markets is limited to 30% of the portfolio, but their pursuit of the world’s best companies leads them to firms whose income streams are more diverse than would be suggested by the names of the countries where they’re headquartered.  The managers note:

Though we have outsized exposure to Europe and undersized exposure to the U.S., we believe our relative country weights are of less significance since the companies we own in these developed economies continually expand their revenue bases across the globe.

Our portfolio remains centered around global industry leading companies with attractive valuations. This has led to a significant overweight position in the consumer sectors where many of our holdings benefit from significant exposure to the faster growth in emerging economies.

Since much of the world’s secular (enduring, long-term) growth is in the emerging markets, the portfolio is positioned to give them substantial exposure to it through their Europe and US-domiciled firms.  While the managers are experienced in handling billions, here they’re dealing with only $17 million.

The results are not surprising.  Morningstar believes that their analysts can identify those funds likely to serve their shareholders best; they do this by looking at a series of qualitative factors on top of pure performance.  When they find a fund that they believe has the potential to be consistently strong in the future, they can name it as a “Gold” fund.   Here are ARTHX’s returns since inception (the blue line) against all of Morningstar’s global Gold funds:

Artisan Global Equity versus gold funds

Not to say that the gap between Artisan and the other top funds is large and growing, but it is.

Bottom Line

Artisan Global Equity is an outstanding small fund for investors looking for exposure to many of the best firms from around the global.  The expenses are reasonable, the investment minimum is low and the manager is first-rate.  Which should be no surprise since two of the few funds keeping pace with Artisan Global Equity have names beginning with the same two words: Artisan Global Opportunities (ARTRX) and Artisan Global Value (ARTGX).

Fund website

Artisan Global Equity

[cr2012]

December 2012, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund will seek a high level of current income by investing in floating rate loans and “other floating rate investments.”  The “other” includes “floating rate debt securities; inflation-indexed securities; certain mortgage- and asset-backed securities, including those backed by collateral that carry an adjustable or floating rate of interest, such as adjustable rate mortgages; certain collateralized loan obligations; certain collateralized debt obligations; certain collateralized mortgage obligations; adjustable rate mortgages; floaters; inverse floaters; money market securities of all types; repurchase agreements; and shares of money market and short-term bond funds”.  The fund will be managed by Bonnie Baha and Robert Cohen.  Ms. Baha was part of Mr. Gundlach’s original TCW team.  No word on Mr. Cohen’s background. The minimum initial investment is $2000, reduced to $500 for IRAs. Expenses not yet set.

Epiphany FFV Global Ecologic Fund

Epiphany FFV Global Ecologic Fund will seek long-term capital growth by investing in a global portfolio of common and dividend-paying preferred stocks.  They seek “to encourage environmentally responsible business practices and a cleaner environment by investing … in environmentally responsible and sustainable companies.”  They anticipate holding about 50 names and, they assure us, they’ll invest no more than 5% in “pure play renewable energy.”  The managers will be  Frank Morris, founder and CEO of Ecologic Advisors andSamuel J. Saladino, CEO of Trinity Fiduciary Partners and the manager of Epiphany FFV Fund and Latin America Fund.  The former is a tiny, perfectly respectable US large cap fund.  The latter is new but doing well so far.  FFV refers to Faith and Family Values and represents the underlying theme of the social and moral screening.  The minimum initial investment is $1000, reduced to $100 for accounts set up with an automatic investing plan. The expense ratio is 1.56%.

Lyrical U.S. Value Equity Fund

Lyrical U.S. Value Equity Fund will seek to achieve long-term capital growth by buying “the stocks of companies that the Adviser believes are undervalued, the undervaluation to be temporary, the underlying business to have sufficient quality and durability, and the estimated discount in the stock price to be large enough to compensate for the risks of the investment.”  Good companies temporarily down.  Got it.  The fund will be managed by Andrew Wellington, Chief Investment Officer of Lyrical Asset Management.  The manager ran a hedge fund for a while, managed institutional midcap value money for Neuberger and was a founding member of Pzena Investment Management. The minimum investment is $10,000, reduced to $1,000 for IRAs.  The expense ratio is 1.45%.

Market Vectors High-Yield/Treasury Bond ETF

Market Vectors High-Yield/Treasury Bond ETF will track an index that invests in global high yield bonds and shorts U.S. Treasuries in order “to hedge interest rate sensitivity.”  Michael Mazier and Francis Rodilosso of Van Eck will manage the fund.  Expense not yet set.

MCM All-Cap Growth Fund

MCM All-Cap Growth Fund (MCAEX) will seek capital appreciation by investing in 25-50 smaller cap US growth stocks.  The fund will be managed by Rich Jones and Jonn Wullschleger, both of Mitchell Capital Management.  Their separate account composite, for accounts managed in this style, modestly outperformed the Russell 3000 Growth Index pretty consistently. The minimum initial investment is $2500.  Expenses are capped at 1.0%.

PIMCO Emerging Markets Full Spectrum Bond Fund

PIMCO Emerging Markets Full Spectrum Bond Fund will pursue maximum total return, consistent with prudent investment management. The plan is to invest in “a broad range of emerging market fixed income asset classes, such as external debt obligations of sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and corporate entities; currencies, and local currency-denominated obligations of sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns, and corporate issuers.”  The managers will actively manage both the asset allocation and security selection.  The benchmark asset allocation is 50% JPMorgan Global Bond Index Emerging Markets- Global Diversified, 25% JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global and 25% JPMorgan Corporate Emerging Market Bond Index Diversified.  They can implement their allocation plan directly by buying securities or indirectly by investing in funds and ETFs.  The manager has not yet been named.  There will be a $1000 investment minimum for the no-load “D” shares.  Expenses have not yet been set.

Shelton Green Alpha Fund

Shelton Green Alpha Fund will seek a high level of long-term capital appreciation by investing in stocks “in the green economy.”  The prospectus is bereft of potentially useful details, such as what they’ll charge and who’ll manage the fund.  We do know that it’s a no-load fund, that the minimum investment is $1000, and that “green” funds have largely been a disaster for both sponsor and investor.  I wish them well.

November 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

I had imagined this as the “post-storm, pre-cliff” edition of the Observer but it appears that “post-storm” would be a very premature characterization.  For four million of our friends who are still without power, especially those along the coast or in outlying areas, the simple pleasures of electric lighting and running water remain a distant hope.  And anything that looks like “normal” might be months in their future.  Our thoughts, prayers, good wishes and spare utility crews go out to them.

I thought, instead, I’d say something about the U.S. presidential election.  This is going to sting, but here it is:

It’s going to be okay.

Hard to believe, isn’t it?  We’re acculturated into viewing the election if as it were some apocalyptic video game whose tagline reads: “America can’t survive .”  The reality is, we can and we will.  The reality is that both Obama and Romney are good guys: smart, patriotic, obsessively hard-working, politically moderate, fact-driven, given to compromise and occasionally funny.  The reality is that they’re both trapped by the demands of electoral politics and polarized bases.

But, frankly, freed of the constraints of those bases, these guys would agree on rather more than they disagree on.  In a less-polarized world, they could run together as a ticket (Obomney 2020!) and do so with a great deal of camaraderie and mutual respect. (Biden-Ryan, on the other hand, would be more than a little bit scary.)  Neither strikes me as a great politician or polished communicator; that’s going to end up constraining – and perhaps crippling – whoever wins.

Why are we so negative?  Because negative (“fear and loathing on the campaign trail”) raises money (likely $6 billion by the time it’s all done) and draws viewers.  While it’s easy to blame PACs, super PACs and other dark forces for that state, the truth is that the news media – mainstream and otherwise – paint good men as evil.  A startling analysis conducted by the Project for Excellence in Journalism found that 72% of all character references to Messrs. Obama and Romney are negative, one of the most negative set of press portrayals on record.

I live in Iowa, labeled a “battleground state,” and I receive four to six (largely poisonous) robo-calls a day.  And so here’s the final reality: Iowa is not a battleground and we’d all be better off if folks stopped using the term.  It’s a place where a bunch of folks are worried, a bunch of folks (often the same ones) are hopeful and we’re trying to pick as best we can.

The Last Ten: T. Rowe Price in the Past Decade

In October we launched “The Last Ten,” a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.  We started with Fidelity, once fabled for the predictable success of its new fund launches.  Sadly, the pattern of the last decade is clear and clearly worse: despite 154 fund launches since 2002, Fidelity has created no compelling new investment option and only one retail fund that has earned Morningstar’s five-star designation, Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX).  We suggested three causes: the need to grow assets, a cautious culture and a firm that’s too big to risk innovative funds.

T. Rowe Price is a far smaller firm.  Where Fidelity has $1.4 trillion in assets under management, Price is under $600 billion.  Fidelity manages 340 funds.  Price has 110.  Fidelity launched 154 funds in a decade, Price launched 22.

Morningstar Rating

Category

Size (millions, slightly rounded)

Africa & Middle ★★★ Emerging Markets Stock

150

Diversified Mid Cap Growth ★★★ Mid-Cap Growth

200

Emerging Markets Corporate Bond

Emerging Markets Bond

30

Emerging Markets Local Currency

Emerging Markets Bond

50

Floating Rate

Bank Loan

80

Global Infrastructure

Global Stock

40

Global Large-Cap ★★★ Global Stock

70

Global Real Estate ★★★★★ Global Real Estate

100

Inflation Protected Bond ★★★ Inflation-Protected Bond

570

Overseas Stock ★★★ Foreign Large Blend

5,000

Real Assets

World Stock

2,760

Retirement 2005 ★★★★ Target Date

1,330

Retirement 2010 ★★★ Target Date

5,850

Retirement 2015 ★★★★ Target Date

7,340

Retirement 2025 ★★★ Target Date

9,150

Retirement 2035 ★★★★ Target Date

6,220

Retirement 2045 ★★★★ Target Date

3,410

Retirement 2050 ★★★★ Target Date

2,100

Retirement 2055 ★★★★★ Target-Date

490

Retirement Income ★★★ Retirement Income

2,870

Strategic Income ★★ Multisector Bond

270

US Large-Cap Core ★★★ Large Blend

50

What are the patterns?

  1. Most Price funds reflect the firm’s strength in asset allocation and emerging asset classes. Price does really first-rate work in thinking about which assets classes make sense and in what configuration. They’ve done a good job of communicating that research to their investors, making things clear without making them childish.
  2. Most Price funds succeed. Of the funds launched, only Strategic Income (PRSNX) has been a consistent laggard; it has trailed its peer group in four consecutive years but trailed disastrously only once (2009).
  3. Most Price funds remain reasonably nimble. While Fido funds quickly swell into the multi-billion range, a lot of the Price funds have remaining under $200 million which gives them both room to grow and to maneuver. The really large funds are the retirement-date series, which are actually funds of other funds.
  4. Price continues to buck prevailing wisdom. There’s no sign of blossoming index fund business or the launch of a series of superfluous ETFs. There’s a lot to be said for knowing your strengths and continuing to develop them.

Finally, Price continues to deliver on its promises. Investing with Price is the equivalent of putting a strong singles-hitter on a baseball team; it’s a bet that you’ll win with consistency and effort, rather than the occasional spectacular play. The success of that strategy is evident in Price’s domination of . . .

The Observer’s Honor Roll, Unlike Any Other

Last month, in the spirit of FundAlarm’s “three-alarm” fund list, we presented the Observer’s second Roll Call of the Wretched.  Those were funds that managed to trail their peers for the past one-, three-, five- and ten-year periods, with special commendation for the funds that added high expenses and high volatility to the mix.

This month, I’d like to share the Observer’s Honor Roll of Consistently Bearable Funds.  Most such lists start with a faulty assumption: that high returns are intrinsically good.

Wrong!

While high returns can be a good thing, the practical question is how those returns are obtained.  If they’re the product of alternately sizzling and stone cold performances, the high returns are worse than meaningless: they’re a deadly lure to hapless investors and advisors.  Investors hate losing money much more than they love making it.

In light of that, the Observer asked a simple question: which mutual funds are never terrible?  In constructing the Honor Roll, we did not look at whether a fund ever made a lot of money.  We looked only at whether a fund could consistently avoid being rotten.  Our logic is this: investors are willing to forgive the occasional sub-par year, but they’ll flee in terror in the face of a horrible one.  That “sell low” – occasionally “sell low and stuff the proceeds in a zero-return money fund for five years” – is our most disastrous response.

We looked for no-load, retail funds which, over the past ten years, have never finished in the bottom third of their peer groups.   And while we weren’t screening for strong returns, we ended up with a list of funds that consistently provided them anyway.

U.S. stock funds

Strategy

Assets (millions)

2011 Honoree or the reason why not

Fidelity Growth Company (FDGRX)

Large Growth

44,100

Rotten 2002

Laudus Growth Investors US Large Cap Growth (LGILX)

Large Growth

1,400

2011 Honoree

Merger (MERFX)

Market Neutral

4,700

Rotten 2002

Robeco All Cap Value (BPAVX)

Large Value

400

Not around in 2002

T. Rowe Price Capital Opportunities (PRCOX)

Large Blend

400

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Growth (RPMGX)

Mid-Cap Growth

18,300

2011 Honoree

TIAA-CREF Growth & Income (TIIRX)

Large Blend

2,900

Not around in 2002

TIAA-CREF Mid-Cap Growth (TCMGX)

Mid-Cap Growth

1,300

Not around in 2002

Vanguard Explorer (VEXPX)

Small Growth

9,000

2011 Honoree

Vanguard Mid Cap Growth (VMGRX)

Mid-Cap Growth

2,200

2011 Honoree

Vanguard Morgan Growth (VMRGX)

Large Growth

9,000

2011 Honoree

International stock funds

American Century Global Growth (TWGGX)

Global

400

2011 Honoree

Driehaus Emerging Markets Growth (DREGX)

Emerging Markets

900

2011 Honoree

Thomas White International (TWWDX)

Large Value

600

2011 Honoree

Vanguard International Growth (VWIGX)

Large Growth

17,200

2011 Honoree

Blended asset funds

Buffalo Flexible Income (BUFBX)

Moderate Hybrid

600

2011 Honoree

Fidelity Freedom 2020 (FFFDX)

Target Date

14,300

2011 Honoree

Fidelity Freedom 2030 (FFFEX)

Target Date

11,000

Rotten 2002

Fidelity Puritan (FPURX)

Moderate Hybrid

20,000

2011 Honoree

Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Extended Term (MNBAX)

Moderate Hybrid

1,300

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Balanced (RPBAX)

Moderate Hybrid

3,400

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Personal Strategy Balanced (TRPBX)

Moderate Hybrid

1,700

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Personal Strategy Income (PRSIX)

Conservative Hybrid

1,100

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Retirement 2030 (TRRCX)

Target Date

13,700

Not around in 2002

T. Rowe Price Retirement 2040 (TRRDX)

Target Date

9,200

Not around in 2002

T. Rowe Price Retirement Income (TRRIX)

Retirement Income

2,900

Not around in 2002

Vanguard STAR (VGSTX)

Moderate Hybrid

14,800

2011 Honoree

Vanguard Tax-Managed Balanced (VTMFX)

Conservative Hybrid

1,000

Rotten 2002

Specialty funds

Fidelity Select Industrials (FCYIX)

Industrial

600

Weak 2002

Fidelity Select Retailing (FSRPX)

Consumer Cyclical

600

Weak 2002

Schwab Health Care (SWHFX)

Health

500

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Global Technology (PRGTX)

Technology

700

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Media & Telecomm (PRMTX)

Communications

2,400

2011 Honoree

Reflections on the Honor Roll

These funds earn serious money.  Twenty-nine of the 33 funds earn four or five stars from Morningstar.  Four earn three stars, and none earn less.  By screening for good risk management, you end up with strong returns.

This is consistent with the recent glut of research on low-volatility investing.  Here’s the basic story: a portfolio of low-volatility stocks returns one to two percent more than the stock market while taking on 25% less risk.

That’s suspiciously close to the free lunch we’re not supposed to get.

There’s a very fine, short article on low-volatility investing in the New York Times: “In Search of Funds that Don’t Rock the Boat” (October 6, 2012).  PIMCO published some of the global data, showing (at slightly numbing length) that the same pattern holds in both developed and developing markets: “Stock Volatility: Not What You Might Think” (January 2012). There are a slug of ETFs that target low-volatility stocks but I’d be hesitant to commit to one until we’d looked at other risk factors such as turnover, market cap and sector concentration.

The roster is pretty stable.  Only four funds that qualified under these screens at the end of 2011 dropped out in 2012.  They are:

FPA Crescent (FPACX) – a 33% cash stake isn’t (yet) helping.  That said, this has been such a continually excellent fund that I worry more about the state of the market than about the state of Crescent.

New Century Capital (NCCPX) – a small, reasonably expensive fund-of funds that’s trailing 77% of its peers this year.  It’s been hurt, mostly, by being overweight in energy and underweight in resurgent financials.

New Century International (NCFPX) – another fund-of-funds that’s trailing about 80% of its peers, hurt by a huge overweight in emerging markets (primarily Latin), energy, and Canada (which is sort of an energy play).

Permanent Portfolio (PRPFX) – it hasn’t been a good year to hold a lot of Treasuries, and PRPFX by mandate does.

The list shows less than half of the turnover you’d expect if funds were there by chance.

One fund deserves honorable mentionT. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRCWX) has only had one relatively weak year in this century; in 2007, it finished in the 69th percentile which made it (barely) miss inclusion.

What you’ve heard about T. Rowe Price is true.  You know all that boring “discipline, consistency, risk-awareness” stuff.  Apparently so.  There are 10 Price funds on the list, nearly one-third of the total.  Second place: Fidelity and Vanguard, far larger firms, with six funds.

Sure bets?  Nope.  Must have?  Dear God, no.  A potentially useful insight into picking winners by dodging a penchant for the occasional disaster?  We think so.

In dullness there is strength.

“TrimTabs ETF Outperforms Hedge Funds”

And underperforms pretty much everybody else.  The nice folks at FINAlternatives (“Hedge Fund and Private Equity News”) seem to have reproduced (or condensed) a press release celebrating the first-year performance of TrimTabs Float Shrink ETF (TTFS).

(Sorry – you can get to the original by Googling the title but a direct-link always takes you to a log-in screen.)

Why is this journalism?  They don’t offer the slightest hint about what the fund does.  And, not to rain on anybody’s ETF, but their trailing 12-month return (21.46% at NAV, as of 10/18) places them 2050th in Morningstar’s database.  That list includes a lot of funds which have been consistently excellent (Akre Focus, BBH Core Select (closing soon – see below), ING Corporate Leaders, Mairs & Power Growth and Sequoia) for decades, so it’s not immediately clear what warrants mention.

Seafarer Rolls On

Andrew Foster’s Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income Fund (SFGIX) continues its steady gains.

The fund is outperforming every reasonable benchmark: $10,000 invested at the fund’s inception has grown to $10,865 (as of 10/26/12).  The same amount invested in the S&P’s diversified emerging markets, emerging Asia and emerging Latin America ETFs would have declined by 5-10%.

Assets are steadily rolling in: the fund is now at $17 million after six months of operation and has been gaining nearly two million a month since summer.

Opinion-makers are noticing: Andrew and David Nadel of Royce Global Value (and five other funds ‘cause that’s what Royce managers do) were the guests on October 26th edition of Wealth Track with Consuelo Mack.  It was good to hear ostensible “growth” and “value” investors agree on so much about what to look for in emerging market stocks and which countries they were assiduously avoiding.  The complete interview on video is available here.  (Thanks to our endlessly vigilant Ted for both the heads-up and the video link.)

Legg Mason Rolls Over

Legg Mason seems to be struggling.  On the one hand we have the high visibility struggles of its former star manager, Bill Miller, who’s now in the position of losing more money for more people than almost any manager.  Their most recent financial statement, released July 27, shows that assets, operating revenue, operating income, and earnings are all down from the year before.   Beside that, there’s a more fundamental struggle to figure out what Legg Mason is and who wants to bear the name.

On October 5 2009 Legg announced a new naming strategy for its funds:

Most funds that were formerly named Legg Mason or Legg Mason Partners will now include the Legg Mason name, the name of the investment affiliate and the Fund’s strategy (such as the Legg Mason ClearBridge Appreciation Fund or the Legg Mason Western Asset Managed Municipals Fund).

The announced rationale was to “leverage the Legg Mason brand awareness.”

Welcome to the age of deleveraging:  This year those same funds are moving to hide the Legg Mason taint.  Western Asset dropped the Legg Mason number this summer.  Clearbridge is now following suit, so that the Legg Mason ClearBridge Appreciation Fund is about to become just Clearbridge Appreciation.

Royce, another Legg Mason affiliate, has never advertised that association.  Royce has always had a great small-value discipline. Since being acquired by Legg Mason in 2001, the firm acquired two other, troubling distinctions.

  1. Managers who are covering too many funds.  By way of a quick snapshot, here are the funds managed by 72-year-old Chuck Royce (and this is after he dropped several):
    Since … He’s managed …

    12/2010

    Royce Global Dividend Value

    08/2010

    Royce Micro-Cap Discovery

    04/2009

    Royce Partners

    06/2008

    Royce International Smaller-Companies

    09/2007

    Royce Enterprise Select

    12/2006

    Royce European Smaller Companies

    06/2005

    Royce Select II

    05/2004

    Royce Dividend Value

    12/2003

    Royce Financial Services

    06/2003

    Royce 100

    11/1998

    Royce Select I

    12/1995

    Royce Heritage

    12/1993

    Royce Total Return

    12/1991

    Royce Premier

    11/1972

    Royce Pennsylvania Mutual

     

    Their other senior manager, Whitney George, manages 11 funds.  David Nadel works on nine, Lauren Romeo helps manage eight.

  2. A wild expansion out of their traditional domestic small-value strength.  Between 1962 and 2001, Royce launched nine funds – all domestic small caps.  Between 2001 and the present, they launched 21 mutual funds and three closed-end funds in a striking array of flavors (Global Select Long/Short, International Micro-Cap, European Smaller Companies).  While many of those later launches have performed well, many have found no traction in the market.  Fifteen of their post-2001 launches have under $100 million in assets, 10 have under $10 million.  That translates into higher expenses in some already-expensive niches and a higher hurdle for the managers to overcome.Legg reports progressively weaker performance among the Royce funds in recent years:

    Three out of 30 funds managed by Royce outperformed their benchmarks for the 1-year period; 4 out of 24 for the 3-year period; 12 out of 19 for the 5-year period; and all 11 outperformed for the 10-year period.

That might be a sign of a fundamentally unhealthy market or the accumulated toll of expenses and expansion.  Shostakovich, one of our discussion board’s most experienced correspondents, pretty much cut to the chase on the day Royce reopened its $1.1 billion micro-cap fund to additional investors: “Chuck sold his soul. He kept his cashmere sweaters and his bow ties, but he sold his soul. And the devil’s name is Legg Mason.”  Interesting speculation.

Observer Fund Profiles

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features

Scout Unconstrained Bond (SUBFX): If these guys have a better track record than the one held by any bond mutual fund (and they do), why haven’t you heard of it?  Worse yet, why hadn’t I?

Stewart Capital Mid-Cap (SCMFX):  If this is one of the top two or three or ten mid-cap funds in operation (and it is), why haven’t you heard of it?  Worse yet, why hadn’t I?

Launch Alert: RiverNorth Dynamic Buy-Write Fund (RNBWX)

On  October 12, 2012, RiverNorth launched their fourth fund, RiverNorth Dynamic Buy-Write Fund.  “Buy-write” describes a sort of “covered call” strategy in which an investor might own a security and then sell to another investor the option to buy the security at a preset price in a preset time frame.  It is, in general, a defensive strategy which generates a bit of income and some downside protection for the investor who owns the security and writes the option.

As with any defensive strategy, you end up surrendering some upside in order to avoid some of the downside.  RiverNorth’s launch announcement contained a depiction of the risk-return profiles for a common buy-write index (the BXM) and three classes of stock:

A quick read is that the BXM offered 90% of the upside of the stock market with only 70% of the downside, which seems the very definition of a good tradeoff.

RiverNorth believes they can do better through active management of the portfolio.  The fund will be managed by Eric Metz, who joined RiverNorth in 2012 and serves as their Derivatives Strategist.  He’s been a partner at Bengal Capital, a senior trader at Ronin Capital and worked at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).   The investment minimum is $5000.  Expenses are capped at 1.80%.

Because the strategy is complex, the good folks at RiverNorth have agreed to an extended interview at their offices in Chicago on November 8th.  With luck and diligence, we’ll provide a full profile of the fund in our December issue.

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves.  Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Twenty-nine new no-load funds were placed in registration this month.  Those include three load-bearing funds becoming no-loads, two hedge funds merging to become one mutual fund, one institutional fund becoming retail and two dozen new offerings.  An unusually large number of the new funds feature very experienced managers.  Four, in particular, caught our attention:

BBH Global Core Select is opening just as the five-star BBH Core Select closes.  Core Select invests about 15% of its money outside the U.S., while the global version will place at least 40% there.  One of Core Select’s managers will co-manage the new fund with a BBH analyst.

First Trust Global Tactical Asset Allocation and Income Fund will be an actively-managed ETF that “seek[s] total return and provide income [and] a relatively stable risk profile.”  The managers, John Gambla and Rob A. Guttschow, had been managing five closed-end funds for Nuveen.

Huber Capital Diversified Large Cap Value Fund, which will invest in 40-80 large caps that trade “at a significant discount to the present value of future cash flows,” will be run by Joseph Huber, who also manages the five-star Huber Small Cap Value (HUSIX) and Huber Equity Income (HULIX) funds.

Oakseed Opportunity Fund is a new global fund, managed by Greg L. Jackson and John H. Park. These guys managed or co-managed some “A” tier funds (Oakmark Global, Acorn, Acorn Select and Yacktman) before moving to Blum Capital, a private equity firm, from about 2004-2012.

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down about 50 fund manager changes, including the blockbuster announcement of Karen Gaffney’s departure from Loomis Sayles.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity conference call

Based on the success of our September conference call with David Sherman of Cohanzick Asset Management and RiverPark’s president, Morty Schaja, we have decided to try to provide our readers with one new opportunity each month to speak with an “A” tier fund manager.

The folks at RiverPark generously agreed to participate in a second conference call with Observer readers. It will feature Mitch Rubin, lead manager of RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity (RLSFX), a fund that we profiled in August as distinctive and distinctly promising.  This former hedge fund crushed its peers.

I’ll moderate the call.  Mitch will open by talking a bit about the fund’s strategy and then will field questions (yours and mine) on the fund’s strategies and prospects. The call is November 29 at 7:00 p.m., Eastern. Participants can register for the conference by navigating to  http://services.choruscall.com/diamondpass/registration?confirmationNumber=10020992

We’ll have the winter schedule in our December issue.  For now, I’ll note that managers of several really good funds have indicated a willingness to spend serious time with you.

Small Funds Communicating Smartly

The Mutual Fund Education Alliance announced their 2012 STAR Awards, which recognize fund companies that do a particularly good job of communicating with their investors.  As is common with such awards, there’s an impulse to make sure lots of folks get to celebrate so there are 17 sub-categories in each of three channels (retail, advisor, plan participant) plus eleven overall winners, for 62 awards in total.

US Global Investors was recognized as the best small firm overall, for “consistency of messaging and excellent use of the various distribution outlets.”  Matthews Asia was celebrated as the outstanding mid-sized fund firm.  Judges recognized them for “modern, effective design [and] unbelievable branding consistency.”

Ironically, MFEA’s own awards page is danged annoying with an automatic slide presentation that makes it hard to read about any of the individual winners.

Congratulations to both firms.  We’d also like to point you to our own Best of the Web winners for most effective site design: Seafarer Funds and Cook & Bynum Fund, with honorable mentions to Wintergreen, Auxier Focus and the Tilson Funds.

Briefly Noted . . .

Artio meltdown continues.  The Wall Street Journal reports that Richard Pell, Artio’s CEO, has stepped down.  Artio is bleeding assets, having lost nearly 50% of their assets under management in the past 12 months.  Their stock price is down 90% since its IPO and we’d already reported the closure of their domestic-equity funds.  This amounts to a management reshuffle, with Artio’s president becoming CEO and Pell remaining at CIO.  He’ll also continue to co-manage the once-great (top 5% over 15 years, bottom 5% over the past five years) Artio International Equity Fund (BJBIX) with Rudolph-Riad Younes.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Growth Fund (SSETX) reopened to new investors on November 1, 2012. It’s a decent little fund with below average expenses.  Both risk and return tend to be below average as well, with risk further below average than returns.

Fidelity announced the launch of a dozen new target-date funds in its Strategic Advisers Multi-Manager Series, 2020 through 2055 and Retirement Income.  The Multi-Manager series allows Fidelity to sell the skills of non-Fidelity managers (and their funds) to selected retirement plans.  Christopher Sharpe and Andrew Dierdorf co-manage all of the funds.

CLOSINGS

The board of BBH Core Select (BBTEX) has announced its imminent closure.  The five-star large cap fund has $3.2 billion in assets and will close at $3.5 billion.  Given its stellar performance and compact 30-stock portfolio, that’s certainly in its shareholders’ best interests.  At the same time, BBH has filed to launched a Global Core fund by year’s end.  It will be managed by one of BBTEX’s co-managers.  For details, see our Funds in Registration feature.

Invesco Balanced-Risk Commodity Strategy (BRCAX) will close to new investors effective November 15, 2012.

Investment News reports that 86 ETFs ceased operations in the first 10 months of 2012.  Wisdom Tree announced three more in late October (LargeCap Growth ROI,  South African Rand SZR and Japanese Yen JYF). Up until 2012, the greatest number of closures in a single calendar year was 58 during the 2008 meltdown.  400 more (Indonesian Small Caps, anyone?) reside on the ETF Deathwatch for October 2012; ETFs with tiny investor bases and little trading activity.  The hidden dimension of the challenge provided by small ETFs is the ability of their boards to dramatically change their investment mandates in search of new assets.  Investors in Global X S&P/TSX Venture 30 Canada ETF (think “Canadian NASDAQ”) suddenly found themselves instead in Global X Junior Miners ETF (oooo … exposure to global, small-cap nickel mining!).

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Under the assumption that indecipherable is good, Allianz announced three name changes: Allianz AGIC Structured Alpha Fund is becoming AllianzGI Structured Alpha Fund. Allianz AGIC U.S. Equity Hedged Fund becomes AllianzGI U.S. Equity Hedged Fund and Allianz NFJ Emerging Markets Value Fund becomes AllianzGI NFJ Emerging Markets Value Fund.

BBH Broad Market (BBBIX) has changed its name to BBH Limited Duration Fund.

Effective December 3, 2012, the expensive, small and underperforming Forward Aggressive Growth Allocation Fund (ACAIX) will be changed to the Forward Multi-Strategy Fund. Along with the new name, this fund of funds gets to add “long/short, tactical and other alternative investment strategies” to its armamentarium.  Presumably that’s driven by the fact that the fund does quite poorly in falling markets: it has trailed its benchmark in nine of the past nine declining quarters.  Sadly, adding hedge-like funds to the portfolio will only drive up expenses and serve as another drag on performance.

Schwab Premier Income (SWIIX) will soon become Schwab Intermediate-Term Bond, with lower expenses but a much more restrictive mandate.  At the moment the fund can go anywhere (domestic, international and emerging market debt, income- and non-income-producing equities, floating rate securities, REITs, ETFs) but didn’t, while the new fund will invest only in domestic intermediate term bonds.

Moving in the opposite direction, Alger Large Cap Growth Institutional (ALGRX) becomes Alger Capital Appreciation Focus at the end of the year. The fund will adopt an all-cap mandate, but will shrink the target portfolio size from around 100 stocks to 50.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

The Board of Directors of Bhirud Funds Inc. has approved the liquidation of Apex Mid Cap Growth Fund (BMCGX) effective on or about November 14, 2012. In announcing Apex’s place on our 2012 “Roll Call of the Wretched,” we noted:

The good news: not many people trust Suresh Bhirud with their money.  His Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX) had, at last record, $192,546 – $100,000 below last year’s level.  Two-thirds of that amount is Mr. Bhirud’s personal investment.  Mr. Bhirud has managed the fund since its inception in 1992 and, with annualized losses of 9.2% over the past 15 years, has mostly impoverished himself.

We’re hopeful he puts his remaining assets in a nice, low-risk index fund.

The Board of Trustees of Dreyfus Investment Funds approved the liquidation of Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Tax-Sensitive Equity Fund (SDCEX) on January 8, 2013.  Ironically, this fund has outperformed the larger, newly-reopened SSETX.  And, while they were at it, the Board also approved the liquidation of Dreyfus Small Cap Fund (the “Fund”), effective on January 16, 2013

ING will liquidate ING Alternative Beta (IABAX) on December 7, 2012.  In addition to an obscure mandate (what is alternative beta?), the fund has managed to lose money over the past three years while drawing only $18 million in assets.

Munder International Equity Fund (MUIAX) is slated to be merged in Munder International Fund — Core Equity (MAICX), on December 7, 2012.

Uhhh . . .

Don’t get me wrong.  MUIAX is a bad fund (down 18% in five years) and deserves to go.  But MAICX is a worse fund by far (it’s down 29% in the same period).  And much smaller.  And newer.

This probably explains why I could never serve on a fund’s board of directors.  Their logic is simply too subtle for me.

Royce Mid-Cap (RMIDX) is set to be liquidated on November 19, 2012. It’s less than three years old, has performed poorly and managed to draw just a few million in assets.  The management team is being dispersed among Royce’s other funds.

It was named Third Millennium Russia Fund (TMRFX) and its charge was to invest “in securities of companies located in Russia.”  This is a fund that managed to gain or lose more than 70% in three of the past 10 years.  Investors have largely fled and so, effective October 10, 2012, the board of trustees tweaked things.  It’s now called Toreador International Fund and its mandate is to invest “outside of the United States.”  As of this writing, Morningstar had not yet noticed.

In Closing . . .


We’ve added an unusual bit of commercial presence, over to your right.  Amazon created a mini-site dedicated to the interests of investors.  In addition to the inevitable links to popular investing books, it features a weekly blog post, a little blog aggregator at the bottom (a lot of content from Bloomberg, some from Abnormal Returns and Seeking Alpha), and some sort of dead, dead, dead discussion group.  We thought you might find some of it useful or at least browseable, so we decided to include it for you.

And yes, it does carry MFO’s embedded link.  Thanks for asking!

Thanks, too, to all the folks (Gary, Martha, Dean, Richard, two Jacks, and one Turtle) who contributed to the Observer in October.

We’ll look for you in December.

 

Scout Unconstrained Bond Fund (SUBFX), November 2012

By David Snowball

This fund is now the Carillon Reams Unconstrained Bond Fund.

Objective and Strategy

The fund seeks to maximize total return consistent with the preservation of capital.  The fund can invest in almost any sort of fixed-income instrument, though as a practical matter their international investments are quite limited.  The fund’s maturity will not normally exceed eight years, but they maintain the option of going longer in some markets and even achieving a negative duration (effectively shorting the bond market) in others.  They can use derivative instruments, such as options, futures contracts (including interest rate futures contracts), currency forwards or swap agreements (including credit default swaps) to enhance returns, increase liquidity and/or gain exposure to particular areas of the market.  Because they sell a security when it approaches fair market value, this may be a relatively high turnover fund.

Adviser

Scout Investments, Inc. Scout is a wholly-owned subsidiary of UMB Financial, both are located in Kansas City, Missouri. Scout advises the eleven Scout funds. As of June 30, 2012, assets under the management of the Advisor were approximately $22.37 billion.  Scout’s four fixed-income funds are managed by its Reams Asset Management division, including Low-Duration Bond (SCLDX), Core Bond (SCCYX, four stars) and Core Plus Bond (SCPZX, rated five star/Silver by Morningstar, as of October 2012).

Manager

Mark M. Egan is the lead portfolio manager of the Fixed Income Funds. Thomas M. Fink, Todd C. Thompson and Stephen T. Vincent are co-portfolio managers of the Fixed Income Funds. Mr. Egan joined the Advisor on November 30, 2010. He oversees the entire fixed income division of the Advisor, Reams Asset Management, and retains oversight over all investment decisions. Mr. Egan was a portfolio manager of Reams Asset Management Company, LLC (“Reams”) from April 1994 until November 2010 and was a portfolio manager of Reams Asset Management Company, Inc. from June 1990 until March 1994. Mr. Egan was a portfolio manager of National Investment Services until May 1990.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Messrs. Egan, Fink and Thompson have each invested over $1,000,000 in the fund.  Mr. Vincent has between $10,000 – 50,000 in it.

Opening date

September 29, 2011.

Minimum investment

$1,000 for regular accounts, reduced to $100 for IRAs or accounts with AIPs.

Expense ratio

0.99%, after waivers, on assets of $45 million (as of October 2012).

Comments

There are 6850 funds of all kinds in Morningstar’s database.  Of those, precisely 117 have a better one-year record than Scout Unconstrained Bond.

There are 1134 fixed-income funds in Morningstar’s database.  Of those, precisely five have a better one-year record.

98.3% of all funds trail Scout Unconstrained between November 1, 2011 and October 30, 2012.  99.6% of all fixed-income funds trailed Scout for the same period.

Surprised?  You might not be if you knew the record of the management team that runs Scout Unconstrained.  Mark Egan and his team from Reams Asset Management have been investing money using this strategy since 1998.  Their audited performance for the private accounts (about $231 million worth of them) is stunningly better than the records of the most renowned bond fund managers.  The funds below represent the work of the three best-known bond managers (Jeff Gundlach at DoubleLine, Bill Gross at PIMCO, Dan Fuss at Loomis) plus the performance of the Gold-rated funds in Morningstar’s two most-flexible categories: multi-sector and world.

 

1 Yr.

3 Yrs.

5 Yrs.

10 Yrs.

Unconstrained Composite

33.98%

20.78

17.45

15.67

SUBFX

25.37

DoubleLine Core Fixed Income

8.62

Loomis Sayles Bond

14.25

10.83

7.08

10.41

Loomis Sayles Strategic Income

14.02

10.63

6.89

11.14

PIMCO Total Return

9.08

11.51

8.92

6.95

Templeton Global Bond

12.92

8.03

9.47

10.95

ML 3 Month LIBOR

0.48

0.37

1.44

2.26

Annualized Performance Ending September 30, 2012

You’ll notice that the performance of Scout Unconstrained does not equal the performance of the Unconstrained Composite.  The difference is that the team bought, in the private accounts, deeply distressed securities in the 2008 panic and they’re now harvesting the rewards of those purchases.  Since the fund didn’t exist, its investors don’t have the benefit of that exposure. Clark Holland, a Portfolio Analyst on the Fund, reports that, “We strive to invest the separate accounts and the mutual fund as closely as possible so returns should be similar going forward.”

Just because I’m a cautious person, I also screened all bond funds against the trailing record of the Unconstrained Bond composite, looking for close competitors.  There were none.

But I’m not sure why.  The team’s strategy is deceptively simple.  Find where the best values are, then buy them.  The Reams website posits this process:

STEP 1: Determine whether the bond market is cheap or expensive by comparing the current real interest rate to historical rates.

STEP 2: Focus on sectors offering relative value and select securities offering the highest risk‐adjusted return.

STEP 3: Continually measure and control exposure to security‐ and portfolio‐level risks.

It looks like the fund benefits from the combination of two factors: boldness and caution.

It’s clear that the managers have sufficient confidence in their judgment to act when other hesitate.  Their 2012 Annual Report cites one such instance:

A contribution to performance in the asset-backed securities (ABS) sector can be traced to our second lien or home equity holdings, which strongly outperformed.  We purchased these securities at an extreme discount after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, when defaults on home equity loans were high. Since then, default rates declined, the perceived risk of owning these securities lessened, and the prices of the securities have risen sharply.

As you comb through the fund’s reports, you find discussions of “airline enhanced equipment trust certificates” and the successful exploitation of mispricing in the derivatives market:

High-yield index swaps (CDX) such as those we own, which represent groups of credit default swaps (CDS), usually are priced similarly to high-yield cash bonds. Due to somewhat technical reasons, a price gap opened, in the second quarter of this year, between the price of high-yield CDX index swaps and high-yield cash bonds .We took advantage of the price gap to buy the CDX index swap at an attractive price and captured a nice return when pricing trended back toward a more normal level.

One simple and bold decision was to have zero long exposure to Treasuries; their peers average 35%.   As with RiverPark Short Term High Yield, the fact that their strategy (separate accounts plus the fund) has attracted a relatively small amount of investment, they’re able to drive performance with a series of relatively small, profitable trades that larger funds might need to skip over.

At the same time, you get a sense of intense risk-consciousness.  Cautious about rising interest rates, the managers expect to maintain a shorter average duration as they look for potential investments. In his October 3, 2012 letter to investors, Mr. Egan lays out his sense of how the market is evolving and how his team will respond:

What to do? Recognize the reality of a challenging environment, focus on your realistic goals as an investor, and be ready to seize opportunities as they arise.  A well-known investor recently opined as to the death of equity as an asset class.  Our take is the death of static risk allocations, or even what constitutes risk, along with buy and hold investing.  The successful investor will be aware of the challenges we face as a society, understand the efficacy or lack of it in the various (mostly political) solutions prescribed, and allow volatility, and the inevitable mispricing that will result, to be your guide. Flexibility and nimbleness will be required.  For our part, we have positioned accounts in a cautious, conservative stance as the cost of doing so has rapidly declined. We may be early and we may forgo some modest gains in risk assets, but it is both appropriate and in keeping with the style that has generated returns well in excess of our peers over most time periods.

Bottom Line

You need to approach any “too good to be true” investment with care and diligence.  The track record behind SUBFX, which is splendid and carefully documented, was earned in a different sort of investment vehicle.  As assets grow, the fund’s opportunity set will change and, possibly, narrow.  That said, the managers have successfully invested substantial sums via this strategy for nearly 15 years; the fact that they’ve placed millions of their own dollars at risk represents a very serious endorsement.

Fund website

Scout Unconstrained Bond.  Mr. Egan also wrote a very good white paper entitled “Fixed Income: The Search for Total Returns in Volatile Markets” (March 2012).  If you’re intrigued by the fund, you’ll get a better sense of the managers’ approach.  Even if you’re not, you might well benefit from their discussion of “the growing risks of not taking risks.”

Fact Sheet

[cr2012]

Stewart Capital Mid Cap Fund (SCMFX), November 2012

By David Snowball

This fund has been liquidated.

Objective and Strategy

Stewart Capital Mid Cap Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation.  It invests, primarily, in domestic midcap stocks.  While it is technically a “diversified” fund, the managers warn that they prefer to invest in “a relatively small number of intensively researched companies.”  They operationalize “relatively small” as 30-60.  They target firms that don’t need “large amounts of leverage to execute their business plan” and firms with sustainable business advantages (favorable demographics and long-term trends, high barriers to entry, good management teams, and high returns on invested capital).

Adviser

Stewart Capital Advisors, LLC, was founded in August 2005.  It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of S&T Bank, headquartered in Indiana, PA.  As of December 31, 2011, Stewart had $965 million in assets under management.

Managers

Matthew A. Di Filippo, Charles G. Frank, Jonathan V. Pavlik, Malcolm E. Polley, Helena Rados-Derr and Nicholas Westric.  Mr. Di Filippo is the senior manager and the adviser’s investment strategist.  Mr. Polley is president and CIO.  His investing career started on Black Monday, 1987 and includes 25 years of primarily-midcap investing.  Except for Ms. Rados-Derr and Mr. Westric, the managers have all been with the fund since inception.  Each of the managers also handles something like 100-300 private accounts.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Modest.  Three of the managers have invested between $10,001-50,000 in the fund: Polley, Di Filippo and Pavlik.  The others have invested under $10,000.  I expressed my concern about such modest commitments to President Polley.  He writes:

I could require that staff invest solely in the fund, but realize that a portfolio that is solely mid-cap oriented for some folks does not meet their risk parameters.  Also, I want staff to invest in the fund on its merits. That said, I have exactly two investments: S&T Bank stock and the Stewart Capital Mid Cap Fund.  I also have two children in college and have been using some of my investment in that fund to pay for that expense.  So, I believe I put my money where my mouth is.

Opening date

December 29, 2006. The fund converted to no-load on April 1, 2012.

Minimum investment

$1,000 or $100 for accounts with an automatic investment plan.

Expense ratio

1.50%, after waivers, on assets of $37.0 million.

Comments

I wandered by the Stewart Capital booth at Morningstar Investment Conference in June, picked up the fund’s factsheet and reports, and then stood there for a long time.  Have you ever had one of those “how on earth did I manage to miss this?” moments? As I looked at the fund’s record, that’s precisely what went through my mind: small, no-load, independent fund, great returns, low risk, low minimum investments.  Heck, they’re even in Steeler Country.  How on earth did I manage to miss this?

Part of the answer is that Stewart was not always a no-load fund, so they weren’t traditionally in my coverage universe, and their marketing efforts are very low-key.

There’s a lot to like here. The two reliable fund rating services, Morningstar and Lipper, agree that SCMFX is at the top of the midcap pack in both risk management and returns.  Here’s the Morningstar snapshot:

 

Returns

Risk

Rating

3-year

High

Below Average

Five Stars

5-year

High

Below Average

Five Stars

Overall

High

Below Average

Five Stars

(Morningstar ratings, as of 10/30/12)

Morningstar’s estimate of tax-adjusted returns places Stewart in the top 1% of mid-cap funds over the past five years.

Lipper supports a similar conclusion:

 

Total Return

Consistent Return

Preservation

Tax Efficiency

3-year

5

5

5

4

5-year

5

5

5

5

Overall

5

5

5

5

(Lipper Leaders ratings, as of 10/30/12)

The fund has a striking pattern of performance over time. Normally good funds make their money either on the upside or the downside; that is, they consistently outperform in either rising or falling markets. Stewart seems to do both.  It has outperformed its peer group in eight of eight down quarters in the past five years (2008 – Q3 2012) but in only four of 11 rising quarters. But it still wins in rising markets. In quarters when the market has been rising, SCMFX gains an average of 10.65% versus 10.58% for its peer group, reflecting the fact that its “up” quarters rarely trail the market by much and sometimes lead it by a lot.

When I asked the simple question, “which mid-cap funds have been as successful? And screened for folks who could match or better Stewart over the past one, three and five year periods, I could find only four funds in a universe of 300 midcaps. Of those, only one fund, the $1.6 billion Nicholas Fund (NICSX), was less volatile.

That’s a distinguished record in a notably volatile market: 10 of the past 23 quarters have seen double-digit gains (six) or losses (four) for midcap stocks.

The fund is distinguished by effective active management. They buy the stocks they expect to outperform, regardless of the broader market’s preferences. They target stocks where they anticipate a 15% annual rate of return and which are selling at a discount to fair-value of at least 15%. Their question seems to be, “would we want to own this whole company?”  That leads them to buy businesses where the industry is favorably positioned (they mostly avoid financials, for example, because the industry only thrives when assets are growing and Stewart suspects that growth is going to be limited for years and years) and the individual firm has exceptional management. An analysis of the portfolio shows the result. They own high quality companies, ones which are growing much more quickly (whether measured by long-term earnings, cash flow, or book value) than their peers.  And they are buying those companies at a good price; their high-quality portfolio is selling at a slight discount (in price/earnings, price/sales, price/cash flow) to their peers.

Bottom Line

This is arguably one of the top two midcap funds on the market, based on its ability to perform in volatile rising and falling markets. Their strategy seems disciplined, sensible and repeatable. Management has an entirely-admirable urge “to guard against … making foolish decisions” based on any desire to buy what’s popular at the moment.  They deserve a spot on the due diligence list for anyone looking to add actively-managed, risk-conscious equity exposure.

Fund website

Stewart Capital

Fact Sheet

[cr2012]

November 2012, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

Advisory Research Value Income Fund

Advisory Research Value Income Fund will seek high current income and long term capital appreciation.  Interesting plan: they intend to invest primarily in preferred securities, but retain the option of buying “other income producing securities including convertible securities, debt securities, common stocks, and securities of other investment companies.”  No more than 20% of the portfolio will be non-U.S. This fund represents a conversion of two hedge funds (Advisory Research Value Income Fund, L.P. and Advisory Research Value Income Fund II, L.P.) into one mutual fund.  The hedge fund returned an average of 4.7% per year from 2003 to 2011, vastly better than the 1.2% registered by its benchmark (Merrill Lynch US Preferred Fixed Rate Index).   Brien M. O’Brien, James M. Langer and Bruce M. Zessar will manage the portfolio.  The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  The expense ratio is not yet set.

BBH Global Core Select

BBH Global Core Select will seek to provide investors with long-term growth of capital by investing in mid- and large-cap stocks around the world.  They describe themselves as “buy and own” investors.  They intend to invest mostly in developed markets, but can invest without limit in emerging markets as well.  At least 40% of the portfolio will be non-US and they can hedge their currency exposure.  Regina Lombardi and Timothy E. Hartch will manage the portfolio.  BBH recently described Lombardi as part of their team of media and consumer analysts.  Hartch comanages the excellent, recently closed BBH Core Select (BBTRX) fund.  The minimum initial investment is $10,000.  The expense ratio is not yet set.

BRC Large Cap Focus Equity Fund

BRC Large Cap Focus Equity Fund (Advisor Class Shares) wants to achieve long-term capital appreciation that will exceed the S&P 500 Index over a three- to five-year time horizon.  They’ll invest in 30-35 large cap stocks.  BRC stands for “Bounded Rationality Concepts.”  These guys believe in behavioral economics and think that they can anticipate events like positive earnings surprises and upgrades.  John R. Riddle will head the portfolio team.  The three managers previously worked for Duff & Phelps which, like Leuthold, is known for its investment research and analysis. The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  The expense ratio, after waivers, will be 1.24%.

Drexel Hamilton Multi-Asset Real Return Fund

Drexel Hamilton Multi-Asset Real Return Fund will seek (duh) real return which they define as “total return that exceeds U.S. inflation over a full [five-year] inflation cycle.”  They plan to invest, mostly, in other Drexel Hamilton funds, in TIPs and in commodity-linked ETFs and ETNs.  The other two Drexel funds in which it will invest have been around less than a year.  Andrew Bang, a West Point grad and the firm’s founder, is the portfolio manager.  Before founding Drexel, he was a Senior Vice President at Shinhan Investment America, a Vice President at AIG Global Investments, and a Portfolio Manager for GE Asset Management (GEAM).  In that latter role he managed $2.5 billion or so. The minimum initial investment is $10,000.  The expense ratio is 1.81% after waivers.

First Trust High Yield Long/Short ETF

First Trust High Yield Long/Short ETF will be an actively-managed ETF which will invest most of its portfolio (long and short) in high yield U.S. and non-U.S. corporate debt obligations, bank loans and convertible bonds. It may invest in “special situations” including defaulted securities and common stocks; companies whose financial condition is troubled or uncertain and that may be involved in bankruptcy proceedings, reorganizations or financial restructurings.  Finally, the manager expects routinely to short U.S. Treasuries and some investment grade U.S. corporate debt; the fund “intends to use the proceeds from the Fund’s short positions to purchase high yield debt securities, thereby creating a form of financial  leverage.” William Housey, Scott D. Fries, Peter Fasone, Todd Larson and Eric Maisel will manage the fund.  All of them seem to have extensive high yield experience at other firms (Morgan Stanley/Van Kampen, BNP Paribas, ABN AMBR)).  Expenses are not yet set.

First Trust Global Tactical Asset Allocation and Income Fund

First Trust Global Tactical Asset Allocation and Income Fund will be an actively-managed ETF that “seek[s] total return and provide income [and] a relatively stable risk profile.”  It will invest in other ETFs, plus some ETNs and sovereign debt.  They’ll also try to sell calls on a portion of the portfolio to supplement their yield.  The description of the fund’s underlying asset allocation strategy isn’t terribly informative; they’ll have a neutral allocation (which isn’t spelled out) and will move from it as conditions call for.  John Gambla and Rob A. Guttschow will manage the fund. Up until 2011, they managed five closed-end funds for Nuveen: Dow 30 Premium and Dividend Income (DPD), Dow 30 Enhanced Premium & Income (NYSE: DPO), NASDAQ Premium Income & Growth (QQQX), Nuveen Core Equity Alpha Fund (JCE) and Nuveen Tax-Advantaged Dividend Growth Fund (JTD). Expenses not yet set.

Hotchkis & Wiley Global Value Fund

Hotchkis & Wiley Global Value Fund seeks capital appreciation by investing, primarily, in stocks of companies located in developed markets.  At least 40% will be non-US and up to 20% might be in emerging markets.  They plan a bottom-up, fundamentals-driven strategy. Scott McBride and Judd Peters will manage the fund.  They have managed private accounts using this strategy since 2011 but the firm hasn’t released performance information yet.  Their public record is mixed: they’re on the management teams for two sad sack domestic funds, Diversified Value (HWCAX) and Large Cap Value (HWLAX).  Since joining the teams, the funds have gone from dreadful to mediocre, so that’s sort of an endorsement. The minimum investment is $2500.  Expenses are not yet set.  There is a 5.75% front-load but H&W funds are generally available no-load at Schwab.

Huber Capital Diversified Large Cap Value Fund

Huber Capital Diversified Large Cap Value Fund seeks to achieve current income and capital appreciation by investing in 40-80 large caps that trade “at a significant discount to the present value of future cash flows.” The fund is benchmarked against the Russell 1000 Value, whose smallest firm has a $230 million market cap, but the managers expect to invest mostly in U.S. stocks above $5 billion.  It may invest up to 20% in ADRs.  Joseph Huber, who also manages the five-star Huber Small Cap Value (HUSIX) and Huber Equity Income (HULIX) funds, will manage the portfolio.  The minimum initial investment is $5000, reduced to $2500 for IRAs.  The opening expense ratio will be 1.25%.

Janus Diversified Alternatives Fund

Janus Diversified Alternatives Fund will seek absolute return with low correlation to stocks and bonds.   Their description of investment strategies is mostly self-important babble about “risk premia opportunities.”  It looks like they use a risk-parity model to set their neutral asset allocation across equity, fixed income, commodity, and currency asset classes.  That is, they adjust allocations so that the risk generated by stocks is the same as that generated by bonds or commodities.  They then look for the sources of the aforementioned “risk premia opportunities,” which is to say, mis-priced securities.  They can invest both long and short. They can invest directly or through mutual funds, ETFs or ETNs. Andrew B. Weisman and John S. Fujiwara will manage the fund.  Both are hedge fund guys who joined Janus in 2012.  “S” shares are available no-load and NTF. The minimum initial investment is $2500.  The expense ratio is not yet set.

Kellner Event Fund

Kellner Event Fund seeks to achieve positive risk-adjusted returns independent of the returns generated by the overall equity markets. The plan is to invest, long and short, “using various strategies” in order to “seek to profit from securities experiencing catalyst driven change.”  Such events might include mergers, bankruptcies, financial or operational stress, restructurings, asset sales, recapitalizations, spin-offs, litigation, regulatory and legislative changes “as well as other types of events.”  It can invest in pretty much any asset class.  George A. Kellner, the adviser’s founder & Chief Executive Officer, will lead the management team.   The public record for the team is awfully thin.  They launched a merger-arbitrage fund in July 2012 and it’s been pretty average.  Several of the managers have experience with event-driven hedge funds, but of course there’s no record available.  The minimum initial investment is $2500, reduced to $2000 for various tax-advantaged plans and $100 for accounts set up with an AIP.  The opening expense ratio will be 2.75% (yikes) in addition to a 2% redemption fee.

Managers AMG Chicago Equity Partners Balanced Fund

Managers AMG Chicago Equity Partners Balanced Fund, yet another convert from the world of loaded funds, will pursue “a high total investment return, consistent with the preservation of capital and prudent economic risk.”  The fund will ordinarily invest 50-65% in stocks and the rest in bonds and cash. It will invest mostly in mid- to large-cap stocks, selected on the basis of “momentum, value, and quality factors.”  The predecessor fund, the same except for a sales load, has been quite consistently above-average.  David C. Coughenour of CEP leads the management team. The minimum initial investment is $2,000.  The expense ratio, after waiver, is 1.10%.  The “service class,” sold through financial intermediaries, is 0.25% cheaper.

Oakseed Opportunity Fund

Oakseed Opportunity Fund will seek long term capital appreciation by investing, mostly, in the stocks of high quality US companies.  They do have the right to invest overseas and they may also invest up to 10% short.  Greg L. Jackson and John H. Park will manage the fund.  These guys managed or co-managed some “A” tier funds (Oakmark Global, Acorn, Acorn Select and Yacktman) around the turn of the century.  Both worked at  Blum Capital, a private equity firm, from about 2004-2012. The minimum initial investment is $2500, reduced to $1000 for various tax-advantaged plans and $100 for accounts set up with an AIP.  The opening expense ratio will be 1.4% in addition to a 2% redemption fee for shares held fewer than 90 days.

Pacific Financial Alternative Strategies, Flexible Growth & Income, Balanced, Foundational Asset Allocation, Faith & Values Based Moderate, Conservative and Aggressive Funds

Pacific Financial Alternative Strategies, Flexible Growth & Income, Balanced, Foundational Asset Allocation, Faith & Values Based Moderate, Conservative and Aggressive Funds.  You’re welcome to read about them if you’d like, but I’m not going to spend time on them.  Here’s the story: Pacific Financial’s three-person management team already runs five funds with diverse focuses.  The “investor” class for every one of those funds is one-star (as of 10/26/2012).  They’re now proposing to add seven more funds, requiring yet more expertise that they have not demonstrated that they possess.  The expense ratios aren’t yet set.  The minimum purchase is $5000.

Riverbridge Growth Fund

Riverbridge Growth Fund will pursue to seek long term capital appreciation by investing in small- to mid-cap US stocks (and some ADRs).   The managers intend to focus on “companies that it views as building their earnings power and building their intrinsic … values over long periods of time.  The advisor uses a bottom-up approach that seeks to identify high quality growth companies that demonstrate the ability to sustain strong secular earnings growth, regardless of overall economic conditions.” Mark A. Thompson, Rick D. Moulton and Dana L. Feick will manage the fund.  Over the last decade, the composite performance of the private accounts using this strategy has been pretty good: up 8.2% per year versus 6.1% for the Russell 3000 over the same period.  The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  The expense ratio, which will include a waiver, is not yet set.  There’s a 1% redemption fee on shares held fewer than 90 days.

Riverbridge Eco Leaders Fund

Riverbridge Eco Leaders Fund will pursue to seek long term capital appreciation by investing in “companies that use strategic technologies, materials and services to: (1) increase productivity by improving quality, efficiency and performance or (2) lower costs by reducing raw materials usage, scrap, and the amount and toxicity of waste as companies having a net positive impact on the environment.”  The managers intend to focus on “companies that it views as building their earnings power and building their intrinsic … values over long periods of time.  The advisor uses a bottom-up approach that seeks to identify high quality growth companies that demonstrate the ability to sustain strong secular earnings growth, regardless of overall economic conditions.” Mark A. Thompson, Rick D. Moulton and Dana L. Feick will manage the fund.  Over the last decade, the composite performance of the private accounts using this strategy has been pretty good: up 7.5% per year versus 5.3% for the S&P500 over the same period. The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  The expense ratio, which will include a waiver, is not yet set.  There’s a 1% redemption fee on shares held fewer than 90 days.

Schwab Target 2045, 2050 and 2055 Funds

Schwab Target 2045, 2050 and 2055 Funds are all funds-of-Schwab-funds.  It appears that they’re only available to “eligible investors,” which appears to translate as “institutions.”  Not sure of why.  Zifan Tang (cool name) manages them all.  Expenses not yet set.

Stonebridge Small-Cap Growth Fund

Stonebridge Small-Cap Growth Fund appears in the SEC filings of October 5, 2012 as a new fund with an N-1A filing.  It is, in reality, an old, expensive and underperforming institutional fund that is becoming a retail one.  This is odd, since there already was a retail version.  It claims to seek long-term growth of capital. “Short-term income is a secondary objective.”  I’m not entirely sure what “short term income” is.  In any case, they invest in domestic small cap stocks, those between $100 million and $3 billion.  And they look for “companies with strong balance sheets, high/growing return on invested capital, positive free cash flow, and earnings growth in excess of 20%.”  Up to 10% may be invested overseas.  Richard C. Barrett and Matthew W. Markatos have managed it for about 30 years. The minimum initial investment is $2500.  The opening expense ratio will be 1.97% and there’s a 2% redemption fee on shares held under 30 days.

Scharf Balanced Opportunity Fund

Scharf Balanced Opportunity Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation and income.  They’ll invest 50-75% in global equities and the rest in global fixed income.  Brian A. Krawez, president of Scharf, is the portfolio manager. Scharf manages a bunch of private accounts using this same strategy and they’ve done quite well over time.  In the five years since Mr. Krawez has been around, the separate accounts outperformed a 60/40 benchmark by between 150 – 300 basis points per year.   The minimum initial investment is $10,000.  The expense ratio, after waiver, is 1.20%.

Sit Quality Income Fund

Sit Quality Income Fund will seek high current income and safety of principal.  The fund invests at least 50% of its assets in U.S. government debt securities and the remainder in investment grade debt securities issued by corporations and municipalities, and mortgage and other asset backed securities.  They’re targeting an average effective duration for the portfolio of approximately 0 to 2 years. Michael C. Brilley, Bryce A. Doty, Mark H. Book, and Chris M. Rasmussen constitute the management team and also manage the five-star Sit US Government Securities fund (SNGVX). The minimum initial investment is $5,000, reduced to $2000 for IRAs.  The expense ratio, after waiver, is 0.90%.

Systematic Mid Cap Value Fund

Systematic Mid Cap Value Fund (SYAMX), which is being converted from a front-loaded fund to a no-load one, will pursue long-term capital appreciation by investing in 60-80 mid-cap stocks.  The manager “[s]eeks out value companies with a confirmed catalyst for sustained fundamental improvement that should eventually lead to either revised earnings estimates or earnings surprises in the future.” Despite an uninspired track record, the earlier version of the fund did accumulate $300 million in assets. Ron Mushock and D. Kevin McCreesh have managed the fund since launch.  The minimum initial investment is $2,000.  The expense ratio, after a generous one basis-point waiver, is 1.13%.  The “service class,” sold through financial intermediaries, is 0.25% cheaper.

WisdomTree Global Corporate Bond Fund

WisdomTree Global Corporate Bond Fund will be an actively-managed ETF that will pursue a high level of total return consisting of both income and capital appreciation.  They plan to invest in debt issues by public, private, and state-owned or sponsored corporations.   They’ll limit emerging market debt to 25% of the portfolio, they can invest 25% in derivatives and expect to hedge their currency exposure.  It looks as if there will be four managers, but their names have not been published and the expenses not yet set.

October 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

The trees have barely begun to change color here in Iowa. The days are warm, football is in the air (had I mentioned that my son Will had a running touchdown on offense and a nifty interception on defense this week?) and dentists everywhere are gearing up for Halloween. It’s an odd time, then, for investors to be concerned with Santa Claus.

Augustana in autumn

The Quad at Augustana College in early autumn

And yet they are. The broad market indexes are up 2.5% in September (typically a rocky month), 16.2% year-to-date and 30% over the past 12 months. In a normal year, investors would hold their breaths through October and then look with happy anticipation to the arrival of “the Santa Claus rally.” In 80 of the past 100 years, stocks have risen in December, generally by a bit more than 2%.

The question folks are raising this year seems worth pondering: will the intersection of a bull run with a fiscal cliff make for a distinctly Grinchy end of the year? Will even the suspicion of such an outcome make enough folks lighten their stock exposure to trigger a rare year-end market sag?

I don’t know, but the prospect makes me especially grateful for the opportunity to enjoy the company of my students and the fading warmth of the harvest season.

The Last Ten: Fidelity’s New Fund Launches Since 2002

“The Last Ten” will be a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.  We start this month with Fidelity, the Beantown Behemoth.

There was, at one time, few safer bets than a new Fidelity fund.  New Fido funds had two things going from them: (1) Fidelity could afford to buy and support the brightest young managers around and (2) older Fidelity funds might, by happenstance, choose to buy a stock recently purchased by the new fund.  The size of those purchases could cause a stock’s price to spike, much to the profit of its early owners.  The effect was consistent enough that it became the subject of newsletters and academic studies.

Which leads us to the question: when was the last time that Fidelity launched a compelling fund?  You know, one-of-a-kind, innovative, must-have, that sort of thing?

Might it have been New Millenium (FMILX), 20 years ago?  If not, what?

Here’s an easier question: when was the last time that Fidelity launched a fund which now carries a five-star rating from Morningstar?

Answer: five years ago, with the launch of Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX) in November of 2007. It’s a fund so low-profile that it doesn’t appear in any of Fidelity’s advertising and is not covered by any of Morningstar’s analysts.  The only other five star fund launched by Fido in a decade is an institutional bond index fund, Spartan Intermediate Term Bond Index (FIBIX), December 2005.

That’s not to say that Fidelity hasn’t been launching funds.  They have.  Hundreds of them.  They’re just not very good.

It’s hard to generate an exact count of Fidelity’s new fund launches because some apparently new funds are just older funds being sold through new channels, such as the launch of a Fidelity Advisor fund that’s just a version of an older Fidelity one.

That said, here’s a rough 10 year total.  Fidelity has launched 154 new mutual funds in a decade.  Those appear as Fidelity, Fidelity Advisor, Fidelity Series and Strategic Adviser funds.  Taking the various share classes into account, Fido made 730 new packages available in the decade.

That includes:

26 Fidelity funds for retail investors

18 Fidelity Series funds – which are available for purchase only by other Fidelity funds.  The most amazing development there is the imminent launch of new funds for Joel Tillinghast and Will Danoff.  Mr. T has brilliantly managed the $35 billion Low Priced Stock (FLPSX) since 1989.  He recently completed a sabbatical, during which time the fund was run by a team.  The team has been retained as co-managers as part of what Fidelity admits is “succession planning.”  He’ll now also manage Intrinsic Opportunities.  Will Danoff, who manages the $85 billion Contrafund (FCNTX) and $20 billion Advisor News Insights (FNIAX) funds, is being asked to manage Opportunistic Insights.

20 Strategic Advisers funds (e.g. SMid Cap Multi-manager) – which rely on non-Fidelity managers.

9 Spartan index funds, some of which overlap Series index funds.

58 Fidelity Advisor funds – some (Advisor Small Cap Value) of which are near-duplicates of other Fidelity funds. But, it turns out that a fair number are either unique to the Advisor lineup or are distinct from their Fidelity sibling. The 14 “Income Replacement” series, for example, are distinct to the Advisor line. Will Danoff’s Advisor New Insights fund, for example, is not a clone of Contrafund.  Advisor Midcap II A is sort of a free agent. Advisor Value Leaders is bad, but unparalleled.

13 “W” class Freedom Index funds are another distinct adviser-only set, which have the same target dates as the Freedom series but which execute exclusively through index funds.

How good are those funds?  They’re definitely “not awful.”  Of the 730 new fund packages, 593 have earned Morningstar ratings.  Morningstar awards five stars to the top 10% of funds in a group and four stars to the next 22.5%.  By sheer coincidence, you’d expect Fido to have fielded 59 new five-star funds.  They only have 18.  And you’d expect 192 to have four or five star ratings.  They managed 118.  Which is to say, new Fidelity funds are far less likely to be excellent than either their storied past or pure chance would dictate.

The same pattern emerges if you look at Morningstar’s “gold” rating for funds, their highest accolade.  Fidelity has launched nine “Gold” funds in that period – all are either bond funds, or index funds, or bond index funds.  None is retail, and none is an actively-managed stock or hybrid fund.

Why the apparent mediocrity of their funds?  I suspect three factors are at work.  First, Fidelity is in the asset-gathering business now rather than the sheer performance business.  The last thing that institutional investors (or even most financial planners) want are high-risk, hard-to-categorize strategies.  They want predictable packages of services, and Fidelity is obliged to provide them.  Second, Fidelity’s culture has turned cautious.  Young managers are learning from early on that “safe is sane.”  If that’s the case, they’re not likely to be looking for the cutting edge of anything.  The fact that they’re turning to overworked 25-year veterans to handle new in-house funds might be a sign of how inspiring the Fidelity “bench” has become.  Third and finally, Fidelity’s too big to pursue interesting projects.  It’s hard for any reasonably successful Fidelity fund to stay below a billion in assets, which means that niche strategies and those requiring nimble funds are simply history.

Bottom line: the “Fidelity new-fund effect” seems history, as Fidelity turns more and more to index funds, repackaged products and outside managers.  But at least they’re unlikely to be wretched, which brings us to …

The Observer’s Annual “Roll Call of the Wretched”

It’s the time of year when we pause to enjoy two great German traditions: Oktoberfest and Schadenfreude.  While one of my favorites, Leinenkugel’s Oktoberfest, was shut out (Bent River Brewery won first, second and third places at the Quad City’s annual Brew Ha Ha festival), it was a great excuse to celebrate fall on the Mississippi.

And a glass of Bent River’s Mississippi Blonde might be just what you need to enjoy the Observer’s annual review of the industry’s Most Regrettable funds.  Just as last year, we looked at funds that have finished in the bottom one-fourth of their peer groups for the year so far.  And for the preceding 12 months, three years, five years and ten years.  These aren’t merely “below average.”  They’re so far below average they can hardly see “mediocre” from where they are.

When we ran the screen in October 2011, there are 151 consistently awful funds, the median size for which is $70 million.  In 2012 there were . . . 151 consistently awful funds, the median size for which is $77 million.

Since managers love to brag about the consistency of their performance, here are the most consistently awful funds that have over a billion in assets.  Funds repeating from last year are flagged in red.

  Morningstar Category

Total Assets
($ mil)

BBH Broad Market Intermediate Bond

2,900

Bernstein International Foreign Large Blend

1,497

Bernstein Tax-Managed Intl Foreign Large Blend

3,456

CRA Qualified Investment CRA Intermediate Bond

1,488

DFA Two-Year Global Fixed-Income World Bond

4,665

Eaton Vance Strategic Income B Multisector Bond

2,932

Federated Municipal Ultrashort Muni National Short

4,022

Hussman Strategic Growth Long/Short Equity

3,930

Invesco Constellation A Large Growth

2,515

Invesco Global Core Equity A World Stock

1,279

Oppenheimer Flexible Strategies Moderate Allocation

1,030

Pioneer Mid-Cap Value A Mid-Cap Value

1,106

Thornburg Value A Large Blend

2,083

Vanguard Precious Metals and M Equity Precious Metals

3,042

Wells Fargo Advantage S/T Hi-Y High Yield Bond

1,102

   

37,047

Of these 13, two (DFA and Wells) deserve a pass because they’re very much unlike their peer group.  The others are just billions of bad.

What about funds that didn’t repeat from last year’s list?  Funds that moved off the list:

  1. Liquidated – the case of Vanguard Asset Allocation.
  2. Fired or demoted the manager and are seeing at least a short term performance bump – Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector Mid Cap (FMCBX ), Fidelity Magellan (FMAGX), Hartford US Government Securities (HAUSX), and Vantagepoint Growth (VPGRX) are examples.
  3. They got lucky.  Legg Mason Opportunity “C”, for example, has less than a billion left in it and is doing great in 2012, while still dragging  a 100th percentile ranking for the past three and five years. Putnam Diversified Income (PINDX) is being buoyed by strong performance in 2009 but most of 2011 and 2012 have been the same old, sad story for the fund.

The most enjoyable aspect of the list is realizing that you don’t own any of these dogs – and that hundreds of thousands of poor saps are in them because of the considered advice of training financial professionals (remember: 11 of the 13 are loaded funds, which means you’re paying a professional to place you in these horrors).

Just When You Thought It Couldn’t Get Any Worse

I then refined the search with the Observer’s “insult to injury” criteria: funds that combined wretched performance with above-average to high risk and above average fees.  The good news: not many people trust Suresh Bhirud with their money.  His Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX) had, at last record, $192,546 – $100,000 below last year’s level.  Two-thirds of that amount is Mr. Bhirud’s personal investment.  Mr. Bhirud has managed the fund since its inception in 1992 and, with annualized losses of 9.2% over the past 15 years, has mostly impoverished himself.

Likewise, with Prasad Growth (PRGRX) whose performance graph looks like this:

The complete Roll Call of Wretched:

  Morningstar Category

Total Assets
($ mil)

AllianceBern Global Value A World Stock 44
Apex Mid Cap Growth Small Growth <1
API Efficient Frontier Value Mid-Cap Blend 22
CornerCap Balanced Moderate Allocation 18
Eaton Vance AMT-Free Ltd Maturity Muni National Interm 67
Eaton Vance CT Municipal Income Muni Single State Long 120
Eaton Vance KY Municipal Income Muni Single State Long 55
Eaton Vance NY Ltd Maturity Muni Muni New York Intermediate 91
Eaton Vance TN Municipal Income Muni Single State Long 53
Legg Mason WA Global Inflation Inflation-Protected Bond 41
Litman Gregory Masters Value Large Blend 81
Midas Equity Precious Metals 55
Pacific Advisors Mid Cap Value Mid-Cap Blend 5
Pioneer Emerging Markets A Diversified Emerging Mkts 316
Prasad Growth World Stock <1
ProFunds Precious Metals Ultra Equity Precious Metals 51
ProFunds Semiconductor UltraSe Technology   4
Pyxis Government Securities B Intermediate Government 83
Rochdale Large Value Large Blend 20
SunAmerica Focused Small-Cap Value Small Blend 101
SunAmerica Intl Div Strat A Foreign Large Blend 70
SunAmerica US Govt Securities Intermediate Government 137
Tanaka Growth Mid-Cap Growth 11
Thornburg Value A Large Blend 2,083
Timothy Plan Strategic Growth Aggressive Allocation 39
Turner Concentrated Growth Investor Large Growth 35
Wilmington Large Cap Growth A Large Growth 89
    3,691

I have a world of respect for the good folks at Morningstar.  And yet I sometimes wonder if they aren’t being a bit generous with funds they’ve covered for a really long time.  The list above represents funds which, absent wholesale changes, should receive zero – no – not any – zilch investor dollars.  They couple bad performance, high risk and high expenses.

And yet:

Thornburg Value (a “Bronze” fund): “This fund’s modified management team deserves more time.”  What?  The former lead manager retired in 2009.  The current managers have been on-board since 2006.  The fund has managed to finish in the bottom 1 – 10% of its peers every year since.  Why do they deserve more time?

Litman Gregory Masters Value: “This fund’s potential is stronger than its long-term returns suggest.”  What does that mean?  For every trailing time period, it trails more or less 90% of its peers.  Is the argument, “hey, this could easily become a bottom 85th percentile fund”?

Two words: run away!  Two happier words: “drink beer!”

Chip, the Observer’s technical director, deserves a special word of thanks for her research and analysis on this piece.  Thanks, Chip!

RPHYX Conference Call

For about an hour on September 13th, David Sherman of Cohanzick Management, LLC, manager of RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile.  Somewhere between 40-50 people signed up for the RiverPark call but only about two-thirds of them signed-in.  For the benefit of folks interested in hearing David’s discussion of the fund, here’s a link to an mp3 version of Thursday night’s conference call. The RiverPark folks guess it will take between 10-30 seconds to load, depending on your connection.  At least on my system it loads in the same window that I’m using for my browser, so you might want to right-click and choose the “open in a new tab” option.

http://78449.choruscall.com/riverpark/riverpark120913.mp3

When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded.

The conference call was a success for all involved.  Once I work out the economics, I’d like to offer folks the opportunity for a second moderated conference call in November and perhaps in alternate months thereafter.  Let me know what you think.

Observer Fund Profiles:

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX): RPHYX has performed splendidly since inception, delivering what it promises, a cash management fund capable of generating 300 basis points more than a money market with minimal volatility.  This is an update of our September 2011 profile.

T. Rowe Price Real Assets (PRAFX): a Clark-Kentish sort of fund.  One moment quiet, unassuming, competent then – when inflation roars – it steps into a nearby phone booth and emerges as . . .

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves.  Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Each month, though, there are interesting new no-load retail funds and, more recently, actively managed ETFs.  This month’s funds are due to be launched before the end of 2012.  Two, in particular, caught our attention:

Buffalo Dividend Focus Fund will try to generate “current income” as its primary goal, through reliance on dividends.  That’s a rare move and might reflect some pessimism about the prospects of using bonds for that goal.  GMO, for example, projects negative real returns for bonds over the next 5-7 years.  It’s particularly interesting that John Kornitzer will run the fund.  John has done a really solid job with Buffalo Flexible Income (BUFBX) over the years and is Buffalo’s founder.

RiverNorth/Oaktree High Income Fund is the latest collaboration between RiverNorth and another first-tier specialist.  RiverNorth’s unmatched strength is in using an asset allocation strategy that benefits from their ability to add arbitrage gains from pricing inefficiencies in closed-end funds.  They’re partnering with Oaktree Capital Management, which is best known in the mutual fund world for its find work on Vanguard Convertible Securities (VCVSX).   Oaktree’s principals have been working together since the mid-1980s on “high yield bonds, convertible securities, distressed debt and principal investments.”  They’re managing $78 billion of institutional and private money for folks on four continents.  Their founder, Howard Marks, still writes frequent shareholder letters (a la Jeremy Grantham) which are thoughtful and well-argued (despite the annoying watermark splashed across each page).

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down 40 fund manager changes, down from last month’s bloodbath in which 70 funds changed management.

WhiteBox, Still in the Box

A number of readers have urged me to look into Whitebox Tactical Opportunities (WBMAX), and I agreed to do a bit of poking around.

There are some funds, and some management teams, that I find immediately compelling.  Others not.

So far, this is a “not.”

Here’s the argument in favor of Whitebox: they have a Multi-Strategy hedge fund which uses some of the same strategies and which, per a vaguely fawning article in Barron’s, returned 15% annually over the past decade while the S&P returned 5%. I’ll note that the hedge fund’s record does not get reported in the mutual funds, which the SEC allows when it believes that the mutual fund replicates the hedge.  And, too, the graphics on their website are way cool.

Here’s the reservation: their writing makes them sound arrogant and obscure.  They advertise “a proprietary, multi-factor quantitative model to identify dislocations within and between equity and credit markets.”  At base, they’re looking for irrational price drops.  They also use broad investment themes (they like US blue chips, large cap financials and natural gas producers), are short both the Russell 2000 (which is up 14.2% through 9/28) and individual small cap stocks, and declare that “the dominant theories about how markets behave and the sources of investment success are untrue.”  They don’t believe in the efficient market hypothesis (join the club).

After nine months, the fund is doing well (up 13% through 9/28) though it’s trailed its peers in about a third of those months.

I’ll try to learn more in the month ahead, but I’ll first need to overcome a vague distaste.

Briefly Noted . . .

RiverPark/Wedgewood Fund (RWGFX) continues to rock.  It’s in the top 2% of all large-growth funds for the past 12 months and has attracted $450 million in assets.  Manager David Rolfe recently shared two analyses of the fund’s recent performance.  Based on Lipper data, it’s the fourth-best performing large growth fund over the past year.  Morningstar data placed it in the top 30 for the past three months.  The fund was also featured in a Forbes article, “Investors will starve on growth stocks alone.”  David is on the short-list of managers who we’d like to draw into a conference call with our readers.  A new Observer profile of the fund is scheduled for November.

Small Wins for Investors

As we noted last month, on Sept. 4, Aston Funds reopened ASTON/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX) to new investors after reallocating capacity to the mutual fund from the strategy’s separate accounts. The firm still intends to close the entire strategy at roughly $1 billion in assets, which should help preserve manager Eric Cinnamond’s ability to navigate the small-cap market.

In a “look before you leap” development, Sentinel Small Company Fund (SAGWX)  reopened to new investors on September 17, 2012.  Except for the fact that the fund’s entire management team resigned six weeks earlier, that would be solidly good news.

Brown Capital Management Small Company (BCSIX) reopened on Sept. 4, 2012.  Morningstar considers this one of the crème de la crème of small growth funds, with both five stars and a “Gold” rating.  It remained closed for less than one year.

CLOSINGS

Loomis Sayles Small Cap Growth (LCGRX) closed to new investors on Sept. 4, 2012.

AQR Risk Parity (AQRNX) will close to new investors on November 16. If you’ve got somewhere between $1 million and $5 million sitting around, unallocated, in your risk-parity investment pot, you might consider this high-minimum fund.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

American Century Inflation Protection Bond (APOAX) is now American Century Short Duration Inflation Protection Bond, which follows a strategy change that has the fund focusing on, well, short duration bonds.

The former BNY Mellon Mid Cap Stock Fund is now BNY Mellon Mid Cap Multi-Strategy Fund and its portfolio has been divided among several outside managers.

Federated Asset Allocation (FSTBX) will become Federated Global Allocation in December.  It will also be required to invest at least 30% outside the US, about 10% is non-US currently.  The fund’s bigger problem seem more related to a high turnover, high risk strategy than to a lack of exposure to the Eurozone.

Virtus Global Infrastructure (PGUAX) changed its name to Virtus Global Dividend (PGUAX) on September 28, 2012.

That same day, Loomis Sayles Absolute Strategies (LABAX) became Loomis Sayles Strategic Alpha Fund. Loomis had been sued by the advisors to the Absolute Strategies Fund (ASFAX), who thought Loomis might be trading on their good name and reputation.  While admitting nothing, Loomis agreed to a change.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

Columbia has merged too many funds to list – 18 in the latest round and 67 since its merger with RiverSource.  Okay, fine, here’s the list:

      • Connecticut Tax-Exempt Fund
      • Diversified Bond Fund
      • Emerging Markets Opportunity Fund
      • Frontier Fund
      • Government Money Market Fund
      • High Yield Opportunity Fund
      • Large Cap Value Fund
      • LifeGoal Income Portfolio
      • Massachusetts Tax-Exempt Fund
      • Mid Cap Growth Opportunity Fund
      • Multi-Advisor International Value Fund
      • Portfolio Builder Moderate Aggressive Fund
      • Portfolio Builder Moderate Conservative Fund
      • Select Small Cap Fund
      • Small Cap Growth Fund II
      • Variable Portfolio – High Income Fund
      • Variable Portfolio – Mid Cap Growth Fund
      • Variable Portfolio – Money Market Fund

Dreyfus/Standish International Fixed Income Fund is slated to merge into Dreyfus/Standish Global Fixed Income Fund (DHGAX).

In an exceedingly rare move, Fidelity is moving to close three funds with an eye to liquidating them. The Dead Funds Walking are Fidelity Fifty (FFTYX), Fidelity Tax Managed Stock (FTXMX) and Fidelity 130/30 Large Cap (FOTTX). The largest is Fifty, with nearly $700 million in assets. Morningstar’s Janet Yang expressed her faith in Fifty’s manager and opined in April that this was a “persuasive option for investors.” Apparently Fidelity was not persuaded. The other two funds, both undistinguished one-star laggards, had about $100 million between them.

Janus Worldwide (JAWWX) is being merged into Janus Global Research (JARFX) at the start of 2013.  That seems like an almost epochal change: JAWWX was once a platform for displaying the sheer brilliance of its lead manager (Helen Young Hayes), then things crumbled.  Returns cratered, Hayes retired, assets dropped by 90% and now it’s being sucked into a fund run by Janus’s analyst team.

According to her LinkedIn page, Ms. Hayes is now an Advisor at Red Rocks Capital, LLC (their site doesn’t mention her),  Director at HEAF (a non-profit) and Advisor at Q Advisors, LLC (but only in the “advisory” sense, she’s not one of the actual Q Advisors).

Although it’s not mentioned on his LinkedIn page, George Maris – who managed JAWWX to a 5% loss during his tenure while his peers booked a 2% gain – will continue to manage Janus Global Select (JORNX), a desultory fund that he took over in August.

Chuck Jaffe used the Janus closing as a jumping-off point for a broader story about the excuses we make to justify keeping wretched funds.  Chuck does a nice job of categorizing and debunking our rationalizations.  It’s worth reading.

A bunch of small Pyxis funds have vanished: Short-Term Government (HSJAX) and  Government Securities (HGPBX) were both absorbed by Pyxis Fixed Income (HFBAX) which, itself, has a long-term losing record.  International Equity (HIQAX) merged into Pyxis Global Equity (HGMAX), and U.S. Equity (HUEAX) into Pyxis Core America Equity (HCOAX).  All of those funds, save Core America, have very weak long-term records.

Triex Tactical Long/Short Fund (TLSNX) closed on September 4, moved to cash and liquidated on September 27.  Not sure what to say.  It has just $2 million in assets, but it’s less than a year old and has substantially above-average performance (as of early September) relative to its “multialternative” peer group.

Turner Concentrated Growth Fund (yep – that stalwart from the “Roll Call of the Wretched,” above) is being merged into Turner Large Growth Fund (TCGFX).

In Closing . . .

For users of our discussion board, we’re pleased to announce the creation of a comprehensive Users Guide.  As with many of our resources, it’s a gift to the community from one of the members of the community.  In this case, Old Joe, who has many years of experience in technical writing, spent the better part of a month crafting the Guide even as chip and Accipiter kept tweaking the software and forcing rewrites.  OJ’s Guide is clear, visually engaging and starts with a sort of Quick Start section for casual users then an advanced section for folks who want to use the wealth of features that aren’t always immediately observable.

For which chip, Accipiter and I all say “thanks, big guy!  You did good.”

Since launch, the Observer has been read by 99,862 people and our monthly readership is pretty steadily around 8500.  Thanks to you all for your trust and for the insights you’ve shared.  Here’s the obligatory reminder: please do consider using (and sharing) the Observer’s link to Amazon.com.  While it’s easy to make a direct contribution to the Observer, only two or three folks have been doing so in recent months (thanks Gary, glad we could help! And thanks Carl, you’re an ace!) which makes the Amazon program really important.

We’ll look for you in November.  Find a nice harvest festival and enjoy some apples for us!

T. Rowe Price Real Assets (PRAFX), October 2012

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

The fund tries to protect investors against the effects of inflation by investing in stocks which give you direct or indirect exposure to “real assets.” Real assets include “any assets that have physical properties.” Their understandably vague investment parameters include “energy and natural resources, real estate, basic materials, equipment, utilities and infrastructure, and commodities.” A stock is eligible for inclusion in the fund so long as at least 50% of company revenues or assets are linked to real assets. The portfolio is global and sprawling.

Adviser

T. Rowe Price. Price was founded in 1937 by Thomas Rowe Price, widely acknowledged as “the father of growth investing.” The firm now serves retail and institutional clients through more than 450 separate and commingled institutional accounts and more than 90 stock, bond, and money market funds. As of December 31, 2011, the Firm managed approximately $489 billion for more than 11 million individual and institutional investor accounts.

Manager

Wyatt Lee handles day-to-day management of the fund and chairs the fund’s Investment Advisory Committee. The IAC is comprised of other Price managers whose expertise and experience might be relevant to this portfolio. Mr. Lee joined Price in 1999. Before joining this fund he “assisted other T. Rowe Price portfolio managers in managing and executing the Firm’s asset allocation strategies.”

Management’s Stake in the Fund

As of December 31, 2011, Mr. Lee has under $10,000 invested in the fund but over $1 million invested in Price funds as a whole. None of the fund’s eight trustees had chosen to invest in it.

Inception

From July 28, 2010 to May 1, 2011, PRAFX was managed by Edmund M. Notzon and available only for use in other T. Rowe Price mutual funds, mostly the Retirement Date series. It became available to the public and Mr. Lee became the manager on May 1, 2011.

Minimum investment

$2,500 for regular accounts, $1000 for IRAs.

Expense ratio

0.93% on assets of $7 billion, as of July 2023.

Comments

PRAFX was created to respond to a compelling problem. The problem was the return of inflation and, in particular, the return of inflation driven by commodity prices. Three things are true about inflation:

  1. It’s tremendously corrosive.
  2. It might rise substantially.
  3. Neither stocks nor bonds cope well with rising inflation.

While inflation is pretty benign for now (in 2011 it was 3.2%), In the ten year period beginning in 1973 (and encompassing the two great oil price shocks), the annual rate of inflation was 8.75%. Over that decade, the S&P500 lost money in four years and returned 6.7% annually. In “real” terms, that is, factoring in the effects of inflation, your investment lost 18% of its buying power over the decade.

Price, which consistently does some of the industry’s best and most forward-thinking work on asset classes and asset allocation, began several decades ago to prepare its shareholders’ portfolios for the challenge of rising inflation. Their first venture in this direction was T. Rowe Price New Era (PRNEX), designed to cope with a new era of rising natural resource prices. The fund was launched in 1969, ahead of the inflation that dogged the 70s, and it performed excellently. Its 1973-1882 returns were about 50% higher than those produced by a globally diversified stock portfolio. As of September 2012, about 60% of its portfolio is linked to energy stocks and the remainder to other hard commodities.

In the course of designing and refining their asset allocation funds (the Spectrum, Personal Strategy and Retirement date funds), Price’s strategists concluded that they needed to build in inflation buffers. They tested a series of asset classes, alone and in combination. They concluded that some reputed inflation hedges worked poorly and a handful worked well, but differently from one another.

  • TIPs had low volatility, reacted somewhat slowly to rising inflation and had limited upside.
  • Commodities were much more volatile, reacted very quickly to inflation (indeed, likely drove the inflation) and performed well.
  • Equities were also volatile, reacted a bit more slowly to inflation than did commodities but performed better than commodities over longer time periods
  • Futures contracts and other derivatives sometimes worked well, but there was concern about their reliability. Small changes in the futures curve could trigger losses in the contracts. The returns on the collateral (usually government bonds) used with the contracts is very low and Price was concerned about the implications of the “financialization” of the derivatives market.

Since the purpose of the inflation funds was to provide a specific hedge inside Price’s asset allocation funds, they decided that they shouldn’t try an “one size fits all” approach that included both TIPs and equities. In consequence, they launched two separate funds for their managers’ use: Real Assets and Inflation-Focused Bond (no symbol). Both funds were originally available only for use in other Price funds, Inflation-Focused Bond (as distinct from the public Inflation-Protected Bond PRIPX) remains available only to Price managers.

How might you use PRAFX? A lot depends on your expectations for inflation. PRAFX is a global stock fund whose portfolio has two huge sector biases: 38% of the portfolio is invested in real estate and 35% in basic materials stocks. In the “normal” world stock fund, those numbers would be 2% and 5%, respectively. Another 16% is in energy stocks, twice the group norm. The relative performance of that portfolio varies according to your inflation assumption. The manager writes that “real assets stocks typically lag other equities during periods of low or falling inflation.” In periods of moderate inflation, “it’s a crap shoot.” He suggested that at 2-3% inflation, a firm’s underlying fundamentals would have a greater effect on its stock price than would inflation sensitivity. But if inflation tops 5%, if the rate is rising and, especially, if the rise was unexpected, the portfolio should perform markedly better than other equity portfolios.

Price’s own asset allocation decisions might give you some sense of how much exposure to PRAFX might be sensible.

  %age of the portfolio in PRAFX, 9/2012
Retirement 2055 (TRRNX)

3.5%

Price Personal Strategy Growth (TRSGX)

3.5

T. Rowe Price Spectrum Growth (PRSGX)

3.4

Retirement 2020 (TRRBX)

2.8

Retirement Income (TRRIX)

1.5

If you have a portfolio of $50,000, the minimum investment in PRAFX would be more (5%) than Price currently devotes in any of its funds.

Mr. Lee is a bright and articulate guy. He has a lot of experience in asset allocation products. Price trusts him enough to build his work into all of their asset allocation funds. And he’s supported by the same analyst pool that all of the Price’s managers draw from. That said, he doesn’t have a public record, he suspects that asset allocation changes (his strength) will drive returns less than will security selection, and his portfolio (315 stocks) is sprawling. All of those point toward “steady and solid” rather than “spectacular.” Which is to say, it’s a Price fund.

Bottom line

Mr. Lee believes that over longer periods, even without sustained bursts of inflation, the portfolio should have returns competitive with the world stock group as a whole. New Era’s performance seems to bear that out: it’s lagged over the past 5 – 10 years (which have been marked by low and falling inflation), it’s been a perfectly middling fund over the past 15 years but brilliant over the past 40. The fund’s expenses are reasonable and Price is always a responsible, cautious steward. For folks with larger portfolios or premonitions of spiking resource prices, a modest position here might be a sensible option.

Fund website

T. Rowe Price Real Assets

Disclosure

I own shares of PRAFX in my retirement portfolio. Along with Fidelity Strategic Real Return (FSRRX) inflation-sensitive funds comprise about 4% of my portfolio.

[cr2012]

RiverPark Short Term High Yield Fund (RPHYX), July 2011, updated October 2012

By David Snowball

This profile has been updated. Find the new profile here.

Objective

The fund seeks high current income and capital appreciation consistent with the preservation of capital, and is looking for yields that are better than those available via traditional money market and short term bond funds.  They invest primarily in high yield bonds with an effective maturity of less than three years but can also have money in short term debt, preferred stock, convertible bonds, and fixed- or floating-rate bank loans.

Adviser

RiverPark Advisors, LLC. Executives from Baron Asset Management, including president Morty Schaja, formed RiverPark in July 2009.  RiverPark oversees the six RiverPark funds, though other firms manage three of them.  RiverPark Capital Management runs separate accounts and partnerships.  Collectively, they have $567 million in assets under management, as of July 31, 2012.

Manager

David Sherman, founder and owner of Cohanzick Management of Pleasantville (think Reader’s Digest), NY.  Cohanzick manages separate accounts and partnerships.  The firm has more than $320 million in assets under management.  Since 1997, Cohanzick has managed accounts for a variety of clients using substantially the same process that they’ll use with this fund. He currently invests about $100 million in this style, between the fund and his separate accounts.  Before founding Cohanzick, Mr. Sherman worked for Leucadia National Corporation and its subsidiaries.  From 1992 – 1996, he oversaw Leucadia’s insurance companies’ investment portfolios.  All told, he has over 23 years of experience investing in high yield and distressed securities.  He’s assisted by three other investment professionals.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Mr. Sherman has over $1 million invested in the fund.  At the time of our first profile (September 2011), folks associated with RiverPark or Cohanzick had nearly $10 million in the fund.  In addition, 75% of Cohanzick is owned by its employees.

Opening date

September 30, 2010.

Minimum investment

$1,000.

Expense ratio

1.25% after waivers on $197 million in assets (as of September 2012).  The prospectus reports that the actual cost of operation is 2.65% with RiverPark underwriting everything above 1.25%.  Mr. Schaja, RiverPark’s president, says that the fund is very near the break-even point.

There’s also a 2% redemption fee on shares held under one month.

Update

Our original analysis, posted September, 2011, appears just below this update.  Depending on your familiarity with the fund’s strategy and its relationship to other cash management vehicles, you might choose to read or review that analysis first.

October, 2012

2011 returns: 3.86%2012 returns, through 9/28: 3.34%  
Asset growth: about $180 million in 12 months, from $20 million  
People are starting to catch on to RPHYX’s discrete and substantial charms.  Both the fund’s name and Morningstar’s assignment of it to the “high yield” peer group threw off some potential investors.  To be clear: this is nota high yield bond fund in any sense that you’d recognize.  As I explain below in our original commentary, this is a conservative cash-management fund which is able to exploit pieces of the high yield market to generate substantial returns with minimal volatility.In a September 2012 conference call with Observer readers, Mr. Sherman made it clear that it’s “absolutely possible” for the fund to lose money in the very short term, but for folks with an investment time horizon of more than three months, the risks are very small.Beyond that, it’s worth noting that:

  1. they expect to be able to return 300 – 400 basis points more than a money market fund – there are times when that might drop to 250 basis points for a short period, but 300-400 is, they believe, a sustainable advantage.  And that’s almost exactly what they’re doing.  Through 9/28/2012, Vanguard Prime Money Market (VMMXX) returned 3 basis points while RPHYX earned 334 basis points.
  2. they manage to minimize risk, not maximize return – if market conditions are sufficiently iffy, Mr. Sherman would rather move entirely to short-term Treasuries than expose his investors to permanent loss of capital.  This also explains why Mr. Sherman strictly limits position sizes and refuses to buy securities which would expose his investors to the substantial short-term gyrations of the financial sector.
  3. they’ve done a pretty good job at risk minimization – neither the fund nor the strategy operated in 2008, so we don’t have a direct measure of their performance in a market freeze. Since the majority of the portfolio rolls to cash every 30 days or so, even there the impairment would be limited. The best stress test to date was the third quarter of 2011, one of the worst ever for the high-yield market. In 3Q2011, the high yield market dropped 600 basis points. RPHYX dropped 7 basis points.  In its worst single month, August 2011, the fund dropped 24 basis points (that is, less than one-quarter of one percent) while the average high yield fund dropped 438 basis points.
  4. they do not anticipate significant competition for these assets – at least not from another mutual fund. There are three reasons. (1) The niche is too small to interest a major player like PIMCO (I actually asked PIMCO about this) or Fidelity. (2) The work is incredibly labor-intense. Over the past 12 months, the portfolio averaged something like $120 million in assets. Because their issues are redeemed so often, they had to make $442 million in purchases and involved the services of 46 brokers. (3) There’s a significant “first mover” advantage. As they’ve grown in size, they can now handle larger purchases which make them much more attractive as partners in deals. A year ago, they had to beat the bushes to find potential purchases; now, brokers seek them out.
  5. expenses are unlikely to move much – the caps are 1.0% (RPHIX) and 1.25% (RPHYX). As the fund grows, they move closer to the point where the waivers won’t be necessary but (1) it’s an expensive strategy to execute and (2) they’re likely to close the fund when it’s still small ($600M – $1B, depending on market conditions) which will limit their ability to capture and share huge efficiencies of scale. In any case, RiverPark intends to maintain the caps indefinitely.
  6. NAV volatility is more apparent than real – by any measure other than a money market, it’s a very steady NAV. Because the fund’s share price movement is typically no more than $0.01/share people notice changes that would be essentially invisible in a normal fund. Three sources of the movement are (1) monthly income distributions, which are responsible for the majority of all change, (2) rounding effects – they price to three decimal points, and changes of well below $0.01 often trigger a rounding up or down, and (3) bad pricing on late trades. Because their portfolio is “marked to market,” other people’s poor end-of-day trading can create pricing goofs that last until the market reopens the following morning.  President Morty Schaja and the folks at RiverPark are working with accountants and such to see how “artificial” pricing errors can be eliminated.

Bottom Line

This continues to strike me as a compelling opportunity for conservative investors or those with short time horizons to earn returns well in excess of the rate of inflation with, so far as we can determine, minimal downside.  I bought shares of RPHYX two weeks after publishing my original review of them in September 2011 and continue adding to that account.

Comments

The good folks at Cohanzick are looking to construct a profitable alternative to traditional money management funds.  The case for seeking an alternative is compelling.  Money market funds have negative real returns, and will continue to have them for years ahead.  As of June 28 2011, Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund (VMMXX) has an annualized yield of 0.04%.  Fidelity Money Market Fund (SPRXX) yields 0.01%.  TIAA-CREF Money Market (TIRXX) yields 0.00%.  If you had put $1 million in Vanguard a year ago, you’d have made $400 before taxes.  You might be tempted to say “that’s better than nothing,” but it isn’t.  The most recent estimate of year over year inflation (released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 15 2011) is 3.6%, which means that your ultra-safe million dollar account lost $35,600 in purchasing power.  The “rush to safety” has kept the yield on short term T-bills at (or, egads, below) zero.  Unless the U.S. economy strengths enough to embolden the Fed to raise interest rates (likely by a quarter point at a time), those negative returns may last through the next presidential election.

That’s compounded by rising, largely undisclosed risks that those money market funds are taking.  The problem for money market managers is that their expense ratios often exceed the available yield from their portfolios; that is, they’re charging more in fees than they can make for investors – at least when they rely on safe, predictable, boring investments.  In consequence, money market managers are reaching (some say “groping”) for yield by buying unconventional debt.  In 2007 they were buying weird asset-backed derivatives, which turned poisonous very quickly.  In 2011 they’re buying the debt of European banks, banks which are often exposed to the risk of sovereign defaults from nations such as Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Spain.  On whole, European banks outside of those four countries have over $2 trillion of exposure to their debt. James Grant observed in the June 3 2011 edition of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, that the nation’s five largest money market funds (three Fidelity funds, Vanguard and BlackRock) hold an average of 41% of their assets in European debt securities.

Enter Cohanzick and the RiverPark Short Term High Yield fund.  Cohanzick generally does not buy conventional short term, high yield bonds.  They do something far more interesting.  They buy several different types of orphaned securities; exceedingly short-term (think 30-90 day maturity) securities for which there are few other buyers.

One type of investment is redeemed debt, or called bonds.  A firm or government might have issued a high yielding ten-year bond.  Now, after seven years, they’d like to buy those bonds back in order to escape the high interest payments they’ve had to make.  That’s “calling” the bond, but the issuer must wait 30 days between announcing the call and actually buying back the bonds.  Let’s say you’re a mutual fund manager holding a million dollars worth of a called bond that’s been yielding 5%.  You’ve got a decision to make: hold on to the bond for the next 30 days – during which time it will earn you a whoppin’ $4166 – or try to sell the bond fast so you have the $1 million to redeploy.  The $4166 feels like chump change, so you’d like to sell but to whom?

In general, bond fund managers won’t buy such short-lived remnants and money market managers can’t buy them: these are still nominally “junk” and forbidden to them.  According to RiverPark’s president, Morty Schaja, these are “orphaned credit opportunities with no logical or active buyers.”  The buyers are a handful of hedge funds and this fund.  If Cohanzick’s research convinces them that the entity making the call will be able to survive for another 30 days, they can afford to negotiate purchase of the bond, hold it for a month, redeem it, and buy another.  The effect is that the fund has junk bond like yields (better than 4% currently) with negligible share price volatility.

Redeemed debt (which represents 33% of the June 2011 portfolio) is one of five sorts of investments typical of the fund.  The others include

  • Corporate event driven (18% of the portfolio) purchases, the vast majority of which mature in under 60 days. This might be where an already-public corporate event will trigger an imminent call, but hasn’t yet.  If, for example, one company is purchased by another, the acquired company’s bonds will all be called at the moment of the merger.
  • Strategic recapitalization (10% of the portfolio), which describes a situation in which there’s the announced intention to call, but the firm has not yet undertaken the legal formalities.  By way of example, Virgin Media has repeatedly announced its intention to call certain bonds in August 2011.  Buying before call means that the fund has to post the original maturities (7 years) despite knowing the bond will cash out in (say) 90 days.  This means that the portfolio will show some intermediate duration bonds.
  • Cushion bonds (14%), a type of callable bond that sells at a premium because the issued coupon payments are above market interest rates.
  • Short term maturities (25%), fixed and floating rate debt that the manager believes are “money good.”

What are the arguments in favor of RPHYX?

  • It’s currently yielding 100-400 times more than a money market.  While the disparity won’t always be that great, the manager believes that these sorts of assets might typically generate returns of 3.5 – 4.5% per year, which is exceedingly good.
  • It features low share price volatility.  The NAV is $10.01 (as of 6/29/11).  It’s never been high than $10.03 or lower than $9.97.  Their five separately managed accounts have almost never shown a monthly decline in value.  The key risk in high-yield investing is the ability of the issuer to make payments for, say, the next decade.  Do you really want to bet on Eastman Kodak’s ability to survive to 2021?  With these securities, Mr. Sherman just needs to be sure that they’ll survive to next month.  If he’s not sure, he doesn’t bite.  And the odds are in his favor.  In the case of redeemed debt, for instance, there’s been only one bankruptcy among such firms since 1985 and even then the bondholders are secured creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings.
  • It offers protection against rising interest rates.  Because most of the fund’s securities mature within 30-60 days, a rise in the Fed funds rate will have a negligible effect on the value of the portfolio.
  • It offers experienced, shareholder-friendly management.  The Cohanzick folks are deeply invested in the fund.  They run $100 million in this style currently and estimate that they could run up to $1 billion. Because they’re one of the few large purchasers, they’re “a logical first call for sellers.  We … know how to negotiate purchase terms.”  They’ve committed to closing both their separate accounts and the fund to new investors before they reach their capacity limit.

Bottom Line

This strikes me as a fascinating fund.  It is, in the mutual fund world, utterly unique.  It has competitive advantages (including “first mover” status) that later entrants won’t easily match.  And it makes sense.  That’s a rare and wonderful combination.  Conservative investors – folks saving up for a house or girding for upcoming tuition payments – need to put this on their short list of best cash management options.

Financial disclosure

Several of us own shares in RPHYX, though the Observer has no financial stake in the fund or relationship with RiverPark.  My investment in the fund, made after I read an awful lot and interviewed the manager, might well color my assessment.  Caveat emptor.

Fund website

RiverPark Short Term High Yield

Fact Sheet

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