T Rowe Price Global Infrastructure (TRGFX), August 2011

By Editor

Update: This fund has been liquidated.

Objective

The fund seeks long-term growth by investing in global corporations involved in infrastructure and utility projects.  The fund holds about 100 stocks, 70% of its investments (as of 3/31/11) are outside of the U.S and 20% are in emerging markets.  The manager expects about 33% of the portfolio to be invested in emerging markets. The portfolio is dominated by utilities (45% of assets) and industrials (40%).  Price highlights the fund’s “substantial volatility” and recommends it as a complement to a more-diversified international fund.

Adviser

T. Rowe Price.  Price was founded in 1937 and now oversees about a half trillion dollars in assets.  They advise nearly 110 U.S. funds in addition to European funds, separate accounts, money markets and so on.  Their corporate culture is famously stable (managers average 13 years with the same fund), collective and risk conscious.  That’s generally good, though there’s been some evidence of groupthink in past portfolio decisions.  On whole, Morningstar rates the primarily-domestic funds higher as a group than it rates the primarily-international ones.

Managers

Susanta Mazumdar.  Mr. Mazumdar joined Price in 2006.  He was, before that, recognized as one of India’s best energy analysts.  He earned a Bachelor of Technology in Petroleum Engineering and an M.B.A., both from the Indian Institute of Technology.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

None.  Since he’s not resident in the U.S., it would be hard for him to invest in the fund.  Ed Giltanen, a TRP representative, reports (7/20/11) that “we are currently exploring issues related to his ability to invest” in his fund.  Only one of the fund’s directors (Theo Rodgers, president of A&R Development Corporation) has invested in the fund.  There are two ways of looking at that pattern: (1) with 129 portfolios to oversee, it’s entirely understandable that the vast majority of funds would have no director investment or (2) one doesn’t actually oversee 129 funds, one nods in amazement at them.

Opening date

January 27, 2010.

Minimum investment

$2,500 for all accounts.

Expense ratio

1.10%, after waivers, on assets of $50 million (as of 5/31/2011).  There’s also a 2% redemption fee on shares held fewer than 90 days.

Comments

Infrastructure investing has long been the domain of governments and private partnerships.  It’s proven almost irresistibly alluring, as well as repeatedly disappointing.  In the past five years, the vogue for global infrastructure investing has reached the mutual fund domain with the launch of a dozen funds and several ETFs.  In 2010, T. Rowe Price launched their entrant.  Understanding the case for investing there requires us to consider four questions.

What do folks mean by “infrastructure investing”? “Infrastructure” is all the stuff essential to a country’s operation, including energy, water, and transportation. Standard and Poor’s, which calculates the returns on the UBS World Infrastructure and Utilities Index, tracks ten sub-sectors including airports, seaports, railroads, communications (cell phone towers), toll roads, water purification, power generation, power distribution (including pipelines) and various “integrated” and “regulated” categories.

Why consider infrastructure investing? Those interested in the field claim that the world has two types of countries.  The emerging economies constitute one type.  They are in the process of spending hundreds of billions to create national infrastructures as a way of accommodating a growing middle class, urbanization and the need to become economically competitive (factories without reliable electric supplies and functioning transportation systems are doomed).  Developed economies are the other class.  They face the imminent need to spend trillions to replace neglected, deteriorating infrastructure that’s often a century old (a 2009 engineering report gave the US a grade of  “D” in 15 different infrastructure categories).  CIBC World Markets estimates there will be about $35 trillion in global infrastructure investing over the next 20 years.

Infrastructure firms have a series of unique characteristics that makes them attractive to investors.

  • They are generally monopolies: a city tends to have one water company, one seaport, one electric grid and so on.
  • They are in industries with high barriers to entry: the skills necessary to construct a 1500 mile pipeline are specialized, and not easily acquired by new entrants into the field.
  • They tend to enjoy sustained and rising cash flows: the revenues earned by a pipeline, for example, don’t depend on the price of the commodity flowing through the pipeline.  They’re set by contract, often established by government and generally indexed to inflation.  That’s complemented by inelasticity of demand.  Simply put, the rising price of water does not tend to much diminish our need to consume it.

These are many of the characteristics that made tobacco companies such irresistible investments over the years.

While the US continues to defer much of its necessary infrastructure investment, demand globally has produced startling results among infrastructure stocks.  The key index, UBS Global Infrastructure and Utilities, was launched in 2006 with backdated results from 1990.  It’s important to be skeptical of any backdated or back-tested model, since it’s easy to construct a model today that would have made scads of money yesterday.  Assuming that the UBS model – constructed by Standard and Poor’s – is even modestly representative, the sector’s 10-year returns are striking:

UBS World Infrastructure and Utilities 8.6%
UBS World Infrastructure 11.1
UBS World Utilities 8.4
UBS Emerging Infrastructure and Utilities 16.5
Global government bonds 7.0
Global equities 1.1
All returns are for the 10 years through March 2010

Now we get to the tricky part.  Do you need a dedicated infrastructure fund in your portfolio? No, it’s probably not essential.  A complex simulation by Ibbotson Associates concluded that you might want to devote a few percent of your portfolio to infrastructure stocks (no more than 6%) but that such stocks will improve your risk/return profile by only a tiny bit.  That’s in part true because, if you have an internationally diversified portfolio, you already own a lot of infrastructure stocks.  TRGFX’s top holding, the French infrastructure firm Vinci, is held by not one but three separate Vanguard index funds: Total International, European Stock and Developed Markets.  It also appears in the portfolios of many major, actively managed international and diversified funds (Artisan International, Fidelity Diversified International, Mutual Discovery, Causeway international Value, CREF Stock). As a result, you likely own it already.

A cautionary note on the Ibbotson study cited above:  Ibbotson says you need marginal added exposure to infrastructure.  The limitation of the Ibbotson study is that it assumed that your portfolio already contained a perfect balance of 10 different asset classes, with infrastructure being the 11th.  If your portfolio doesn’t match that model, the effects of including infrastructure exposure will likely be different for you.

Finally, if you did want an infrastructure fund, do you want the Price fund? Tough question.  The advantages of the Price fund are substantial, and flow from firmwide commitments: expect below average expenses, a high degree of risk consciousness, moderate turnover, management stability, and strong corporate oversight.  That said, the limitations of the Price fund are also substantial:

Price has not produced consistent excellence in their international funds: almost all of them are best described with words like “solid, consistent, reliable, workman-like.”  While several specialized funds (Africa and Middle East, for example) appear strikingly weak, part of that comes from Morningstar’s need to place very specialized funds into their broad emerging markets category.  The fact that the Africa fund sucks relative to broadly diversified emerging markets funds doesn’t tell us anything about how the Africa fund functions against an African benchmark.  Only one of the Price international funds (Global Stock) has been really bad of late (top 10% of its peer group over the three years ending 7/22/11), and even that fund was a star performer for years.

Mr. Mazumdar has not proven himself as a manager: this is his first stint as a manager, though he has been on the teams supporting several other funds.  To date, his performance has been undistinguished.  Since inception, the fund substantially trails its broad “world stock” peer group.  That might be excused as a simple reflection of weakness in its sector.  Unfortunately, it also trails almost everyone in its sector: for both 2011 (through late July) and for the trailing 12 months, TRGFX has the weakest performance of any of the twelve mutual funds, CEFs and ETFs available to retail investors.  The same is true of the fund’s performance since inception.  It’s a short period and his holdings tend to be smaller companies than his peers, but the evidence of superior decision-making has not yet appeared.

The manager proposes a series of incompletely-explained changes to the fund’s approach, and hence to its portfolio.  While I have not spoken with Mr. Mazumdar, his published work suggests that he wants to move the portfolio to one-third North America, one-third Europe and one-third emerging markets.  That substantially underweights North America (50% of global market cap) while hugely overweighting the emerging markets (11%) and ignoring developed markets such as Japan.  The move might be brilliant, but is certainly unexplained.  Likewise, he professes a plan to shift emphasis from the steadier utility sector toward the more dynamic (i.e., volatile) infrastructure sector without quite explaining why he’s seeking to rebalance the fund.

Bottom Line

The case for a dedicated infrastructure fund, and this fund in particular, is still unproven.  None of the retail funds has performed brilliantly in comparison to the broad set of global funds, and none has a long track record.  That said, it’s clear this is a dynamic sector that’s going to draw trillions in cash.  If you’re predisposed to establish a small position there as a test, TRGFX offers a sensible, low cost, highly professional choice.  To the extent it reflects Price’s general international record, expect performance somewhat on par with an index fund’s.

Fund website

T. Rowe Price Global Infrastructure.  For those with a finance degree and a masochistic streak (or an abnormal delight in statistics, which is about the same thing), Ibbotson’s analysis of the portfolio-level effects of adding infrastructure investments is available as Infrastructure and Strategic Asset Allocation, 2009.

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2011.  All rights reserved.  The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication.  For reprint/e-rights contact David@MutualFundObserver.com.

July 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

The craziness of summer always amazes me.  People, who should be out watching their kids play Little League, or lounging in the shade with a cold drink, instead fret like mad about the end of the (investing) world as we know it.  Who would have guessed, despite all of the screaming, that it’s been a pretty decent year in the market so far?  Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index fund (VTSMX) returned 6.3% in the first six months of 2011.  The market turbulence in May and June still constituted a drop of less than 3% from the market’s late April highs.

In short, more heat than light, so far.

Justice Thomas to investors: “Sue the Easter Bunny!”

On June 13th, the Supreme Court issued another ruling (Janus Capital Group vs. First Derivative Traders)  that seemed to embrace political ideology rather more than the facts of the case. The facts are simple: Janus’s prospectuses said they did not tolerate market-timing of the funds.  In fact, they actively colluded in it.  When the news came out, Janus stock dropped 25%.  Shareholders sued, claiming that the prospectus statements were material and misleading.  The Court’s conservative bloc, led by Skippy Thomas, said that stockholders could sue the business trust in which the funds are organized, but not Janus.  Since the trust has neither employees nor assets, it seems to offer an impregnable legal defense against any lies embedded in a prospectus.
The decision strikes me as asinine and Thomas’s writing as worse.  The only people cheerleading for the decision are Janus’s lawyers (who were active in the post-decision press release business) and the editorial page writers for The Wall Street Journal:

In Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, investors claimed to have been misled into buying shares of stock at a premium by prospectuses that misrepresented Janus Investment Fund’s use of so-called market timing. . .

The Court’s ruling continues a string of recent cases that put limits on trial-bar marauding, but the dissent by the four liberal Justices all but invites further attempts. As in so many legal areas, this Supreme Court is only a single vote away from implementing through the courts a political agenda that Congress has consistently refused to pass.

The editorial can sustain its conclusion only by dodging the fact (the business trust is a shell) and quoting Thomas’s thoughtless speechwriter/speechmaker analogy (which fails to consider the implication of having the writer and maker being the same person).   The Journal‘s news coverage recognized the problem with the ruling:

William Birdthistle, a professor at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, said the ruling disregarded the practical reality that mutual funds are dominated by their investment advisers, who manage the business and appoint the funds’ boards of directors.

“Everyone knows the fund is an empty marionette. It doesn’t do anything,” said Prof. Birdthistle, who filed a brief supporting the Janus investors. “You’re left with a circumstance where no one is responsible for this.”

The New York Times gets closer:

With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a 5-to-4 majority, the Supreme Court has made it much harder for private lawsuits to succeed against mutual fund malefactors, even when they have admitted to lying and cheating.

The court ruled that the only entity that can be held liable in a private lawsuit for “any untrue statement of a material fact” is the one whose name the statement is presented under. That’s so even if the entity presenting the statement is a business trust — basically a dummy corporation — with no assets, while its owner has the cash.

Justice Thomas’s opinion is short and, from the mutual fund industry’s perspective, very sweet: Janus Capital Group and Janus Capital Management were heavily involved in preparing the prospectuses, but they didn’t “make” the statements so they can’t be held liable. . . Which means that there is no one to sue for the misleading prospectuses.

The ICI was publicly silent (too busy preparing their latest “fund expenses have too plummeted” and “America, apple pie and 12(b)1 fee” press releases,) though you have to imagine silent high-fives in the hallway.  I’m not sure of what to make of Morningstar’s reaction.  They certainly expressed no concern about, displeasure with or, alternately, support for the decision.  Mostly they conclude that there’s no threat in the future:

The ruling should not have a material impact on Janus mutual fund shareholders, according to Morningstar’s lead Janus fund analyst, Kathryn Young. Janus has had procedures in place since 2003 to prevent market-timing . . .

Uhhh . . .  Uhhh . . .  if those procedures are expressed as a sort of contract – communicated to investors – in the prospectus . . .  uhhh . . . hello?

The more pressing question is whether the decision also guts the SEC’s enforcement power, since the decision seems to insulate a firm’s decision-makers from the legal consequences of their acts.  It’s unclear why that insulation wouldn’t protect them from regulators quite as thoroughly as from litigators.

In short, you’ll have about as much prospect of winning a suit against the Easter Bunny as you will of winning against a fund’s fictitious structure.

The Odd Couple: Manager Gerry Sullivan and the Vice Fund (VICEX)

One of the fund industry’s nicest guys, Gerry Sullivan, has been appointed to run an awfully unlikely fund: VICEX.  Gerry has managed the Industry Leaders fund (ILFIX) since its launch.  The fund uses a quantitative approach to identify industries in which there are clear leaders and then looks to invest in the one or two leading firms.  The fund has a fine long-term record, though it’s been stuck in the mud for the past couple years.  The problem is the fund’s structural commitment to financial stocks, which have been the downfall of many good managers (think: Bruce Berkowitz, 90% financials, bottom 1% of large cap funds through the first half of 2011).  Since financial services match the criteria for inclusion, Sullivan has stuck with them – and has been stuck with them.  The rest of the portfolio is performing well, and he’s waiting for the inevitable rebound in U.S. financials.

In the interim, he’s been appointed manager of two very distinctive, sector-limited funds:

Generation Wave Growth Fund (GWGF), a sort of “megatrends” fund targeting the health care, financial services and technology sectors, and

Vice Fund (VICEX), which invests in “sin stocks.”  It defines those as stocks involved with aerospace/defense, gaming, tobacco and alcoholic beverages.

I’m sure there are managers with less personal engagement in sin industries than Gerry (maybe John Montgomery, he of the church flute choir, at Bridgeway), but not many.

Almost all of the research on sin stocks reaches the same conclusion: investing here is vastly more profitable than investing in the market as a whole.  Sin stocks tend to have high barriers to entry (can you imagine anyone starting a new tobacco company?  or a new supersonic fighter manufacturer?) and are often mispriced because of investor uneasiness with them.  Over the medium- to long-term, they consistently outperform both the market and socially-responsible indexes.  One recent study found a global portfolio of sin stocks outperforming the broad market indexes in 35 of 37 years, with “an annual excess return between 11.15% and 13.70%”  (Fabozzi, et al, “Sin Stock Returns,” Journal of Portfolio Management, Fall 2008).

About two-thirds of the portfolio will be selected using quantitative models and one-third with greater qualitative input.  He’s begun reshaping the portfolio, and I expect to profile the fund once he’s had a couple quarters managing it.

Who You Callin’ a “Perma-bear”?

Kiplinger’s columnist Andrew Feinberg wrote an interesting column on the odd thought patterns of most perma-bears (“Permanent Pessimists,” May 2011).  My only objection is his assignment of Jeremy Grantham to the perma-bear den.  Grantham is one of the founders of the institutional money manager GMO (for Grantham, Mayo, and van Otterloo).  He writes singularly careful, thoughtful analyses – often poking fun at himself and his own errors (“I have a long and ignoble history of being early on market calls and, on two occasions, damaged the financial well-being of two separate companies – Batterymarch and GMO”) – which are accessible through the GMO website.

Feinberg notes that Grantham has been bearish on the US stock market for 20 years.  That’s a half-truth.  Grantham has been frequently bearish about whatever asset class has been most in vogue recently.  The bigger questions are, is he wrong and is he dangerous?  In general, the answers are “sometimes” and “not so much.”

One way of testing Grantham’s insights is to look at the performance of GMO funds that have the flexibility to actually act on his recommendations.  Those funds have consistently validated Grantham’s insights.  GMO Global Balanced, Global Equity Allocation and U.S. Equity Allocation are all value-conscious funds whose great long-term records seem to validate the conclusion that Grantham, skeptical and grumpy or not, is right quite often enough.

Who You Callin’ “Mr. Charge Higher Prices”?

This is painful, but an anonymous friend in the financial services industry sent along really disturbing ad for a webinar (a really ugly new word).  The title of the June 8th webinar was “How to Influence Clients to Select Premium-Priced Financial Products and Services! (While Reinforcing Your Valuable Advice).”    The seminar leader “is known as Mr. Charge Higher Prices because he specializes in teaching how to get to the top of your customer’s price . . . and stay there!”


Sound sleazy?  Not at all, since the ad quotes a PhD, Professor of Ethics saying that the seminar leader shows you how to sell high-priced products which are also “higher-value products that more closely align with their goals and objectives.  [He] teaches them how to do so with integrity and professionalism.”  Of course, a quick internet search of the professor’s name and credentials turns up the fact that his doctorate is from an online diploma mill and not a university near London. It’s striking that seven years after public disclosure of his bought-and-paid-for PhD, both the ethicist and Mr. Higher Prices continue to rely on the faux credential in their advertising.

And so, one simple ad offers two answers to the question, “why don’t investors trust me more?”

Two Funds, and why they’re worth your time

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s two new funds:

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX): put your preconceptions aside and pick up your copy of Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis (1940).  Benjamin Graham was the genius who trained the geniuses and one of his favorite investments was “cigar butt stocks.”  Graham said of cigar butts found on the street, they might only have two or three good puffs left in them but since they were so cheap, you should still pick them up and enjoy them.  Cigar butt stocks, likewise: troubled companies in dying industries that could be bought for cheap and that might still have a few quarters of good returns.

You could think of RiverPark as a specialist in “cigar butt bonds.” They specialize in buying high-yield securities that have been, or soon will be, called.  Effectively, they’re buying bonds that yield 4% or more, but which mature in the next month or two.  The result is a unique, extremely low volatility cash management fund that’s earning several hundred times more than a money market.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit. There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight gf them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

The selection of this month’s star was inspired by a spate of new fund launches.  As a result of some combination of anxiety about a “new normal” investing world dominated by low returns and high volatility, fund companies have become almost obsessive about launching complex, expensive funds, whose managers have an unprecedented range of investment options.  Eight of the nine no-load funds on July’s funds in registration page represent that sort of complex strategy:

  • Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies
  • PIMCO Credit Absolute Return Fund
  • PIMCO Inflation Response Multi-Asset
  • PIMCO Real Income 2019 and 2029
  • PIMCO Tax Managed Real Return Fund
  • Schooner Global Absolute Return Fund
  • Toews Hedged Commodities Fund

The same thing’s true of the May and June lists: 75% “alternative strategy” funds.

We don’t list load-bearing funds, in general, but recent registrations and launches there show the same pattern:

  • Franklin Templeton Global Allocation
  • BlackRock Credit Opportunities
  • BlackRock Emerging Market Long/Short Equity
  • Parametric Structured Commodity Strategy Fund
  • Neuberger Berman Global Allocation

The question is: if managers asked to execute a simple strategy (say, buying domestic stocks) couldn’t beat a simple index (the S&P 500), what’s the prospect that they’re going to soar when charged with executing hugely complex strategies?

This month’s star tests the hypothesis, “simpler really is better”:

ING Corporate Leaders Trust Series B (LEXCX): at $500 million in assets, you might think LEXCX a bit large to qualify as “in the shadows.”  This 76 year old fund is almost never in the news.  There’s never been an interview with its manager, because it has no manager.  There’s never been a shift in portfolio strategy, because it has no portfolio strategy.  Born in the depths of the Great Depression, LEXCX has the industry’s simplest, more stable portfolio.  It bought an equal number of shares of America’s 30 leading companies in 1935, and held them.  Period.  No change.  No turnover.  No manager.

The amazing thing?  This quiet antique has crushed not only its domestic stock peers for decades now, it’s also outperforming the high-concept funds in the very sort of market that should give them their greatest advantage.  Read on, Macduff!

Nassim Taleb is launching a Black Swan ETF!

Or not. Actually just “not.”

Nassim Taleb, a polymath academic, is the author of Fooled by Randomness (2001) and The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007).  The latter book, described by the Times of London as one of the “Books that helped to change the world,” argues that improbable events happen rather frequently, are effectively unpredictable, and have enormous consequences.  He seems to have predicted the 2007-09 meltdown, and his advice lends itself to specific portfolio actions.

Word that “Taleb is launching a black swan ETF” is rippling through various blogs, discussion boards (both here and Morningstar) and websites.  There are three small problems with the story:

  1. Taleb isn’t launching anything.  The original story, “Protect Your Tail,” from Forbes magazine, points to Taleb’s former investment partner and hedge fund manager, Mark Spitznagel.  The article notes, “After Taleb became seriously ill the duo shut the fund. Taleb has since given up money management . . .”
  2. It’s not clear that Spitznagel is launching anything.  Forbes says, “In July Universa intends to tap the financial adviser market by offering its own black swan ETF. The fund will mimic some of the strategies employed by its institutional-only hedge fund and will have an expense ratio of 1.5%.”  Unfortunately, as of late June, there’s no such fund in registration with the SEC.
  3. And you wouldn’t need it if there was such a fund.  Spitznagel himself calls for allocating “about 1% of an investment portfolio to fund such a ‘black swan protection protocol.'”  (Hmmm… in my portfolio that’d be about $12.50.)  If you wanted to have some such protection without a fund with a trendy name, you could adopt Taleb’s recommendation for a “barbell strategy,” in which you place 80% into stable investments, like government bonds and cash, and 20% into risky ones, such stocks and commodities.

Oddly enough, that comes close to describing the sort of strategy already pursued by funds like Permanent Portfolio (PRPFX) and Fidelity Strategic Income (FSICX) and those funds charge half of the reported “black swan” expenses.

Briefly noted:

Long-time SmartMoney columnist, James B. Stewart has moved to The New York Times.  Stewart helped found the publication and has been writing the “Common Sense” column for it for 19 years, yet the letter from the editor in that issue made no mention of him and his own final column offered his departure as an afterthought. On June 24th, his first column, also entitled “Common Sense,” appeared in the Times.  Stewart’s first story detailed the bribery of Mexican veterinarians by Tyson Foods.  He’ll be a Saturday columnist for the Business Day section of the paper, but they’re no word on what focus – if any – the feature might have.

For those interested in hiking their risk profiles, Matthews Asia launched its new Matthews China Small Companies Fund (MCSMX) on May 31, 2011.  As with most Matthews funds, there’s a lead manager (Richard Gao, who also manages Matthews China MCHFX) and a guy who’s there in case the manager gets hit by a bus (Henry Zhang, also the back-up guy on Matthews China).

Possible investors will want to read Andrew Foster’s new commentary for Seafarer Capital.  Andrew managed Matthews Asia Growth & Income (2005-2011) before leaving to found Seafarer.  While he has not yet filed to launch a mutual fund, Andrew has been posting a series of thoughtful essays on Asian investing, including several that focus on odd numbers and Chinese finance.  He promises in the next essay to look at BRICS in general but will also “touch upon China’s elevated (some would say breakneck) pace of investment, and what it means for the future of that country.”

Investors will also want to look at the prevalence of financial fraud in Chinese companies.  A recent Barron’s article provides a list of 20 Chinese firms that had a stop trading on the NASDAQ recently, a sign that their American accountants wouldn’t sign-off on the books.  While Matthews has a fine record and Gao promises extensive face-to-face meetings and fundamental research, these seem to be investments treacherous even for major firms.

Vanguard’s new actively managed emerging-markets fund, Vanguard Emerging Markets Select Stock (VMMSX) launched at the end of June.  It will complement their existing emerging markets index fund (VEIEX), the largest e.m. fund in existence.  Vanguard has four high-quality sub-advisors (M&G Investment Management, Oaktree Capital Management, Pzena Investment Management, and Wellington Management) none of whom have yet run an emerging markets funds.  Minimum investment is $3000 and the expense ratio is 0.95%, far below the category average.Rejoice!  AllianceBernstein is liquidating AllianceBernstein Global Growth (ABZBX). It’s no surprise, given the fund’s terrible performance of late.

Schwab plans to liquidate Schwab YieldPlus (SWYSX), a fund which once had $12 billion in assets.  Marketed as a higher-yield alternative to money markets, it blew apart in 2008 – down 47% – and Schwab has spent hundreds of millions on federal and state claims related to the fund, and faced charges filed by the SEC. Schwab will liquidate Schwab Tax-Free YieldPlus (SWYTX) and Schwab California Tax-Free YieldPlus (SWYCX) at the same time.

Vanguard Structured Large-Cap Growth liquidated on May 31, 2011.

John Hancock Classic Value Mega Cap (JMEAX) will liquidate on Aug. 19, 2011.

Calvert Large Cap Growth (CLGAX) will merge into Calvert Equity (CSIEX), assuming that shareholders (baaaa!) approve.  They’ve got the same management team and Calvert will lower CSIEX’s expenses a bit.

Morgan Stanley Special Growth (SMPAX) will soon merge into Morgan Stanley Institutional Small Company Growth (MSSGX).

ING Value Choice (PAVAX) and ING Global Value Choice (NAWGX) will close to most new investors on July 29, 2011.

Nuveen Tradewinds Value Opportunities (NVOAX) and Nuveen Tradewinds Global All-Cap (NWGAX) will close to most new investors on August 1, 2011.

Fidelity Advisor Mid Cap (FMCDX) will change its name to Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector Mid Cap on August 1, 2011.

JPMorgan Dynamic Small Cap Growth (VSCOX) and JPMorgan Small Cap Growth (PGSGX) will close to most new investors on August 12, 2011.

The MFO Mailbag . . .

I receive a couple dozen letters a month.  By far, the most common is a notice that someone goofed up their email address when signing up our e-mail notification service or registering for the site.  Regrets to Wolfgang and fjujv1.  The system generated a flood of mail reporting on its daily failure to reach you.  For other folks, please double-check the email you register with and, if you have a spam blocker, put the Mutual Fund Observer on your “white list” or our mail won’t get through.

Is there a Commentary archive (Les S)?  Yes, Les, there is.  You just can’t see it yet.  Chip is adjusting the site navigation and, within a week, the April through June commentaries will be available through links on the main commentary page.

Will the Observer post lists of Alarming, Three-Alarm and Most Alarming Three-Alarm funds (Joe B, Judy S, Ed S)?  Sorry, but no.  Those were Roy’s brainchild and I lack the time, expertise and passion needed to maintain them.  Morningstar’s free fund screener will allow you to generate lists of one-star funds, but I’m not familiar with other free screening tools aimed at finding the stinkers.

Is it still possible to access stuff you’d written at FundAlarm (Charles C)?  Not directly now that FundAlarm has gone dark.  I’d be happy to share copies of anything that I’ve retained (drop an email note), though that’s a small fraction of FundAlarm’s material.  There’s an interesting back door.  Google allows you to search for cached material by site.  That is, for example, you can ask The Google if it could provide a list of all references to Fidelity Canada that appeared at FundAlarm.com.  To do that, simple add the word site, a colon, and a web address to your search.

Fidelity Canada site:fundalarm.com

If the word “cached” appears next to a result, it means that Google has saved a copy of that page for you.

Shouldn’t Marathon Value be considered a Star in the Shadows (Ira A)?  Yes, quite possibly. Ira has recommended several other find small funds in the past and Marathon Value (MVPFX) seems to be another with a lot going for it.  I’ll check it out.  Thanks, Ira.  If you’ve got a fund you think we should look at more closely, drop a line to David@MutualFundObserver.com, and I’ll do a bit of reading.

In closing . . .

Thanks to all the folks who’ve provided financial support for the Observer this month.  In addition to a half dozen friends who provided cash contributions, either via PayPal or by check, readers purchased almost 250 items through the Observer’s Amazon link.  We have, as a result, paid off almost all of our start-up expenses.  Thanks!

For July, we’ll role out three new features: our Amazon store (which will make it easier to find highly-recommended books on investing, personal finance and more), our readers’ guide to the best commentary on the web, and The Falcon’s Eye.  (Cool, eh?)  Currently, if you enter a fund’s ticker symbol in a discussion board post, it generates a pop-up window linking you to the best web-based resources for researching and assessing that fund.  In July we’ll roll that out as a free-standing tool: a little box leading you to a wealth of information, including the Observer’s own fund profiles.

Speaking of which, there are a number of fund profiles in the works for August and September.  Those include Goodhaven Fund, T. Rowe Price Global Infrastructure and Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond funds, RiverPark Wedgewood Fund and, yes, even Marathon Value.

Until then, take care and keep cool!

David

 

Voya Corporate Leaders Trust B (formerly ING Corporate Leaders Trust B),(LEXCX), August 2012 update (originally published July 2011)

By Editor

At the time of publication, this fund was named ING Corporate Leaders Trust B.

Objective

The fund pursues long-term capital growth and income by investing in an equal number of shares of common stocks of a fixed-list of U.S. corporations.

Adviser

ING Funds. ING Funds is a subsidiary of ING Groep N.V. (ING Group), a Dutch financial institution offering banking, insurance and asset management to more than 75 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. ING Funds has about $93 billion in assets under management.

Manager

None.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

None (see above).

Opening date

November 14, 1935.

Minimum investment

$1,000.

Expense ratio

0.49% on assets of $804 million, as of July 2023.

Update

Our original analysis, posted July, 2011, appears just below this update.  Depending on your familiarity with the research on behavioral finance, you might choose to read or review that analysis first.

August, 2012

2011 returns: 12.25%, the top 1% of comparable funds2012 returns, through 7/30: 9.5%, top 40% of comparable funds  
Asset growth: about $200 million in 12 months, from $545 million.  The fund’s expense ratio dropped by 5 basis points.  
This is a great fund about which to write an article and a terrible fund about which to write a second article.  It’s got a fascinating story and a superlative record (good for story #1) but nothing ever changes (bad for story #2).  In the average year, it has a portfolio turnover rate of 0%.The fund (technically a “trust”) was launched in late 1935 after three years of a ferocious stock market rally.  The investors who created the trust picked America’s top 30 companies but purposefully excluded banks because, well, banks and bankers couldn’t be trusted.  Stocks could neither be added nor removed, ever, unless a stock violated certain conditions (it had to pay a dividend, be priced above $1 and so on), declared bankruptcy or was acquired by another firm.  If it was acquired, the acquiring firm took its place in the fund.  If a company split up or spun off divisions, the fund held both pieces.

By way of illustration, the original fund owned American Tobacco Company.  ATC was purchased in 1969 by American Brands, which then entered the fund.  American sold the tobacco division for cash and, in time, was renamed Fortune Brands.  In 2011, Fortune brands dissolved into two separate companies – Beam (maker of Jim Beam whiskey) and Fortune Brands Home & Security (which owns brands such as Moen and Master Lock) – and so LEXCX now owns shares of each.  As a Corporate Leaders shareholder, you now own liquor because you once owned tobacco.

Similarly, the fund originally owned the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe railroad, which became Santa Fe Railway which merged with Burlington Northern Santa Fe which was purchased by Berkshire Hathaway.  That evolution gave the fund its only current exposure to financial services.

The fund eliminated Citigroup in 2008 because Citi eliminated its dividend and Eastman Kodak in 2011 when its stock price fell below $1 as it wobbled toward bankruptcy.

And through it all, the ghost ship sails on with returns in the top 1-7% of its peer group for the past 1, 3, 5, 10 and 15 years.  It has outperformed all of the other surviving funds launched in the 1930s and turned $1,000 invested in 1940 (the fund’s earliest records were reportedly destroyed in a fire) to $2.2 million today.

The fund and a comment of mine were featured in Randall Smith,  “RecipeforSuccess,” Wall Street Journal, July 8 2012.  It’s worth looking at for the few nuggets there, though nothing major.  The fund, absent any comments of mine, was the focus of an in-depth Morningstar report, “Celebrating 75 Years of Sloth”  (2011) that’s well worth reading.

ING has a similarly named fund: ING Corporate Leaders 100 (IACLX).  It’s simply trading on the good name of the original fund.  Avoid it.

Comments

At last, a mutual fund for Pogo. Surely you remember Pogo, the first great philosopher of behavioral finance? Back in 1971, when many of today’s gurus of behavioral finance were still scheming to get a bigger allowance from mom, Pogo articulated the field’s central tenet: “We have met the enemy, and he is us.”

Thirty-seven years and three Nobel prizes later, behavioral economists still find themselves merely embellishing the Master’s words.  The late Peter L. Bernstein in Against the Gods states that the evidence “reveals repeated patterns of irrationality, inconsistency, and incompetence in the ways human beings arrive at decisions and choices when faced with uncertainty.” James O’Shaughnessy, author of What Works on Wall Street, flatly declares, “Successful investing runs contrary to human nature. We make the simple complex, follow the crowd, fall in love with the story, let the emotions dictate decisions, buy and sell on tips and hunches, and approach each investment decision on a case-by-case basis, with no underlying consistency or strategy.”

The problem is that these mistakes haunt not just mere mortals like you and me. They describe the behavior of professional managers who, often enough, drive down returns with every move they make. Researchers have found that the simple expedient of freezing a mutual fund’s portfolio on January 1st would lead to higher returns than what the fund’s manager manages with accomplish with all of his or her trades. One solution to this problem is switching to index funds. The dark secret of many index funds is that they’re still actively managed by highly fallible investors, though in the case of index funds the investors masquerade as the index construction committee. The S&P 500, for example, is constructed by a secretive group at Standard & Poor’s that chooses to include and exclude companies based on subjective and in some cases arbitrary criteria. (Did you know Berkshire Hathaway with a market cap of $190 billion, wasn’t in the S&P 500 until 2010?) And, frankly, the S&P Index Committee’s stock-picking ability is pretty wretched. As with most such indexes, the stocks dropped from the S&P consistently outperform those added. William Hester, writing for the Hussman funds, noted:

… stocks removed from the S&P 500 [have] shown surprisingly strong returns, consistently outperforming the shares of companies that have been added to the index. Since the beginning of 1998, the median annualized return of all stocks deleted from the index and held from their removal date through March 15 of [2005] was 15.4 percent. The median annualized return of all stocks that were added to the index was 2.9 percent.

The ultimate solution, then, might be to get rid of the humans altogether: no manager, no index committee, nothing.

Which is precisely what the Corporate Leaders Trust did. The trust was created in November of 1935 when the Dow Jones Industrials Average was 140. The creators of the trust identified America’s 30 leading corporations, bought an equal number of shares in each, and then wrote the rules such that no one would ever be able to change the portfolio. In the following 76 years, no one has. The trust owns the same companies that it always has, except in the case of companies which went bankrupt, merged or spun-off (which explains why the number of portfolio companies is now 21). The fund owns Foot Locker because Foot Locker used to be Venator which used to be F. W. Woolworth & Co., one of the original 30. If Eastman Kodak simply collapses, the number will be 20. If it merges with another firm or is acquired the new firm will join the portfolio. The portfolio, as a result, typically has an annual turnover rate of zero.

Happily, the strategy seems to work.  It’s rare to be able to report a fund’s 50- or 75-year returns, knowing that no change in manager or strategy has occurred the entire time.  Since that time period isn’t particularly useful for most investors, we can focus on “short-term” results instead.

Relative to its domestic large value Morningstar peer group, as of June 2011, LEXCX is:

Over the past year In the top 1%
Over the past three years Top 23%
Over the past five years Top 3%
Over the past 10 years Top 2%
During the 2008 collapse Top 7%

 

During the 2000-02 meltdown, it lost about half as much as the S&P 500 did.  During the October 2007 – March 2009 meltdown, it loss about 20% less (though the absolute loss was still huge).

How does the ultimate in passive compare with gurus and trendy fund categories?

Over the past three, five and ten years, Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A), the investment vehicle for the most famous investor of our time, Warren Buffett, also trails LEXCX.

Likewise, only one fund in Morningstar’s most-flexible stock category (world stock) has outperformed LEXCX over the past three, five and ten years.  That’s American Funds Smallcap World (SMCWX), a $23 billion behemoth with a sales load.

Among all large cap domestic equity funds, only six (Fairholme, Yacktman and Yacktman Focused, Amana Growth and Amana Income, and MassMutual Select Focused Value) out of 2130 have outperformed LEXCX over the same period.  To be clear, that includes only the 2130 domestic large caps that have been around at least 10 years.

Morningstar’s most-flexible fund category, multi-alternative strategies, encompasses the new generation of go-anywhere, do-anything, buy long/sell short funds.  On average, they charge 1.70% in expenses and have 200% annual turnover.  Over the past three years, precisely one (Direxion Spectrum Select Alternative SFHYX) of 22 has outperformed LEXCX.  I don’t go back further than three years because so few of the funds do.

Only 10 hedge-like mutual funds have better three year records than LEXCX and only three (the Direxion fund, Robeco Long/Short and TFS Market Neutral) have done better over both three and five years.

Both of the major fund raters – Morningstar (high return/below average risk) and Lipper (5 out of 5 scores for total return, consistency of returns, and capital preservation) – give it their highest overall rating (five stars and Lipper Leader, respectively).

Bottom Line

If you’re looking for consistency, predictability and utter disdain for human passions, Corporate Leaders is about as good as you’ll get. While it does have its drawbacks – its portfolio has been described as “weirdly unbalanced” because of its huge stake in energy and industrials – the fund makes an awfully strong candidate for investors looking for simple, low-cost exposure to American blue chip companies.

Fund website

Voya Corporate Leaders Trust Fund Series B

2022 Annual Report

[cr2012]

June 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

After a lovely month in England, I returned to discover that things are getting back to “normal” again in the financial markets.

Top executives of publicly traded money management firms got raises averaged 33% “as improved financial results and increases in assets under management put them further away from the market turmoil of years past” (Randy Diamond, “Good times rollin’ once again for money manager execs,” Pensions and Investments Online, May 16 2011). While paltry by bankers’ standards, some of the money firm chiefs should be able to cover their mortgages: Larry Fink of BlackRock took home $24 million, while Janus CEO Richard Weil and Affiliated Managers Group CEO Sean Healey each got $20 million.

Pension plans are moving back into hedge fund investing.  According to the consulting firm Prequin, pension plans have 6.8% of their money in hedge funds now compared to 3.6% in 2007.  One motive for the change: hedge funds have returned 6.8% on average over the decade compared to 5.7% for the plans’ stock investments.  By increasing exposure to hedge funds, the plans can mask the magnitude of their uncovered commitments.  That is, they can project higher future returns and so argue that they’ll surely be able to cover their apparently huge deficits.  (“Pensions leap back to hedge funds,” WSJ, May 27 2011)

Rich folks are losing interest in managing their own investments, and are back to handing money over to their “wealth managers” to shepherd.  In 2009, 69% of high net worth investors wanted to take “an active role” in managing their investments.  It’s down to 47% in 2011, which Clifford Favrot of Delta Financial Advisers describes as “returning to normal” (“Rich relax a bit but stay on guard,” WSJ, May 27 2011).

In general, any time folks decide that it’s time to stop worrying, it’s time to start worrying.  Worrier par excellence Jeremy Grantham of GMO argues that the strong performance of risk assets – both stocks and bonds – is detached from the underlying economy.  His advice: “the environment has simply become too risky to justify prudent investors hanging around, hoping to get luck.  So now is not the time to float along with the Fed, but to fight it.”  While Grantham ruefully admits “to a long and ignoble history of being early on market calls” (well, sometimes two years early), he’s renewed his calls to concentrate on high quality US blues and emerging market equities (“Time to be serious – and probably too early – once again,” GMO Quarterly Letter, May 2011).

Part of Wall Street’s Normal: Gaming the System

Folks who suspect that the game is rigged against them have gotten a lot of fodder in the last two months.  A widely discussed article in Rolling Stone Magazine (“The Real Housewives of Wall Street,” April 2011) looks at how federal bailout money was allocated.  In general: (1) poorly and (2) to the rich.  While Stone is not generally a voice of conservatism, its story might have a comfortable home even in the National Review:

. . . the government attempted to unfreeze the credit markets by handing out trillions to banks and hedge funds. And thanks to a whole galaxy of obscure, acronym-laden bailout programs, it eventually rivaled the “official” budget in size — a huge roaring river of cash flowing out of the Federal Reserve to destinations neither chosen by the president nor reviewed by Congress, but instead handed out by fiat by unelected Fed officials using a seemingly nonsensical and apparently unknowable methodology.

Stone argues that “the big picture” of a multi-trillion dollar bailout is simply too big for human comprehension, but that you can learn a lot by looking through the lens of the assistance given a single firm: Waterfall TALF Opportunity.  While Waterfall received a pittance – a mere quarter billion compared to Goldman Sachs $800 billion – Waterfall was distinguished by the credentials of its two chief investors: Christy Mack and Susan Karches.

Christy is the wife of John Mack, the chairman of Morgan Stanley. Susan is the widow of Peter Karches, a close friend of the Macks who served as president of Morgan Stanley’s investment-banking division. Neither woman appears to have any serious history in business, apart from a few philanthropic experiences. Yet the Federal Reserve handed them both low-interest loans of nearly a quarter of a billion dollars through a complicated bailout program that virtually guaranteed them millions in risk-free income.

Stone details the story of the women’s risk-free profits, courtesy of a category of bailout program they describe as “giving already stinking rich people gobs of money for no ****ing reason at all.”  Waterfall investors put up $15 million, then received $220 million in federal funds with the promise that they could receive 100% of any investment gains but be responsible for only 10% of any investment losses they incurred.  It’s a fascinating, frustrating story.

Happily, the women wouldn’t need to worry about investment losses as long as they accepted guidance from the world’s best investors: members of the U.S. House of Representatives.  A study in Business and Politics examined the financial disclosure records of all the members of Congress.  They concluded that somehow members of Congress outperformed the stock market by “6.8% per annum after compounding – better than hedge-fund superstars.”  U.S. Senators performed even better.  While it’s possible that House members are simply smarter than hedge fund managers, the authors darkly conclude “We find strong evidence that Members of the House have some type of non-public information which they use for personal gain” (“Fire Your Hedge Fund, Hire Your Congressman,” Barron’s, 05/26/2011).

It’s the world’s scariest ad!

Remember Larry, Darryl and Darryl from the old Newhart TV show?  The three deranged brothers launched their first business – “Anything for a Buck”. They’ll do anything for a buck. If it’s something cool like digging up an old witch’s body from the cellar, they might even pay you the buck!

 

Larry, Darryl and Darryl
 

Apparently they’re now the masterminds behind iShares, whose slogan seems to be “anything can be an ETF!”

 

iShares-ad
 

Fairholme Fund wobbles

Fairholme Fund (FAIRX), a huge, idiosyncratic beast run by Morningstar’s equity manager of the decade, Bruce Berkowitz, has had a bad year.  The fund trails its average peer by 15 percentage points of the past year and ranks in the bottom 1% of large cap value funds for the past quarter, two quarters and four quarters (as of June 2011).  The fund sucked in $4 billion of anxious money in 2010 after a long, remarkable run.  Predictable as the rains in spring, $1 billion of assets rushed back out the door in April alone (per Morningstar fund flow estimates).  That’s three times worse than any other month in its history.

Bruce Berkowitz didn’t dodge the fund’s problems in a May 11 conference call with investors:

Here are my thoughts on the Fairholme Funds recent performance: horrible, [and] that’s the summary in hindsight and it may be to be expected over the short term.

We’ve always stated in our reports that short-term performance should not be over emphasized. It’s the long term that counts. This is not the first time we’ve underperformed; it won’t be the last time and I don’t think it’s reality to outperform every month, quarter or year.

So it’s been lousy for months, we’ve been losing, we’re way underperforming, and it may stay lousy for more time.

He argues that the short-term problem is his decision to buy financial stocks (now 90% of the portfolio), which is expects to continue buying.  “We need to buy low and buy lower and buy lower. Even when the crowd yells you’re wrong. This is how we’ve achieved our performance over the past decade and this is how we will achieve our performance in the next couple of decades.”

One of his highest-visibility holdings, St. Joe Corporation (JOE) a Florida land company.  They started as a paper mill, got rich, got stupid, bought a bunch of stuff they shouldn’t have (brokerage firms, for example), had no debt but made no money.  After a long battle, Fairholme took control of St. Joe in March, forcing out the CEO and much of the board.

Why care?

There’s an interesting argument that St. Joe was less important for its huge land holdings than for its ability to make investments that Fairholme itself cannot make.  A fascinating article in Institutional Investor notes:

St. Joe may not seem like a major prize in the big scheme of things, with a market value of just $2.4 billion, but Berkowitz and Charles Fernandez, his No. 2 at Fairholme for the past three and a half years, saw a huge opportunity. Not only did they think that the company’s real estate operations could be worth a lot more in the future, they saw St. Joe as a way to buy assets that a regulated mutual fund would be prohibited from owning directly. In essence, if successful, they could transform their flagship Fairholme Fund into something akin to a hedge fund or an investment vehicle like Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway.

“We’re trying to go in a direction we think most mutual funds will be going — where we have the flexibility to do private transactions and public transactions, and the ability to do what makes sense for our shareholders,” Berkowitz says. (“Fairholme’s Bruce Berkowitz Is Beating Hedge Fund Managers at Their Own Game,” Institutional Investor, 05/19/2011).

Indeed, in his conference call, Berkowitz says, “JOE is, at its heart, an asset manager.”

The possibilities are intriguing.  In his interview with the Observer, Mr. Berkowitz argued that Fairholme’s size ($20 billion in assets) was critical to its future.  While many observers felt the fund was too unwieldy, Berkowitz argues that only its size allows it to become party to a set of expensive, unconventional opportunities.

Beyond the simple matter of corporate restructurings, bankruptcies and other conventional “special situations,” managers are looking increasingly far afield for opportunities.  Hedge fund manager David Einhorn, who lost big to Berkowitz in the St. Joe fight, recently announced a $200 million investment in the New York Mets.   And bond maestro Jeff Gundlach pushed the investment potential of gemstones at a recent investment conference:

[Gundlach] likes gold for its “Biblical street cred, if such a thing is possible.” But he advocates gem stones over gold. “Gold has shown itself to be money and pretty. Gems have also shown themselves to be money and prettier,” he says.  (Mark Gongloff, gundlach-leads-off-with-prostitutes, WSJ Marketbeat blog, 05/25/2011

Hmmm . . . perhaps Newt Gingrich’s reported $500,000 bill with Tiffany’s isn’t just egregious excess: it’s creative portfolio management.

This never turns out well: the emerging markets debt obsession grows

A lot of emerging market debt funds are now coming to market, many of them specializing in debt priced in some local currency.  By Morningstar’s estimate, of the 20 emerging-markets local-currency funds, 14 have been opened in the last year.  These funds are a vote against the future of the US dollar and in favor of currencies supported – largely – by commodity-producing economies and growing populations.  Among the recent notable entrants:

Harbor Emerging Markets Debt (HAEDX) launched on May 2, 2011, and invests in securities that are economically tied to emerging markets, or priced in emerging-markets currencies. It’s being sub-advised, as all Harbor funds are.  The subadvisor is Stone Harbor Investment Partners whose Stone Harbor Emerging Markets Debt (SHMDX) has returned 10.5% annualized since inception. Harbor Emerging Markets Debt has an expense ratio of 1.05% and a $1000 minimum.

Aberdeen Asset Management launched Aberdeen Emerging Markets Debt Local Currency (ADLAX) on May 2, 2011. Brett Diment will lead the team responsible for managing the fund.

Forward Management launched Forward Emerging Markets Corporate Debt (FFXIX) on May 3, 2011. The fund will invest mainly in emerging-markets corporate debt, and will be subadvised by SW Asset Management. David Hinman and Raymond Zucaro will manage the fund.

T. Rowe Price launched T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond on May 26. The fund will invest in bonds denominated in emerging-markets currencies or derivatives that provide emerging-markets bond exposure.  Andrew Keirle and Christopher Rothery who manage the fund also have been managing a similar strategy for institutional investors in the T. Rowe Price Funds SICAV–Emerging Local Markets Bond Fund since 2007. That said, the institutional fund has consistently trailed T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Bond (PREMX) since inception.

HSBC filed to launch HSBC Emerging Markets Debt, which will invest primarily in U.S.-dollar-denominated while Emerging Markets Local Debt will invest in local-currency debt. Both should come on-line on June 30, 2011.

PIMCO Developing Local Markets (PLMDX) will be renamed PIMCO Emerging Markets Currency on August 16, to reflect a slight strategy shift. The fund holds positions in short maturity local bonds and currency derivatives.  The change will give the managers a bit more freedom to choose which countries to pursue.

Emerging market bond funds have returned an average of 12-13% annually over the past 10-15 years. On face, easier and more diverse access to these assets should be a good thing.  Remember two things:  First, the asset class has done so well that future returns are likely modest.  Grantham, Mayo, van Otterloo (GMO) projects real returns on emerging market debt of just1.7% annually over the next 5-7 years (Asset Class Return Forecast, 04/30/2011).   That’s well below their projection for E.M. stocks (4.5% real) or U.S. blue chip companies (4.0%).   Second, much of those gains took place when relatively few investment companies were interested.  In 2003 for example, investors placed only $14 billion to work in emerging market debt.  Fidelity New Market Income (FNMIX) earned 31% that year. In 2010, it was $72 billion and the Fido fund returned 11%.  As more funds pile in, profits are going to become fewer and opportunities thinner.  While E.M. debt is a valid asset class, joining the herd rushing toward it might bear a moment’s reflect.

Funds worth your attention

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s two new fund:

Fidelity Global Strategies (FDYSX): this relatively young fund has one of Fidelity’s broadest, most ambitious mandates.  In June 2011, it was rechristened to highlight a global approach.  It’s not clear that the changes are anything more than pouring old wine in a new bottle.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit.  There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.  This month’s star:

RiverNorth Core Opportunity (RNCOX): going, going, gone as of June 30.  This former “most intriguing new fund” is larger than most “stars,” but it deserves recognition for two reasons.  First, it’s truly a one-of-a-kind offering.  Second, its imminent closing makes this the idea time for potential investors to do their research and make a decision before regrets set in.

Research on the cutting edge of “duh”

Investment managers and strategies plow through an enormous amount of behavioral research these days, trying to use the predictable patterns of human (i.e., investor) behavior to better position their portfolios.  That said, a remarkable amount of published research in the area seems to cry out “duh!”

On unusually warm days, people are more likely to believe in global warming than they are on cold days, according to a survey of 1200 Americans and Australians by the Center for Decision Sciences at the Columbia Business School.

In a related study, people sitting in a steadily warming room are more likely to believe in global warming than those who are not.

On sunny days, investors are more like to choose stocks over bonds but when it’s ridiculously hot, investors become cranky and markets become volatile.

By the way, if you hand folks a warm drink, they’re more likely to rate you as a “warm” person than it you hand them a cold drink.

Extreme market volatility is bad for investors’ hearts: among Chinese investors anyway.  A 1% market jump correlates with a 2% jump in heart attacks among Chinese investors (and you thought you had problems with emerging markets’ volatility).

If you build more highways, that is, if you make driving easier and more convenient, people drive more, according to a study soon to be published in the American Economic Review.

Work is stressful, which can be scientifically measured by checking levels of the stress hormone cortisol.  A new study in the Journal of Family Psychology suggests that women’s stress levels drop when their husbands are helping with chores, but it’s the opposite for men: Their stress levels fall when their wives are busy while they’re relaxing. Oddly, the scientists didn’t report results for families in which dad did the housework, and mom relaxed.

Briefly noted:

Janus did something right and cool: kudus to Janus for publicizing the investments made by each manager in each fund, as well as in Janus funds as a whole.  While this information is purely available (it’s in the Statement of Additional Information), I know of no other fund company that brings it all together in one place.  For those interested, check here to see how serious their Janus manager is about his or her fund.

Janus Venture (JAVTX) reopened to new investors on May 6 and launched a series of new share classes (A, C, S and I).  As usual, it’s not clear why Janus re-opened the fund: it has a larger portfolio ($1.3 billion) for a small cap fund, the largest in its history, and small caps are already coming off an extended run.  The best reason to take the fund seriously, at least if you can access it without a load, is the strength of its new management team.  Janus Triton (JATTX) managers Chad Meade and Brian Schaub have run Venture for less than a year, but have made a real difference in that time.  They’ve decreased the fund’s concentration and eliminated some of its micro-cap exposure, and have generated very solid returns.  Triton, also a small cap fund, has been an exceedingly solid performer for Janus and noticeably less volatile than the typical Janus fund.  The advantage of a fee cap (holding total expenses to 1.05% for the next year) makes it more attractive still.

Journalists are funny. You can almost hear the breathlessness in Neal Anderson’s prose: “The MFWire has learned that the Boston-based mutual fund giant is re-branding the large cap blend fund as the Fidelity Global Strategies Fund. . . “(“Fido Shifts a Fund’s Name and Strategies,” 05/04/2011).  True enough, but it’s not exactly as if you needed a secret contact to find this out: Fidelity duly submitted the paperwork and it was made publicly available a week before in the SECs EDGAR database.

RiverNorth Core Opportunity (RNCOX) will close to new investors on June 30, 2011.  You really might want to read the new fund profile this month.

The Quant Funds have a new name.  They’re now the Pear Tree Funds because the former name “no longer reflects the true nature of the mutual fund family.”  At base, the funds have three sub-advisors (Polaris, PanAgora and Columbia Partners), not all of who are quant investors and the advisor felt “the former name no longer reflects the true nature” of their funds.  Apparently “pear trees” (dense, brittle and short-lived) comes closer.

During the FundAlarm hiatus, Fidelity launched Fidelity Conservative Income Bond (FCONX).  It’s an ultra-short term bond fund run by Kim Miller.  While he’s been with Fidelity for 20 years, his management experience is limited most to money market funds, though he was on the team for several of the Asset Manager and municipal bond funds.  The fund’s expense ratio is 0.40% and it has accumulated $100 million in assets in three months.  (A slow start for a Fido fund!)

Similarly, the BearlyBullish fund registered in March and launched in early May.  At base, it’s a mid- to large-cap stock fund, mostly invested in the US and Canada.  When the managers’ market indicators turn negative, the fund simply moves more of its assets to cash.  That strategy worked in 2008, when the separately managed accounts that use this system dropped 24% while the broad market dropped by 37%.  It’s run by a team from Alpha Capital Management.  The investment minimum is $1000 and the expense ratio is 1.49%.

Nuveen Quantitative Large Cap Core (FQCAX) changed its name to Nuveen Quantitative Enhanced Core.

Old Mutual Strategic Small Companies (OSSAX) changed its name to Old Mutual Copper Rock International Small Cap. The fund also changed its strategy from a domestic small-cap strategy to an international small-cap strategy.

Pending shareholder approval on June 27, Madison Mosaic Small/Mid-Cap Fund will become NorthRoad International Fund (MADMX) and the Fund’s investment objective will be changed from “long-term growth” to “long-term capital appreciation by investing in non-U.S. companies.” Under the proposal, total fund operating expenses will decrease from 1.25% to 1.15% (annualized). Madison owns a majority stake in New York-based NorthRoad already.  Northroad handles institutional accounts now and their three managers have good credentials, both in previous employment (Lazard Asset Management in a couple cases) and colleges (Williams, Columbia, Yale).  The Small/Mid-Cap fund drew negligible assets and was only a so-so performer in its short life, so this is likely a substantial gain for the firm and its shareholders.

Dreyfus Core Value will merge into Dreyfus Strategic Value (DAGVX) on Nov. 16.

MFS Core Growth (MFCAX) will merge into MFS Growth (MFEGX).

Munder Large-Cap Growth has merged into Munder Growth Opportunities (MNNAX).

RidgeWorth Large Cap Quantitative Equity (SQEAX) will merge into RidgeWorth Large Cap Core Growth Stock (CFVIX) on July 15.

Loomis Sayles Disciplined Equity liquidated on May 13.

William Blair Emerging Markets Growth (BIEMX) will close to new investors on June 30.  Heartland Value Plus (HRVIX) closed to new investors in mid-May.  Heartland noted some skepticism about the state of the small cap market in justifying their close.

In closing . . .

Google Analytics offers fascinating snapshots of the Observer community.  7000 people have visited the site and about a thousand drop by more than once a day.  Greetings to visitors from Canada, Spain, Israel, Mexico and the U.K. – our most popular countries outside the U.S.  A cheery smile to the women who (secretly) use the Observer: research just released by the market-research firm Mintel Group discovered that women, more than men, were likely to make their investments through mutual funds (“Girls just want to have funds,” Barron’s, 05/21/2011).  Over half of all the folks who wrote me before the launch of the Observer were women who relied on FundAlarm’s research and discussions, though most admitted to never feeling quite brave enough to post.

Men, contrarily, were more likely to use ETFs, stocks, options and futures – and to trade actively.  (Note to the guys: stop that!)

In addition, a special wave to our one visitor from Kenya, who seems faithfully to have read every page on the site!

Thanks to all the folks who’ve provided financial support to the Observer of the past month.  Thanks especially to the six friends of the Observer who made direct contributions through PayPal.  In response to a couple notes, I’ve also posted my snail mail address for the sake of people who want to either write or send a check (which dodges PayPal’s fees).   In addition, our Amazon link led to 244 purchases in May, which contributes a lot.  Thanks to you all!

A special thanks to Roy Weitz, who stepped in as moderator during my three weeks in England.

We read, and respond to, everything we can.  Chip continues to monitor the Board’s technical questions and I try to handle any of the emailed notes.  If you have a question, comment, compliment or concern, just write me!

If you write, please remember to include your name and contact information.  I’m always interested in learning about funds or investment trends that intrigue you, but I’m exceedingly wary of anonymous tips.

Take care and I’ll see you again on July 1!

 

David

RiverNorth Core Opportunity (RNCOX), June 2011

By Editor

Objective

The fund seeks long-term capital appreciation and income, while trying to maintain a sense of “prudent investment risk over the long-term.”  RNCOX is a “balanced” fund with several twists.  First, it adjusts its long-term asset allocation in order to take advantage of tactical allocation opportunities.  Second, it invests primarily in a mix of closed-end mutual funds and ETFs.

Adviser

RiverNorth Capital, which was founded in 2000.  RiverNorth manages about $700 million in assets, including two funds, a limited partnership and a number of separate accounts.

Managers

Patrick Galley and Stephen O’Neill.  Mr. Galley is the chief investment officer for RiverNorth Capital.  Before that, he was a Vice President at Bank of America in the Portfolio Management group.  Mr. O’Neill is “the Portfolio Manager for RiverNorth Capital,” and also an alumnus of Bank of America.  Messrs Galley and O’Neill also manage part of one other fund (RiverNorth/DoubleLine Strategic Income, RNSIX), one hedge fund and 700 separate accounts, valued at $150 million.  Many of those accounts are only nominally “separate” since the retirement plan for a firm’s 100 employees might be structured in such a way that it needs to be reported as 100 separate accounts.  Galley and O’Neill are assisted by a quantitative analyst whose firm specializes in closed-end fund trading strategies.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Mr. Galley and Mr. O’Neill each has invested between $100,000 – $500,000 in the fund, as of the January, 2011 Statement of Additional Information.  In addition, Mr. Galley founded and owns more than 25% of RiverNorth.

Opening date

December 27, 2006.

Minimum investment

$5,000 for regular accounts and $1,000 for retirement accounts.

This fund is closing at the end of June 2011.

Expense ratio

2.39% after minimal expense deferrals.

Comments

The argument in favor of RNCOX is not just its great performance.  It does have top flight performance credentials:

  • five-star rating from Morningstar, as of June 2011
  • a Lipper Leader for total and consistent returns, also as of June 2011
  • annualized return of 9.2% since inception, compared to 0.6% for the S&P 500
  • above average returns in every calendar year of its existence
  • top 2% returns since inception

and so on.  All of that is nice, but not quite central.

The central argument is that RNCOX has a reason to exist, a claim that lamentably few mutual funds can seriously make.  RNCOX offers investors access to a strategy which makes sense and which is not available through – so far as I can tell – any other publicly accessible investment vehicle.

To understand that strategy, you need to understand the basics of closed-end funds (CEFs).  CEFs are a century-old investment vehicle, older by decades that conventional open-end mutual funds.  The easiest way to think of them is as actively-managed ETFs: they are funds which can be bought or sold throughout the day, just like stocks or ETFs.   Each CEF carries two prices.  Its net asset value is the pro-rated value of the securities in its portfolio.  Its market price is the amount buyers are willing to pay to obtain one share of the CEF.  In a rational, efficient market, the NAV and the market price would be the same.  That is, if one share of a CEF contained $100 worth of stock (the NAV), then one share of the fund would sell for $100 (the market price).  But they don’t.

Why not?  Because investors are prone to act irrationally.  They panic and sell stuff for far less than its worth.  They get greedy and wildly overpay for stuff.  Because the CEF market is relatively small – 644 funds and $183 billion in assets (Investment Company Institute data, 5/27/2009) – panicked or greedy reactions by a relatively small number of investors can cause shares of a CEF to sell at a huge discount (or premium) to the actual value of the securities that the fund sells.  By way of example, shares of Charles Royce’s Royce Micro-cap Trust (RMT) are selling at a 16% discount to the fund’s NAV; if you bought a share of RMT last Friday and Mr. Royce did nothing on Monday but liquidate every security in the portfolio and return the proceeds to his investors, you would be guaranteed a 16% profit on your investment.  Funds managed by David Dreman, Mario Gabelli, the Franklin Mutual Series team, Mark Mobius and others are selling at 5 – 25% discounts.

It’s common for CEFs to maintain modest discounts for long periods.  A fund might sell at a 4% discount most of the time, reflecting either skepticism about the manager or the thinness of the market for the fund’s shares.  The key to RNCOX’s strategy is the observation that those ongoing discounts occasionally balloon, so that a fund that normally sells at a 4% discount is temporarily available at a 24% discount.  With time, those abnormal discounts revert to the mean: the 24% discount returns to being a 4% discount.  If an investor knows what a fund’s normal discount is and buys shares of the fund when the discount is abnormally large, he or she will almost certainly profit when the discount reverts to normal.  This tendency to generate panic discounts offers a highly-predictable source of “alpha,” largely independent of the skill of the manager whose CEF you’re buying and somewhat independent of what the market does (a discount can evaporate even when the overall market is flat, creating a profit for the discount investor).  The key is understanding the CEF market well enough to know what a particular fund’s “normal” discount is and how long that particular fund might maintain an “abnormal” discount.

Enter Patrick Galley and the RiverNorth team.  Mr. Galley used to work for Bank of America, analyzing mutual fund acquisition deals and arranging financing for them.  That work led him to analyze the value of CEFs, whose irrational pricing led him to conclude that there were substantial opportunities for arbitrage and profits.  After exploiting those opportunities in separately managed accounts, he left to establish his own fund.

RiverNorth Core’s portfolio is constructed in two steps: asset allocation and security selection.  The fund starts with a core asset allocation, a set of asset classes which – over the long run – produce the best risk-adjusted returns.  The core allocations include a 60/40 split between stocks and bonds, about a 60/40 split in the bond sleeve between government and high-yield bonds, about an 80/20 split in the stock sleeve between domestic and foreign, about an 80/20 split within the foreign stock sleeve between developed and emerging, and so on.  But as any emerging markets investor knows from last year’s experience, the long-term attractiveness of an asset class can be interrupted by short periods of horrible losses.  In response, RiverNorth makes opportunistic, tactical adjustments in its asset allocation.  Based on an analysis of more than 30 factors (including valuation, liquidity, and sentiment), the fund can temporarily overweight or underweight particular asset classes.

Once the asset allocation is set, the managers look to implement the allocation by investing in a combination of CEFs and ETFs.  In general, they’ll favor CEFs if they find funds selling at abnormal discounts.   In that case, they’ll buy the CEF and hold it until the discount returns to normal. (I’ll note, in passing, that they can also short CEFs selling at abnormal premiums to the NAV.) They’ll then sell and if no other abnormally discounted CEF is available, they’ll buy an ETF in the same sector.  If there are no inefficiently-priced CEFs in an area where they’re slated to invest, the fund simply buys ETFs.

In this way, the managers pursue profits from two different sources: a good tactical allocation (which other funds might offer) and the CEF arbitrage opportunity (which no other fund offers).  Given the huge number of funds currently selling at double-digit discounts to the value of their holdings, it seems that RNCOX has ample opportunity for adding alpha beyond what other tactical allocation funds can offer.

There are, as always, risks inherent in investing in the fund.  The managers are experts at CEF investing, but much of the fund’s return is driven by asset allocation decisions and they don’t have a unique competitive advantage there.  Since the fund sells a CEF as soon as it reverts to its normal discount, portfolio turnover is likely to be high (last year it was 300%) and tax efficiency will suffer. The fund’s expenses are much higher than those of typical no-load equity funds, though not out of line with expenses typical of long/short, market neutral, and tactical allocation funds.  Finally, short-term volatility could be substantial: large CEF discounts can grow larger and the managers intend to buy more of those more-irrationally discounted shares.  In Q3 2008, for example, the fund lost 15% – about three times as much as the Vanguard Balanced Index – but then went on to blow away the index over the following three quarters.

Bottom Line

For investors looking for a core fund, especially one in a Roth or other tax-advantaged account, RiverNorth Core really needs to be on your short list of best possible choices.  The managers have outperformed their peer group in both up- and down-markets and their ability to exploit inefficient pricing of CEFs is likely great enough to overcome the effects of high expenses and still provide superior returns to their investors.

Fund website

RiverNorth Funds

RiverNorth Core Opportunity

Fact Sheet

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2011.  All rights reserved.  The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication.  For reprint/e-rights contact David@MutualFundObserver.com.

 

Fidelity Global Strategies (FDYSX), June 2011

By Editor

Since publication, this fund has merged into Fidelity Asset Manager 60%.

Objective

The fund seeks to maximize total returns.  It will, in theory, do that by making top-down judgments about the short- and long-term attractiveness of all available asset classes (domestic, international and emerging markets equities; domestic, international, emerging markets, high yield, investment grade and inflation protected bonds, floating rate loans, and ETNs; and up to 25% commodities).  It will then allocate its resources to some combination of Fidelity funds, a Fidelity-owned commodities fund based in the Cayman Islands, exchange-traded funds and notes, and “direct investments.”  They highlight the note that they might place “a significant portion of the fund’s assets in non-traditional assets” including market-neutral funds.

Adviser

Fidelity Management & Research Company, the investment advisor to all 300 Fidelity mutual funds.  Fidelity employs (give or take a layoff or two) 500 portfolio managers, analysts and traders and has $1.4 trillion in assets under management.

Manager

Jurrien Timmer and Andrew Dierdorf.  Mr. Timmer has been Fidelity’s Director of Market Research for the past 12 years and is a specialist in tactical asset allocation.  Mr. Dierdorf is a relative newcomer to Fidelity and co-manages 24 of Fidelity’s Freedom funds.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Mr. Dierdorf has between $50,000 – 100,000 in the fund and Mr. Timmer had invested between $500,000 and $1,000,000.  Only two of the fund’s nine trustees (Albert Gamper and James Keyes) had large investments in the fund while six (including Abby Johnson) had nothing.  Fidelity’s directors make between $400,000 – 500,000 per year (sign me up!) and their compensation is pro-rated over the number of funds they oversee; as of the most recent SAI, each director had received $120 in compensation for his or her work with this fund.

Opening date

November 1, 2007.

Minimum investment

$2500 for a regular account and $500 for an IRA.

Expense ratio

1.00% on assets of $450 million.

Comments

From 2007 through June 2011, this was the Fidelity Dynamic Strategies Fund.  It was rechristened as Global Strategies on June 1, 2011.  The fund also adopted a new benchmark that increases international equity and bond exposure, while decreasing US bond and money market exposure:

Dynamic Strategies benchmark Global Strategies benchmark
50% S&P 500 60% MSCI All Country World
40% Barclays US bond index 30% Barclays US bond
10% Barclays US-3 Month T-bill index 10% Citigroup Non-US G7 bond

Here’s the theory: Fidelity has greater analytic resources than virtually any of its competitors do.  And it has been moving steadily away from “vanilla” funds and toward asset allocation and niche products.  That is, they haven’t been launching diversified, domestic mid-cap funds as much as 130/30, enhanced index, frontier market, strategic objective and asset allocation funds.  They’ve been staffing-up to support those projects and should be able to do an exceptional job with them.

Fidelity Global Strategies is the logical culmination of those efforts: like Leuthold Core (LCORX) or PIMCO All-Asset (PAAIX), its managers make a top-down judgment about the world’s most attractive investment opportunities and then move aggressively to exploit those opportunities.

My original 2008 assessment of the fund was this:

In theory, this fund should be an answer to investors’ prayers.  In practice, it looks like a mess . . . Part of the problem surely is the managers’ asset allocation (mis)judgments.  On June 30 (2008), at the height of the recent energy price bubble, they combined “high conviction secular themes – commodities . . . our primary ‘ace in the hole’ for the period” with “our conviction, and our positive view on energy and materials stocks” to position the portfolio for a considerable fall.

Those errors had to have been compounded by the sprawling mess of a portfolio they oversee . . . The fund complements its portfolio of 38 Fidelity funds (28 stock funds, six bond funds and 4 money market and real estate funds) with no fewer than 75 exchange-traded funds.  In many cases, the fund invests simultaneously in overlapping Fidelity funds and outside ETFs.

The bottom line:

At 113 funds, this strikes me as an enormously, inexplicably complex creation.  Unless and until the managers accumulate a record of consistent downside protection or consistent up-market out-performance, neither of which is yet evident, it’s hard to make a case for the fund.

Neither the experience of the last two years nor the recent revamping materially alters those concerns.

Since inception, the fund has not been able to distinguish itself from most of the plausible, easily-accessible alternatives.  Here’s the comparison of $10,000 invested at the opening of Dynamic Strategies, compared with a reasonable peer group.

Dynamic Strategies $10,700
Vanguard Balanced Index (VBINX), an utterly vanilla 60/40 split between US stocks and US bonds 10,800
Vanguard STAR (VGSTX), a fund of Vanguard funds with a pretty static stock/bond mix 10,700
Fidelity Global Balanced (FGBLX) 10,800
Morningstar benchmark index (moderate target risk) 10,900

In short, the fund’s ability to actively allocate and to move globally has not (yet) outperformed simple, low-cost, low-turnover competitors.  In its first 13 quarters of existence, the fund has outperformed half the time, underperformed half the time, and effectively tied once.  More broadly, that’s reflected in the fund’s Sharpe ratio.  The Sharpe ratio attempts to measure how much extra return you get in exchange for the extra risk that a manager chooses to subject you to.   A Sharpe ratio greater than zero is, all things being equal, a good thing.  FDYSX’s Sharpe ratio is 0.34, not bad but no better than its benchmark’s 0.36.

The portfolio continues to be large (24 Fidelity funds and 45 ETFs), though much improved over 2008.  It continues to

By way of example:

  • The fund holds three of Fidelity’s emerging markets funds (Emerging Markets, China and Latin America) but also 14 emerging markets ETFs (mostly single country or frontier markets).  It does not, however, hold Fidelity’s Emerging EMEA (FEMEX) fund which would have been a logical first choice in lieu of the ETFs.
  • The fund holds Fidelity’s Mega Cap and Disciplined Equity stock funds, but also the S&P500 ETF.  For no apparent reason, it invests 1% of the portfolio in the Institutional class of the Advisor class of Fidelity 130/30 Large Cap.  In consequence, it has staked a bold 0.4% short position on the domestic market.  But why?

The recent changes don’t materially strengthen the fund’s prospects.  It invests far less internationally (15%) than it could and invests about as much (20%) on commodities now as it will be able to with a new mandate.  The manager’s most recent commentary (“Another Fork in the Road,” 04/28/2011) foresees higher inflation, lax Fed discipline and an allocation with is “neutral on stocks, short on bonds, and long on hard assets.”  The notion of a flexible global allocation is certainly attractive.  Still neither a new name nor a tweaked benchmark, both designed according to Fidelity, “to better reflect its global allocation,” is needed to achieve those objectives.

Bottom Line

I have often been skeptical of Fidelity’s funds and have, I blush to admit, often been wrong in that skepticism.  Undeterred, I’m skeptical here, too.  As systems become more complex, they became more prone to failure.  This remains a very complex fund.  Investors might reasonably wait for it to distinguish itself in some way before considering a serious commitment to it.

Fund website

Fidelity Global Strategies

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2011.  All rights reserved.  The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication.  For reprint/e-rights contact David@MutualFundObserver.com.

Amana Developing World Fund (AMDWX), May 2011

By Editor

Objective

The fund seeks long-term capital growth by investing exclusively in stocks of companies with significant exposure (50% or more of assets or revenues) to countries with developing economies and/or markets. That investment can occur through ADRs and ADSs.  Investment decisions are made in accordance with Islamic principles. The fund diversifies its investments across the countries of the developing world, industries, and companies, and generally follows a value investment style.

Adviser

Saturna Capital, of Bellingham, Washington.  Saturna oversees five Sextant funds, the Idaho Tax-Free fund and three Amana funds.  The Sextant funds contribute about $250 million in assets while the Amana funds hold about $3 billion (as of April 2011).  The Amana funds invest in accord with Islamic investing principles. The Income Fund commenced operations in June 1986 and the Growth Fund in February, 1994. Mr. Kaiser was recognized as the best Islamic fund manager for 2005.

Manager

Nicholas Kaiser with the assistance of Monem Salam.  Mr. Kaiser is president and founder of Saturna Capital. He manages five funds (two at Saturna, three here) and oversees 26 separately managed accounts.  He has degrees from Chicago and Yale. In the mid 1970s and 1980s, he ran a mid-sized investment management firm (Unified Management Company) in Indianapolis.  In 1989 he sold Unified and subsequently bought control of Saturna.  As an officer of the Investment Company Institute, the CFA Institute, the Financial Planning Association and the No-Load Mutual Fund Association, he has been a significant force in the money management world.  He’s also a philanthropist and is deeply involved in his community.  By all accounts, a good guy all around. Mr. Monem Salam, vice president and director of Islamic investing at Saturna Capital Corporation, is the deputy portfolio manager for the fund.

Inception

September 28, 2009.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Mr. Kaiser directly owned $500,001 to $1,000,000 of Developing World Fund shares and indirectly owned more than $1,000,000 of it. Mr. Salam has something between $10,00 to $50,000 Developing World Fund. As of August, 2010, officers and trustees, as a group, owned nearly 10% of the Developing World Fund.

Minimum investment

$250 for all accounts, with a $25 subsequent investment minimum.  That’s blessedly low.

Expense ratio

1.59% on an asset base of about $15 million.  There’s also a 2% redemption fee on shares held fewer than 90 days.

Comments

Mr. Kaiser launched AMDWX at the behest of many of his 100,000 Amana investors and was able to convince his board to authorize the launch by having them study his long-term record in international investing.  That seems like a decent way for us to start, too.

Appearances aside, AMDWX is doing precisely what you want it to.

Taken at face value, the performance stats for AMDWX appear to be terrible.  Between launch and April 2011, AMDWX turned $10,000 into $11,000 while its average peer turned $10,000 to $13,400.  As of April 2011, it’s at the bottom of the pack for both full years of its existence and for most trailing time periods, often in the lowest 10%.

And that’s a good thing.  The drag on the fund is its huge cash position, over 50% of assets in March, 2011.  Sibling Sextant International (SSIFX) is 35% cash.  Emerging markets have seen enormous cash inflows.  As of late April, 2011, emerging markets funds were seeing $2 billion per week in inflows.  Over 50% of institutional emerging markets portfolios are now closed to new investment to stem the flow.  Vanguard’s largest international fund is Emerging Markets Stock Index (VEIEX) at a stunning $64 billion.  There’s now clear evidence of a “bubble” in many of these small markets and, in the past, a crisis in one region has quickly spread to others. In response, a number of sensible value managers, including the remarkably talented team behind Artisan Global Value (ARTGX), have withdrawn entirely from the emerging markets. Amana’s natural caution seems to have been heightened, and they seem to be content to accumulate cash and watch. If you think this means that “bad things” and “great investment values” are both likely to manifest soon, you should be reassured at Amana’s disciplined conservatism.

The only question is: will Amana’s underperformance be a ongoing issue?

No.

Let me restate the case for investing with Mr. Kaiser.

I’ve made these same arguments in profiling Sextant International (SSIFX) as a “star in the shadows.”

Mr. Kaiser runs four other stock funds: one large value, one large core international (which has a 25% emerging markets stake), one large growth, and one that invests across the size and valuation spectrum.  For all of his funds, he employs the same basic strategy: look for undervalued companies with good management and a leadership position in an attractive industry.  Buy.  Spread your bets over 60-80 names.  Hold.  Then keep holding for between ten and fifty years.

Here’s Morningstar’s rating (as 4/26/11) of the four equity funds that Mr. Kaiser manages:

  3-year 5-year 10-year Overall
Amana Trust Income ««««« ««««« ««««« «««««
Amana Trust Growth ««««« ««««« ««««« «««««
Sextant Growth «««« ««« ««««« ««««
Sextant International ««««« ««««« ««««« «««««

In their overall rating, every one of Mr. Kaiser’s funds achieves “above average” or “high” returns for “below average” or “low” risk.

Folks who prefer Lipper’s rating system (though I’m not entirely clear why they would do so), find a similar pattern:

  Total return Consistency Preservation Tax efficiency
Amana Income ««««« «««« ««««« «««««
Amana Growth ««««« ««««« ««««« ««««
Sextant Growth «««« ««« ««««« «««««
Sextant International ««««« «« ««««« «««««

I have no idea of how Lipper generated the low consistency rating for International, since it tends to beat its peers in about three of every four years, trailing mostly in frothy markets.  Its consistency is even clearer if you look at longer time periods. I calculated Sextant International’s returns and those of its international large cap peers for a series of rolling five-year periods since with the fund’s launch in 1995.  I looked at what would happen if you invested $10,000 in the fund in 1995 and held for five years, then looked at 1996 and held for five, and so on.  There are ten rolling five-year periods and Sextant International outperformed its peers in 100% of those periods.  Frankly, that strikes me as admirably consistent.

At the Sixth Annual 2010 Failaka Islamic Fund Awards Ceremony (held in April, 2011), which reviews the performance of all managers, worldwide, who invest on Islamic principles, Amana received two “best fund awards.”

Other attributes strengthen the case for Amana

Mr. Kaiser’s outstanding record of generating high returns with low risk, across a whole spectrum of investments, is complemented by AMDWX’s unique attributes.

Islamic investing principles, sometimes called sharia-compliant investing, have two distinctive features.  First, there’s the equivalent of a socially-responsible investment screen which eliminates companies profiting from sin (alcohol, porn, gambling).   Mr. Kaiser estimates that the social screens reduce his investable universe by 6% or so.  Second, there’s a prohibition on investing in interest-bearing securities (much like the 15 or so Biblical injunctions against usury, traditionally defined as accepting an interest or “increase”), which effective eliminates both bonds and financial sector equities.  The financial sector constitutes about 25% of the market capitalization in the developing world.   Third, as an adjunct to the usury prohibition, sharia precludes investment in deeply debt-ridden companies.  That doesn’t mean a company must have zero debt but it does mean that the debt/equity ratio has to be quite low.  Between those three prohibitions, about two-thirds of developing market companies are removed from Amana’s investable universe.

This, Mr. Kaiser argues, is a good thing.  The combination of sharia-compliant investing and his own discipline, which stresses buying high quality companies with considerable free cash flow (that is, companies which can finance operations and growth without resort to the credit markets) and then holding them for the long haul, generates a portfolio that’s built like a tank.  That substantial conservatism offers great downside protection but still benefits from the growth of market leaders on the upside.

Risk is further dampened by the fund’s inclusion of multinational corporations domiciled in the developed world whose profits are derived in the developing world (including top ten holding Western Digital and, potentially, Colgate-Palmolive which generates more than half of its profits in the developing world).  Mr. Kaiser suspects that such firms won’t account for more than 20% of the portfolio but they still function as powerful stabilizers.  Moreover, he invests in stocks and derivatives which are traded on, and settled in, developed world stock markets.  That gives exposure to the developing world’s growth within the developed world’s market structures.  As of 1/30/10, ADRs and ADSs account for 16 of the fund’s 30 holdings.

An intriguing, but less obvious advantage is the fund’s other investors.

Understandably enough, many and perhaps most of the fund’s investors are Muslims who want to make principled investments.  They have proven to be incredibly loyal, steadfast shareholders.  During the market meltdown in 2008, for example, Amana Growth and Amana Income both saw assets grow steadily and, in Income’s case, substantially.

The movement of hot money into and out of emerging markets funds has particularly bedeviled managers and long-term investors alike.  The panicked outflow stops managers from doing the sensible thing – buying like mad while there’s blood in the streets – and triggers higher expenses and tax bills for the long-term shareholders.  In the case of T. Rowe Price’s very solid Emerging Market Stock fund (PRMSX), investors have pocketed only 50% of the fund’s long-term gains because of their ill-timed decisions.

In contrast, Mr. Kaiser’s investors do exactly the right thing.  They buy with discipline and find reason to stick around.  Here’s the most remarkable data table I’ve seen in a long while.  This compares the investor returns to the fund returns for Mr. Kaiser’s four other equity funds.  It is almost universally the case that investor returns trail far behind fund returns.  Investors famously buy high and sell low.  Morningstar’s analyses suggest s the average fund investor makes 2% less than the average fund he or she owns and, in volatile areas, fund investors often lose money investing in funds that make money.

How do Amana/Sextant investors fare on those grounds?

  Fund’s five-year return Investor’s five-year return
Sextant International 6.3 12.9
Sextant Growth 2.5 5.3
Sextant Core 3.8 (3 year only) 4.1 (3 year only)
Amana Income 7.0 9.0
Amana Growth 6.0 9.8

In every case, those investors actually made more than the nominal returns of their funds says is possible.  Having investors who stay put and buy steadily may offer a unique, substantial advantage for AMDWX over its peers.

Is there reason to be cautious?  Sure.  Three factors are worth noting:

  1. For better and worse, the fund is 50% cash, as of 3/31/11.
  2. The fund’s investable universe is distinctly different from many peers’.  There are 30 countries on his approved list, about half as many as Price picks through.  Some countries which feature prominently in many portfolios (including Israel and Korea) are excluded here because he classifies them as “developed” rather than developing.  And, as I noted above, about two-thirds of developing market stocks, and the region’s largest stock sector, fail the fund’s basic screens.
  3. Finally, a lot depends on one guy.  Mr. Kaiser is the sole manager of five funds with $2.8 billion in assets.  The remaining investment staff includes his fixed-income guy, the Core fund manager, the director of Islamic investing and three analysts.  At 65, Mr. Kaiser is still young, sparky and deeply committed but . …

Bottom line

If you’re looking for a potential great entree into the developing markets, and especially if you’re a small investors looking for an affordable, conservative fund, you’ve found it!

Company link

Amana Developing World

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2011.  All rights reserved.  The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication.  For reprint/e-rights contact David@MutualFundObserver.com.

LKCM Balanced Fund (LKBAX), May 2011

By Editor

Objective

The fund seeks current income and long-term capital appreciation.  The managers invest in a combination of blue chip stocks, investment grade intermediate-term bonds, convertible securities and cash.  In general, at least 25% of the portfolio will be bonds.   In practice, the fund is generally 70% equities.  The portfolio turnover rate is modest, typically 25% or below.

Adviser

Founded in 1979 Luther King Capital Management provides investment management services to investment companies, foundations, endowments, pension and profit sharing plans, trusts, estates, and high net worth individuals.  Luther King Capital Management has seven shareholders, all of whom are employed by the firm, and 29 investment professionals on staff.  As of December, 2010, the firm had about $8 billion in assets.  They advise the five LKCM funds and the three LKCM Aquinas funds, which invest in ways consistent with Catholic values.

Manager

Scot Hollmann, J. Luther King and Mark Johnson.  Mr. Hollman and Mr. King have managed the fund since its inception, while Mr. Johnson joined the team in 2010.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Hollman has between $100,00 and $500,000 in the fund, Mr. King has over $1 million, and Mr. Johnson has a pittance (but it’s early).

Opening date

December 30, 1997.

Minimum investment

$10,000 across the board.

Expense ratio

0.81%, after waivers, on an asset base of $19 million (as of April 2011).

Comments

The difference between a successful portfolio and a rolling disaster, is the investor’s ability to do the little things right.  Chief among those is keeping volatility low (high volatility funds tend to trigger disastrous reactions in investors), keeping expenses low, keeping trading to a minimum (a high-turnover strategy increases your portfolio cost by 2-3% a year) and rebalancing your assets between stocks, bonds and cash.  All of which works, little of which we have the discipline to do.

Enter: the hybrid fund.  In a hybrid, you’re paying a manager to be dull and disciplined on your behalf.  Here’s simple illustration of how it works out.  LKCM Balanced invests in the sorts of stocks represented by the S&P500 and the sorts of bonds represented by an index of intermediate-term, investment grade bonds such as Barclay’s.  The Vanguard Balanced Index fund (VBINX) mechanically and efficiently invests in those two areas as well.  Here are the average annual returns, as of March 31 2011, for those four options:

  3 year 5 year 10 year
LKCM Balanced 6.1% 5.5 5.4
S&P 500 index 2.6 3.3 4.2
Barclays Intermediate bond index 5.7 5.2 5.6
Vanguard Balanced Index fund 4.9 4.7 5.2

Notice two things: (1) the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. LKCM tends to return more than either of its component parts.  (2) the active fund is better than the passive. The Vanguard Balanced Index fund is an outstanding choice for folks looking for a hybrid (ultra-low expenses, returns which are consistently in the top 25% of peer funds over longer time periods).  And LKCM consistently posts better returns and, I’ll note below, does so with less volatility.

While these might be the dullest funds in your portfolio, they’re also likely to be the most profitable part of it.  Their sheer dullness makes you less likely to bolt.  Morningstar research found that the average domestic fund investor made about 200 basis points less, even in a good year, than the average fund did.  Why?  Because we showed up after a fund had already done well (we bought high), then stayed through the inevitable fall before we bolted (we sold low) and then put our money under a mattress or into “the next hot thing.”  The fund category that best helped investors avoid those errors was the domestic stock/bond hybrids.  Morningstar concluded:

Balanced funds were the main bright spot. The gap for the past year was just 14 basis points, and it was only 8 for the past three years. Best of all, the gap went the other way for the trailing 10 years as the average balanced-fund investor outperformed the average balanced fund by 30 basis points. (Russel Kinnel, “Mind the Gap 2011,” posted 4/18/2011)

At least in theory, the presence of that large, stolid block would allow you to tolerate a series of small volatile positions (5% in emerging markets small caps, for example) without panic.

But which hybrid or balanced fund?  Here, a picture is really worth a thousand words.

Scatterplot graph

This is a risk versus return scatterplot for domestic balanced funds.  As you move to the right, the fund’s volatility grows – so look for funds on the left.  As you move up, the fund’s returns rise – so look for funds near the top.  Ideally, look for the fund at the top left corner – the lowest volatility, highest return you can find.

That fund is LKCM Balanced.

You can reach exactly the same conclusion by using Morningstar’s fine fund screener.  A longer term investor needs stocks as well as bonds, so start by looking at all balanced funds with at least half of their money in stocks.

There are 302 such funds.

To find funds with strong, consistent returns, ask for funds that at least matched the returns of LKCM Balanced over the past 3-, 5- and 10-years.

You’re down to four fine no-load funds (Northern Income Equity, Price Capital Appreciation, Villere Balanced, and LKCM).

Finally, ask for funds no more volatile than LKBAX.

And no one else remains.

What are they doing right?

Quiet discipline, it seems.  Portfolio turnover is quite low, in the mid-teens to mid-20s each year.  Expenses, at 0.8%, are low, period, and remarkably low for such a small fund.  The portfolio is filled with well-run global corporations (U.S. based multinationals) and shorter-duration, investment grade bonds.

Why, then, are there so few shareholders?

Three issues, none related to quality of the fund, come to mind.  First, the fund has a high minimum initial investment, $10,000.  Second, the fund is not a consistent “chart topper,” which means that it receives little notice in the financial media or by the advisory community.  Finally, LKCM does not market its services.  Their website is static and rudimentary, they don’t advertise, they’re not located in a financial center (Fort Worth), and even their annual reports offer one scant paragraph about each fund.

What are the reasons to be cautious?

On whole, not many since LKCM seems intent on being cautious on your behalf.  The fund offers no direct international exposure; currently, 1% of the portfolio – a single Israeli stock – is it.  It also offers no exposure (less than 2% of the portfolio, as of April 2011) to smaller companies.  And it does average 70% exposure to the U.S. stock market, which means it will lose money when the market tanks.  That might make it, or any fund with substantial stock exposure, inappropriate for very conservative investors.

Bottom Line

This is a singularly fine fund for investors seeking equity exposure without the thrills and chills of a stock fund.  The management team has been stable, both in tenure and in discipline.  Their objective remains absolutely sensible: “Our investment strategy continues to focus on managing the overall risk level of the portfolio by emphasizing diversification and quality in a blend of asset classes.”

Fund website

LKCM Balanced

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2011.  All rights reserved.  The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication.  For reprint/e-rights contact David@MutualFundObserver.com.

May 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to May and welcome to the Observer’s first monthly commentary.  Each month I’ll try to highlight some interesting (often maddening, generally overlooked) developments in the world of funds and financial journalism.  I’ll also profile for you to some intriguing and/or outstanding funds that you might otherwise not hear about.

Successor to “The Worst Best Fund Ever”

They’re at it again.  They’ve found another golden manager.   This time Tom Soveiro of Fidelity Leveraged Company Stock and its Advisor Class sibling.  Top mutual fund for the past decade so:

Guru Investor, “#1 Fund Manager Profits from Debt”
Investment News, “The ‘Secret’ of the Top Performing Fund Manager”
Street Authority, “2 Stock Picks from the Best Mutual Fund on the Planet”
Motley Fool, “The Decade’s Best Stock Picker”
Mutual Fund Observer, “Dear God.  Not again.”

The first sign that something might be terribly amiss is the line: “Thomas Soviero has replaced Ken Heebner at the top” (A New Winner on the Mutual Fund Charts, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 21 April 2011).  Ken Heebner manages the CGM Focus (CGMFX) fund, which I pilloried last year as “the worst best fund ever.”  In celebration of Heebner’s 18.8% annual returns over the decade, it was not surprising that Forbes made CGMFX “the Best Mutual Fund of the Decade.”  The Boston Globe declared Kenneth “The Mad Bomber” Heebner “The Decade’s Best” for a record that “still stands atop all competitors.” And SmartMoney anointed him “the real Hero of the Zeroes.”

All of which I ridiculed on the simple grounds that Heebner’s funds were so wildly volatile that no mere moral would ever stay invested in the dang things.  The simplest measure of that is Morningstar’s “investor returns” calculation.  At base, Morningstar weights a fund’s returns by its assets: a great year in which only a handful of people were invested weighs less than a subsequent rotten year when billions have flooded the fund.  In Heebner’s case, the numbers were damning: the average investor in CGMFX lost 11% a year in the same period that the fund made 19% a year. Why?  Folks rushed in after the money had already been made, were there for the subsequent inferno, and fled before his trademark rebounds.

Lesson for us all: we’re not as brave or as smart as we think.  If you’re going to make a “mad investment” with someone like “The Mad Bomber,” keep it to a small sliver of your portfolio – planners talk about 5% of so – and plan on holding through the inevitable disaster.

Perhaps, then, you should approach Heebner’s successor with considerable caution.

The new top at the top is Fidelity Advisor Leveraged Company Stock (FLSAX).  Fidelity has developed a great niche investing in high-yield or “junk” bonds.  They’ve leveraged an unusually large analyst staff to support:

  • Fidelity Capital and Income (FAGIX), a five-star high yield bond fund that can invest up to 20% in stocks
  • Fidelity Floating Rate High Income (FFRHX), which buys floating rate bank loans
  • Fidelity High Income (SPHIX), a four-star junk bond fund
  • Fidelity Focused High Income (FHIFX), a junk bond fund that can also own convertibles and equities
  • Fidelity Global High Income (no ticker), likely launch in June 2011
  • Fidelity Strategic Income (FSICX), which has a “barbell shaped” portfolio, which one end being high quality government debt and the other being junk. Nothing in-between.

And the Fidelity Leveraged Company Stock (FLVCX), which invests in the stock of those companies which resort to issuing junk bonds or which are, otherwise, highly-leveraged (a.k.a., deeply in debt).  As with most of the Fidelity funds, there’s also an “advisor” version with five different share classes.

Simple, yes?  Great fund, stable management, interesting niche, buy it!

Simple no.

Most of the worshipful articles fail to mention two things:

1. the fund thrives when interest rates are falling and credit is easy.  Remember, you’re investing in companies whose credit sucks.  That’s why they were forced to issue junk bonds in the first place.  If the market force junk bonds constricts, these guys have nowhere to turn (except, perhaps, to guys with names like “Two Fingers”).  The potential for the fund to suffer was demonstrated during the credit freeze in 2008 when the fund lost between 53.8% (Advisor “A” shares) and 54.5% (no-load) of value.  Both returns place it in the bottom 2 or 3% of its peer group.

The fund’s performance during the market crash (October 07 – March 09) explains why it has a one-star rating from Morningstar for the past three years. Across all time periods, it has “high” risk, married recently to “low” returns.  Which helps explain why . . .

2. the fund is not shareholder-friendly.People like the idea of high-risk, high-return funds a lot more than they like the reality of them. Almost all behavioral finance research finds the same dang thing about us: we are drawn to shiny, high-return funds just about as powerfully as a mosquito is drawn to a bug-zapper.

And we end up doing just about as well as the mosquito does.  Morningstar captures some sense of our impulses in their “investor return” calculations.  Rather than treating a fund’s first year return of 500% – when it had only three investors, say – equal to its fifth year loss of 50% – which it has 20,000 investors – Morningstar weights returns by the size of the fund in the period when those returns were earned.

In general, a big gap between the two numbers suggests either (1) investors rushed in after the big gains were already made or (2) investors continue to rush in and out in a sort of bipolar frenzy of greed and fear.

Things don’t look great on that front:

Fidelity Leveraged Company returned 14.5% over the past decade.  Its shareholders made 3.6%.

Fidelity Advisor Leveraged Company, “A” shares, returned 14.9% over the past decade.  Its shareholders, on average, lost money: down 0.1% for the same period.

Two other observations here:  the wrong version won.  For reasons unexplained, the lower-cost no-load version of the fund trailed the Advisor “A” shares over the past decade, 14.5% to 14.9%.  And that little difference made a difference.  $10,000 invested in the no-load shares grew to $38,700 after 10 years while Advisor shares grew to $40,100.  little differences add up, but I don’t know how.  Finally, the advisors apparently advised poorly.  Here’s a nice win for the do-it-yourself folks buying the no-load shares.  The advisor-sold version had far lower investor returns than did the DIY version.  Whether because they showed up late or had a greater incentive to “churn” their clients’ portfolios, the advisor-led group managed to turn a great decade into an absolute zero (on average) for their clients.

“Eight Simple Steps to Starting Your Own Mutual Fund Family”

Sean Hanna, editor-in-chief at MFWire.com has decided to published a useful little guide “to help budding mutual fund entrepreneurs on their way” (“Eight Simple Steps,” April 21 2011).  While many people spent one year and a million dollars, he reports, to start a fund, it can be a lot simpler and quicker.  So here are MFWire’s quick and easy steps to getting started:

Step 1: Develop a Strategy
Step 2: Hire Expert Counsel
Step 3: Your Board of Directors
Step 4: The Transfer Agent
Step 5: Custodian
Step 6: Distribution
Step 7: Fund Accountant
Step 8: Getting Noticed

The folks here at the Observer applaud Mr. Hanna for his useful guide, but we’d suggest two additional steps need to be penciled-in.  We’ll label them Step 0 and Step 9.

Step 0: Have your head examined.  Really.  There are nearly 500 funds out there with under $10 million in assets.  Make sure you have a reason to be #501.  Forty or so have well-above average five year records and have earned either four- or five-star Morningstar ratings.  And they’re still not drawing investors.

Step 9: Plan on losing money.  Even if your fund is splendid, you’re almost certain to lose money on it.  Mr. Hanna’s essay begins by complaining about “the old boy network” that dominates the industry.  Point well taken.  If you’re not one of “the old boys,” you’re likely to toil in frustrated obscurity, slowly draining your reserves.  Indeed, much of the reason for the Observer’s existence is that no one else is covering these orphan funds.

My suggestion: if you can line up three major investors who are willing to stay with you for the first few years, you’ll have a better chance of making it to Year Three, your Morningstar and Lipper ratings, and the prospect of making it through many advisors’ fund screening programs.  If you don’t have a contingency for losing money for three to five years, think again.

Hey!  Where’d my manager go?

Investors are often left in the dark when star managers leave their funds.  Fund companies have an incentive to pretend that the manager never existed and certainly wasn’t the reason to anyone invested in the fund (regardless of what their marketing materials had been saying for years).  In general, you’ll hear that a manager “left to pursue other opportunities” and often not even that much.  Finding where your manager got to is even harder.  Among the notable movers:

Chuck Akre left FBR Focus (FBRVX) and launched Akre Focus (AKREX).  Mr. Akre made a smooth marketing move and ran an ad for his new fund on the Morningstar profile page for his old fund.   Perhaps in consequence, he’s brought in $300 million to his new fund.

Eric Cinnamond left Intrepid Small Cap (ICMAX) to become lead manager of Aston/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX).   Mr. Cinnamond’s splendid record, and Aston’s marketing, have drawn $60 million to ARIVX.

Andrew Foster left Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX) after a superb stint in which he created one of the least volatile and most profitable Asia-focused portfolios.  He has launched Seafarer Capital Partners, with plans (which I’ll watch closely) to launch a new international fund. In the interim, he’s posting thoughtful weekly essays on economics and investing.

If you’re a manager (or know the whereabouts of a vanished manager) and want, like the Who’s Down in Whoville to cry out “We are here!  We are here!  We are here!” then drop me a line and I’ll pass word of your new venue along.

The last Embarcadero story ever

It all started with Garrett Van Wagoner, whose Van Wagoner Emerging Growth Fund which returned 291% in 1999.  Heck, all of Van Wagoner’s funds returned more than 200% that year before plunging into a 10-year abyss.  The funds tried to hide their shame but reorganizing into the Embarcadero Funds in 2008, but to no avail.

In one of those “did you even blush when you wrote that?” passages, Van Wagoner Capital Management, investment adviser of the Embarcadero Funds, opines that “there are important benefits from investing through skilled money managers whose strategies, when combined, seek to provide enhanced risk-adjusted returns, lower volatility and lower sensitivity to traditional financial market indices.”

Uhh . . . that is, by the way, plagiarized.  It’s the same text used by the Absolute Strategies Fund (ASFAX) in describing their investment discipline.  Not sure who stole it from whom.

This is the same firm that literally abandoned two of their funds for nearly a decade – no manager, no management contract, no investments – while three others spent nearly six years “in liquidation”.   Rallying, the firm reorganized those five funds into two (Market Neutral and Absolute Return).  Sadly, they couldn’t then find anyone to manage the funds.  On the downside, that meant they were saddled with high expenses and an all-cash portfolio during 2010.  Happily, that was their best year in a decade.  And, sadly, no one was there to enjoy the experience.  Embarcadero’s final shareholder report notes:

While 2010 was difficult for the Funds, shareholders now have the benefit of new management utilizing an active investment program with expenses that are lower than previously applicable to the Funds.  No shareholders remain in the Funds, and their existence will be terminated in the near future.

Uhh . . . if there are no shareholders, who is benefiting from new management?  The “new management” in question is Graham Tanaka, whose Tanaka Growth Fund (TGFRX ) absorbed the remnants of the Embarcadero funds.  TGFRX is burdened with high expenses (2.45%), high volatility (a 10-year beta of 140) and low returns (a whopping 0.96% annually over the decade).  The sad thing is that’s infinitely better than they’re used to: Embarcadero Market Neutral lost 16.4% annually while Embarcadero Absolute Disast Return lost 23.8%.

Sigh: the Steadman funds (aka “Deadman funds” which refused, for decades, to admit they were dead), gone.  American Heritage (a fund entirely dependent on penile implants), gone.  Frontier Microcap (sometimes called “the worst mutual fund ever”), gone.  And now, this.  The world suddenly seems so empty.

Funds for fifty: the few, the proud, the affordable!

It’s increasingly difficult for small investors to get started in investing.  Many no-load funds formerly offered low minimums (sometimes just $100) to entice new investors.  That ended when they discovered that thousands of investors opened a $100 fund, adding a bit at first, then promptly forget about it.  There’s no way that a $400 account does anybody any good: the fund company loses money by holding it (it would only generate $6 to cover expenses for the year) and investors end up with tiny puddles of money.

A far brighter idea was to waive the minimum initial investment requirement on the condition that an investor commit to an automatic monthly investment until the fund reached the normal minimum.  That system helps enormously, since investors are likely to leave automatic plans in place long enough to get some good from them.

For those looking to start investing, or start their children in investing, look at one of the handful of no-load fund firms that still waives the minimum investment for disciplined investors:

  • Amana – run in accordance with Islamic investment principles (in practice, socially responsible and debt-avoidant), the three Amana funds ask only $250 to start and waive even that for automatic investors.
  • Artisan – one of the most distinguished boutique firms, whose five autonomous teams manage 11 domestic and international equity funds
  • Aston – which specializes in strong, innovative sub-advised funds.
  • Manning & Napier – the quiet company, M&N has a remarkable collection of excellent funds that almost no one has heard of.
  • Parnassus – runs a handful of solid-to-great socially responsible funds, including the Small Cap fund which I’ve profiled.
  • Pax World – a mixed bag in terms of performance, but surely the most diverse collection of socially-responsible funds (Global Women’s Equity, anyone) around.
  • T. Rowe Price – the real T. Rowe Price is said to be the father of growth investing, but he gave rise to a family of sensible, well-run, risk-conscious funds, almost all of which are worth your attention.

Another race to the bottom

Two more financial supermarkets, Firstrade and Scottrade, have joined the ranks of firms offering commission free ETFs.  They join Schwab, which started the movement by making 13 of its Schwab-branded ETFs commission-free, TD Ameritrade (with 100 free ETFs, Vanguard (64) and Fidelity (31).  The commissions, typically $8 per trade, were a major impediment for folks committed to small, regular purchases.

That said, none of the firms above did it to be nice.  They did it to get money, specifically your money.  It’s their business, after all.  In some cases, the “free” ETFs have higher expenses ratios than their commission-bearing cousins.  In some cases, additional fees apply.  AmeriTrade, for example, charges $20 if you sell within a month of buying.  And in some cases, the collection of free ETFs is unbalanced, so you’re decision to buy a few ETFs for free locks you into buying others that do bear fees.

In any case, here’s the new line-up.

Firstrade (no broad international ETF)
Vanguard Long-Term Bond (BLV)
Vanguard Intermediate Bond (BIV)
Vanguard Short-Term Bond (BSV)
Vanguard Small Cap Growth (VBK)
iShares S&P MidCap 400 (IJH)
Vanguard Emerging Markets (VWO)
Vanguard Dividend Appreciation (VIG)
iShares S&P 500 (IVV)
PowerShares DB Commodity Index (DBC)
iShares FTSE/Xinhua China 25 (FXI)

Scottrade (no international and no bonds)
Morningstar US Market Index ETF (FMU)
Morningstar Large Cap Index ETF (FLG)
Morningstar Mid Cap Index ETF (FMM)
Morningstar Small Cap Index ETF (FOS)
Morningstar Basic Materials Index ETF (FBM)
Morningstar Communication Services Index ETF (FCQ)
Morningstar Consumer Cyclical Index ETF (FCL)
Morningstar Consumer Defensive Index ETF (FCD)
Morningstar Energy Index ETF (FEG)
Morningstar Financial Services Index ETF (FFL)
Morningstar Health Care Index ETF (FHC)
Morningstar Industrials Index ETF (FIL)
Morningstar Real Estate Index ETF (FRL)
Morningstar Technology Index ETF (FTQ)
Morningstar Utilities Index ETF (FUI)

Four funds worth your attention

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers.  These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s two new funds are:

Amana Developing World (AMDWX) is the latest offering from the most consistently excellent fund company around (Saturna Capital, if you didn’t already know).  Investing on Muslim principles with a pedigree anyone would love, AMDWX offers an intriguing, lower-risk option for investors interested in emerging markets exposure without the excitement.

Osterweis Strategic Investment (OSTVX) is a flexible allocation fund that draws on the skills and experience of a very successful management team.  Building on the success of Osterweis (OSTFX) and Osterweis Strategic Income (OSTIX), this intriguing new fund offers the prospect of moving smoothly between stocks and bonds and sensibly within them.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit.  There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.  This month’s two stars are:

Artisan Global Value (ARTGX): Artisan is the first fund to move from “intriguing new fund” to “star in the shadows.”  This outstanding little fund, run the same team that runs the closed, five-star Artisan International Value (ARTKX) fund has been producing better returns with far less risk than its peers, just as ARTKX has been doing for years.  So why no takers?

LKCM Balanced (LKBAX): this staid balanced fund has the distinction of offering the best risk/return profile of any balanced fund in existence, and it’s been doing it for over a decade.  A real “star in the shadows.” Thanks for Ira Artman for chiming in with a recommendation on the fund, and links to cool resources on it!

Briefly Noted:

Morningstar just announced a separation agreement with their former chief operating officer, Tao Huang.  Mr. Huang received $3.15 million in severance and a consulting contract with the company.  (I wonder if Morningstar founder Joe Mansueto, who had to sign the agreement, ever thinks back to the days when he was a tiny, one-man operation just trying to break even?)  It’s not clear why Mr. Huang left, though it is clear that no one suggests anyone did anything wrong (no one “violated any law, interfered with any right, breached any obligation or otherwise engaged in any improper or illegal conduct”), he’s promised not to “disparage” Morningstar.

On April 26, Wasatch Emerging India Fund (WAINX) launched.  The fund focuses on Indian small cap companies and has two experienced managers, Ajay Krishnan and Roger Edgley.   Mr. Krishnan is a native of India and co-manages Wasatch Ultra Growth.  Mr. Edgley, a native of England for what that matters, manages Wasatch Emerging Markets Small Cap, International Opportunities and International Growth. Wasatch argues that the Indian economy is roaring ahead and that small caps are undervalued.  Since they cover several hundred Indian firms for their other funds, they’re feeling pretty confident about being the first Indian small cap fund.

I somehow missed the launch of Leuthold Global Industries, back in June 2010.

The Baron funds have decided to ease up on frequent traders.  “Frequent trading” used to be “six months or less.”    As of April 20, 2011, it’s 90 days or less.

You might call it DWS not-too-International (SUIAX).  A supplement to the prospectus, dated 4/11/11, pledges the fund to invest at least 65% of its assets internationally, the same threshold DWS uses for their Global Thematic fund.  Management is equally bold in promising to think about whether they’ll buy good investments:  “Portfolio management may buy a security when its research resources indicate the potential for future upside price appreciation or their investment process identifies an attractive investment opportunity.”  DWS hired their fourth lead manager (Nikolaus Poehlmann) in five years in October 2009, fired him and his team in April 2011, and brought on a fifth set of managers. That might explain why they trail 96% of their peers over the past 1-, 3-, and 5-year periods but it doesn’t really help in explaining how they’ve managed to accumulate $1 billion in assets.

Henderson has changed the name of two of its funds: Henderson Global Opportunities is now Henderson Global Leaders Fund (HFPIX) and Henderson Japan-Asia Focus Fund is now Henderson Japan Focus (HFJIX).   Both funds are small and expensive.  Japan posts a relatively fine annualized loss of 6% over the past five years while Global Leaders has clocked in with a purely mediocre 1.3% annual loss over its first three years of existence.

ING plans to sell their Clarion fund to CB Richard Ellis Group by July 1, 2011. ING Clarion Real Estate (IVRIX) will keep the same strategy and management team, though presumably a new moniker.

Loomis Sayles Global Markets changed its name to Loomis Sayles Global Equity and Income (LGMAX).

The portfolio-management team responsible for Aston/Optimum Mid Cap (ABMIX) left Optimum Investment Advisers and joined Fairpointe Capital.  Aston canned Optimum, hired Fairpointe and has renamed the fund Aston/Fairpointe Mid Cap. There will be no changes to the management team or strategy.

Thanks!

Mutual Fund Observer has had a good first month of operation.  That wouldn’t have been possible without the support, financial, technical and otherwise, of a lot of kind people.  And so thanks:

  • To Roy Weitz and FundAlarm, who led the way, provided a home, guided my writing and made this all possible.
  • To the nine friends who have, between them, contributed $500 through our PayPal to help support us.
  • To the many people who used the Observer’s link to Amazon, from which we received nearly a hundred dollars more.  If you’re interested in helping out, click on the “support us” link to learn more.
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I am deeply indebted to you all, and I’m looking forward to the challenge of maintaining a site worthy of your attention.

But not right now!  On May 3rd I leave for a long-planned research trip to Oxford University.  There I’ll work on the private papers of long-dead diplomats, trying to unravel the story behind a famous piece of World War One atrocity propaganda.  It was the work of a committee headed by one of the era’s most distinguished diplomats, and it was almost certainly falsified.  So I’ll spend a week at the school on which they modeled Hogwarts, trying to learn what Lord Bryce knew and when he knew it.  Then off to enjoy London and the English countryside with family.

You’ll be in good hands while I’m gone.  Roy Weitz, feared gunslinger and beloved curmudgeon, will oversee the discussion board while I’m gone.  Chip and Brad, dressed much like wizards themselves, will monitor developments, mutter darkly and make it all work.

Until June 1 then!

 

David

Centaur Total Return Fund (TILDX)

By Editor

This profile has been updated. Find the new profile here.

Objective

The fund seeks “maximum total return” through a combination of capital appreciation and income. The fund invests in undervalued securities, included (mostly domestic) high dividend large cap stocks, REITs, master limited partnerships, royalty trusts and convertibles. The manager invests in companies “that it understands well.” The managers also generate income by selling covered calls on some of their stocks.

Adviser

T2 Partners Management, LP. T2, named for founders Whitney Tilson and Glenn Tongue, manages about $150 million through its two mutual funds (the other is Tilson Focus TILFX) and three hedge funds (T2 Accredited, T2 Qualified and Tilson Offshore). These are Buffett-worshippers, in the Warren rather than Jimmy sense. The adviser was founded in 1998.

Manager

Zeke Ashton, founder, managing partner, and a portfolio manager of Centaur Capital Partners L.P., has managed the fund since inception. Mr. Ashton is the the Sub-Advisor. Before founding Centaur in 2002, he spent three years working for The Motley Fool where he developed and produced investing seminars, subscription investing newsletters and stock research reports in addition to writing online investing articles. He graduated from Austin College, a good liberal arts college, in 1995 with degrees in Economics and German.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Somewhere between $100,000 and $500,000 as of October 2009.

Opening date

March 16, 2005

Minimum investment

$1,500 for regular and tax-advantaged accounts, reduced to $1000 for accounts with an automatic investing plan

Expense ratio

2.00% after waivers on an asset base of $40 million, plus a 2% redemption fee on shares held less than a year.

Comments

Tilson Dividend presents itself as an income-oriented fund. The argument for that orientation is simple: income stabilizes returns in bad times and adds to them in good. The manager imagines two sources of income: (1) dividends paid by the companies whose stock they own and (2) fees generated by selling covered calls on portfolio investments.

The core of the portfolio are a limited number (currently about 25) of high quality stocks. In bad markets, such stocks benefit from the dividend income – which helps support their share price – and from a sort of “flight to quality” effect, where investors prefer (and, to an extent, bid up) steady firms in preference to volatile ones. About three-quarters of those stocks are domestic, and one quarter represent developed foreign markets.

The manager also sells covered calls on a portion of the portfolio. At base, he’s offering to sell a stock to another investor at a guaranteed price. “If GM hits $40 a share within the next six months, we’ll sell it to you at that price.” Investors buying those options pay a small upfront price, which generates income for the fund. As long as the agreed-to price is approximately the manager’s estimate of fair value, the fund doesn’t lose much upside (since they’d sell anyway) and gains a bit of income. The profitability of that strategy depends on market conditions; in a calm market, the manager might place only 0.5% of his assets in covered calls but, in volatile markets, it might be ten times as much.

The fund currently generates a lot of income but the reported yield is low because the fund’s expenses are high, and covering operating expenses has the first call on income flow. While it has a high cash stake (about 20%), cash is not current generating appreciable income.

The fund’s conservative approach is succeeded (almost) brilliantly so far. At the fund’s five year anniversary (March 2010), Lipper ranked it as the best performing equity-income fund for the trailing three- and five-year periods. At that same point, Morningstar ranked it in the top 1% of mid-cap blend funds. It’s maintained that top percentile rank since then, with an annualized return of 9.3% from inception through late November 2010.

The fund has achieved those returns with remarkably muted volatility. Morningstar rates its risk as “low” (and returns “high”) and the fund’s five-year standard deviation (a measure of volatility) is 15, substantially below its peers score of 21.

And, on top of it all, the fund has substantially outperformed its more-famous stable-mate. Tilson Focus (TILFX), run by value investing guru Whitney Tilson, has turned a $10,000 investment at inception into $13,100 (good!). Tilson Dividend turned that same investment into $16,600 (better! Except for that whole “showing up the famous boss” issue).

Bottom Line

There are risks with any investment. In this case, one might be concerned that the manager has fine-tuned his investment discipline to allow in a greater number of non-income-producing investments. That said, the fund earned a LipperLeader designation for total returns, consistency and preservation of gains, and a five-star designation from Morningstar. For folks looking to maintain their stock exposure, but cautiously, this is an awfully compelling little fund.

Fund website

Tilson mutual funds website 

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2011.  All rights reserved.  The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication.  For reprint/e-rights contact David@MutualFundObserver.com.